Aktuelle Publikationen

Bei den Wahlen zum ungarischen Parlament 2010 hat das Partei-"Bündnis" FIDESZ/KDNP zum ersten Mal in der post-kommunistischen Geschichte Ungarns die Zweidrittelmehrheit gewonnen. Der massive Rechtsruck wurde durch mehrere Faktoren begünstigt: den Verlust des Bürgervertrauens durch die "Lügenrede" von 2006, die Regierungskorruption und politische Günstlingswirtschaft, die Machenschaften der Gyurcsány-Regierung sowie ihre Unfähigkeit die Wirtschaftskrise zu mildern. Die Zweidrittelmehrheit der neuen Regierung bietet die Möglichkeit zu großen Änderungen – aber auch zum Missbrauch. Angetreten mit dem Ziel die Wirtschaft zu stabilisieren, das Sozial-, Gesundheits- und Bildungswesen umzuformen und die nationale Einheit zu stärken, birgt viele schwierige und zweischneidige Entscheidungen mit kontraproduktiven Wirkungen in sich, so dass es zu einer politischen Destabilisierung kommen könnte.

Much of the current conflict literature attempts to explain the occurrence of violence as the result of determinants exogenous to the conflict process. This paper takes a different approach and analyzes how violence in civil wars spreads in space and time, drawing on earlier work on micro-diffusion of violence in criminology as well as high resolution conflict data. Two general scenarios are distinguished in our analysis: the relocation and the escalation of conflict. Relocation diffusion corresponds to a shift in the location of violence, whereas escalation diffusion refers to the spatial expansion of the conflict site. We argue that unconventional warfare in civil wars without demarcated front lines should primarily lead to the second type of pattern. We describe an extension to a joint count statistic to measure both diffusion types in conflict event data. Monte Carlo simulation allows for the establishment of a baseline for the frequency of contiguous conflict events under the assumption of independence, and thus provides a significance test for the observed patterns. Our results suggest that violence in civil wars exhibits patterns of diffusion, and in particular, that these patterns are primarily of the escalation type, driven by the dynamic expansion of the scope of the conflict.

Why and when do states take the burden upon themselves to send peacekeepers into a civil war, rather than relying on intergovernmental organizations to do so? While there are a few empirical studies on the conditions under which the UN sends peacekeeping missions, no such analyses of state-conducted peacekeeping exist. In this study, a theoretical framework on state-conducted peacekeeping in civil wars is developed and empirically tested. Not surprisingly, when acting outside international organizations, states are able to take their own interests directly into account and select those civil wars to which they send peacekeepers accordingly. States’ interests play a much greater role here than, for example, the interests of the major powers do forUNpeacekeeping. When states send peacekeepers they are more likely to choose former colonies, military allies, trade partners, or countries with which they have ethnic ties. Yet, this does not mean that state-conducted peacekeeping occurs only where states see their own interests. Contrary to conventional wisdom, states also provide peacekeeping to ‘tough’ cases, the most challenging civil wars. These are long, ethnic wars. This tendency for states to provide peacekeeping holds when civil wars produce dire effects on civilians. States are more likely to send peacekeepers into civil wars that kill or displace many people. Finally, states react to opportunities: the more previous mediation attempts, the higher the chances for state-conducted peacekeeping.

Prozesse kollektiver Identität strukturieren nicht nur die Collective Action-Frames der AktivistInnen, sondern auch deren Alltagspraxen. Zumindest in präfigurativen Bewegungen sind beide eng verwoben und eine dauerhafte Diskrepanz zwischen ihnen verhindert die Möglichkeit eine konsistente kollektive Identität zu generieren und vermindert so die Mobilisierungsfähigkeit einer Bewegung. In dem Artikel argumentiert Sebastian Haunss, dass Szenen eine zentrale Rolle dabei spielen Frames und Alltagspraxen zu verbinden. Auf der Grundlage einer Frameanalyse von Bewegungsdiskursen der zweiten deutschen Schwulenbewegung und der Autonomen zeigt er, dass im ersten Fall die Schwulenbewegung vor dem Hintergrund der AIDS-Epidemie immer weniger in der Lage war, die sich ändernden Alltagspraxen schwuler Aktivisten mit der etablierten kollektiven Identität der Bewegung in Einklang zu bringen. Im zweiten Fall gelang es dagegen den Autonomen, ihre Bewegungsidentität den sich ändernden Alltagspraxen anzupassen. Die (Un-)Fähigkeit beide Spären zu integrieren ist – unter anderen – ein Faktor, der das Scheitern bzw. den Erfolg der beiden Bewegungen, einen hohen Mobilisierungsgrad aufrechtzuerhalten, erklären kann.

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The theory of regulatory competition in environmental policy predicts a ‘race to the bottom’ of standards. This article tests the theory using environmental output data for 24 countries from 1970 to 2005. It finds a clear ‘race to the top’ and a search for international harmonization when competition is imminent.

Immer mehr politische Prozesse werden auf Online-Kanälen begleitet. Dies gilt sowohl für klassische politische Akteure als auch für neue basisdemokratische Bewegungen. Ob bei Protesten gegen Stuttgart 21, beim Volksentscheid über den Nichtraucherschutz in Bayern oder bei Massenprotesten gegen politische Regime in der arabischen Welt – Onlinekommunikation hat einen besonderen Status erreicht. Dieses neue Forschungsfeld eröff net neue Perspektiven, denn sobald Menschen über Online-Kanäle kommunizieren, hinterlassen sie Datenspuren, die ihre Handlungen dokumentieren. Wissenschaftlern bieten diese Spuren neue Einblicke in menschliches Verhalten.

Studies of constitutional reforms so far have equated formal ratification with a successful reform. The paper goes beyond this narrow focus by adding substantive success as a second dimension based on two indicators: degree of agenda fulfilment and degree to which the reform contributes to solve the constitutional problem. Analysing territorial reforms in unitary or federal states, we distinguish two types of problems—group and efficiency problems. The comparative analysis of formal and substantive success demonstrates that first, reforms can be at least partly successful in terms of substance, although they may have failed formally; second, fulfilling the reform agenda seems to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for solving the constitutional problem at stake; third, cases with group problems score higher on both indicators, thus being more successful than cases with efficiency problems. Furthermore, the characteristics of the two most successful cases suggest that opportunities for participation, open dialogue and consensus building play an important role in explaining the results.

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This article investigates electoral irregularities in the 1990 to 2005 Bundestag elections of unified Germany. Drawing on the Second Digit Benford Law (2BL) by Mebane (2006), the analysis consists of comparing the observed frequencies of numerals of candidate votes and party votes at the precinct level against the expected frequencies according to Benford’s Law. Four central findings stand out. First, there is no evidence for systematic fraud or mismanagement with regard to candidate votes from districts where fraud would be most instrumental. Second, at the state level (Bundesland), there are 51 violations in 190 tests of the party list votes. Third, East German states are not more prone to violations than Western ones. This finding refutes the notion that the East’s more recent transition to democracy poses problems in electoral management. Fourth, a strong variation in patterns of violation across Bundesländer exists: states with dominant party control are more likely to display irregularities. The article concludes by hypothesizing and exploring the notion that partisan composition of nominees involved in the counting may produce a higher likelihood of violation and be a cause of Länder variation. This may especially be the case when a party dominates in a Bundesland or opponents to the former socialist regime party are involved in the counting.