Aktuelle Publikationen

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dc.contributor.author: Chauvet, Lisa; Collier, Paul

Electronic petitions can serve as an influential mechanism for political participation. We present a study on the dynamics in the German e-petition system which was introduced in late 2008. Drawing on a data set of signatures, we analyze four aspects: (a) the types of petitions found, (b) the temporal dynamics of petitions, (c) the types of users found, and (d) the intersection of different petitions' supporter populations. We present evidence that (a) the system is dominated by a very small number of high-volume petitions and (b) these high-volume petitions have a delayed boosting effect on the base activity in the petition system. We furthermore (c) present a typology of users, showing that although highly active “new lobbyists” and “hit-and-run activists” exist, one- or two-time petitioners have the largest impact. Finally, it is indicated that (d) many of the high-volume petitions share a significant part of their user base, hinting at a complex, topically motivated network of supporters. Through the application of methods from what has been called “Computational Social Sciences,” we illuminate a highly relevant field of political behavior online, while demonstrating the capability of data-driven approaches in such novel domains.

Dieser Beitrag analysiert sowohl die politischen Grundlagen des schwedisch-sozialdemokratischen Modells als auch jüngere Dynamiken im Bereich demokratischer Reformpolitiken. Es kann gezeigt werden, dass sich die Grundkonstanten des schwedisch-sozialdemokratischen Modells grundlegend verändert haben. Erstens büßte die Sozialdemokratie ihre hegemoniale Position ein und zweitens erodierte die korporatistische Reformpolitik. Bedeutsame Veränderungen des schwedischen Wohlfahrtsmodells wurden bereits nach 1990 auch von sozialdemokratisch geführten Regierungen durchgeführt. Die jetzige bürgerliche Koalition führt die Deregulierung und Privatisierung fort und schränkt zudem erfolgreich die Machtbasis der Arbeiterbewegung ein. Das schwedische Modell ist auf dem Weg, seine sozialdemokratische Besonderheit in Europa und weltweit einzubüßen.

Blais (2006) and Blais and Aarts (2006) in their review essays on voter turnout call attention to a striking puzzle about the link between electoral systems and turnout, namely that, ceteris paribus, proportional representation (PR) systems with many parties appear to have higher national-level turnout than single-member district (SMD) plurality systems with few parties, yet turnout does not increase with the (effective) number of parties (ENP) at the national level. To address this puzzle we turn to district-specific within-nation panel data from Switzerland and Spain. Our country-specific findings allow us to explain the national-level puzzle as essentially an ecological artefact, in that the multi-member districts found in proportional systems, on average, do exhibit higher turnout than SMDs, but turnout does not rise with district magnitude, m, once we move beyond the contrast between m = 1 and m > 1. Using a more sophisticated approach to measuring political competition that does not treat all PR systems as generating identical turnout incentives (Grofman and Selb, 2009), we seek to explain this puzzle by showing both empirically and theoretically that (1) proportionality does not necessarily increase with district magnitude, and (2) competition does not necessarily increase with district magnitude.

Decision-making processes in Europe involve complex networks of actors who are trying to influence them at the various levels of the European multi-level governance system. Interest group research often assumes that the ability of an actor to exert influence depends mainly on its financial and personal resourcefulness, on its ability to provide expert knowledge and on its economic and/or political power. Recent conflicts in which ‘weak’ actors were able to persist have challenged this assumption. We claim that a careful analysis of the actor networks is able to complement the traditional actor-resource-centred perspective, and that paying attention to the structure of collective action networks is necessary to fully grasp the dynamics of decision-making processes in Europe in which the power of networks sometimes outweighs the power of resources.

Real-world simple plurality elections rarely bear out the strong Duvergerian prediction that, in equilibrium, only two competitors receive votes. Recent advances in strategic voting theory demonstrate that voter uncertainty about competitors’ true support levels in the constituency may lead to limited strategic voting, and hence incomplete desertion of trailing parties. This is the first attempt to estimate empirically the impact of uncertainty on incentives to vote strategically. Calibrating a model of strategic voting to voting results from simple plurality elections in German constituencies, it is found that strategic voters operate under high levels of uncertainty. These results support the proposition that uncertainty about party support impedes formation of Duvergerian equilibria.

The article deals with the forthcoming challenges to the German system of co-determination (Mitbestimmung ) arising from the Europeanization of industrial relations (IR) in general and the European Company (Societas Europaea — SE) in particular. After some short remarks on co-determination’s national history and present challenges, recent political controversies are discussed. Then the most important European regulations on employee involvement are analysed from a German perspective. The main part of the article presents some first empirical results on the new SE form with particular emphasis on its impact on the existing German system. Finally, some tentative conclusions are made.

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Why does ethnic violence occur in some places but not others? This paper argues that the local ethnic configuration below the national level is an important determinant of how likely conflict is in any particular place. Existing studies of ethnicity and conflict focus on national-level fractionalization or dominance, but much of the politics surrounding ethnic groups’ grievances and disputes takes place at a more local level. We argue that the existence of multiple ethnic groups competing for resources and power at the level of sub-national administrative regions creates a significant constraint on the ability of states to mitigate ethnic groups’ grievances. This in turn increases the likelihood of conflict between ethnic groups and the state. In particular, we argue that diverse administrative regions dominated by one group should be most prone for conflict. Using new data on conflict and ethnic group composition at the region level, we test the theory and find that units with one demographically dominant ethnic group among multiple groups are most prone to conflict.

Electoral rules should affect parliamentary behavior. In particular, deputies elected from single-member districts should be more likely to deviate from the party line than deputies elected under proportional representation. This paper suggests a framework for conceptualizing and modeling the effect of the type of mandate on deputies’ propensity to cast deviating votes in mixed electoral systems. The proposed modeling strategy uses disaggregated voting data and integrates dependencies among observations in a multi-level design. Empirically, the paper analyses voting behavior in the 16th German Bundestag (2005–2009) and shows that the odds of district MPs to deviate are significantly higher despite frequent claims that the two types of MPs behave alike. However, the behavioral differences cannot be attributed to attempts by district MPs to follow their local constituents as competing principals.