Aktuelle Publikationen

Current transition theories attribute the varying economic openness of postcommunist countries to the lack of democracy or the inhibiting veto power of vested interests. In this article, the authors offer micro-foundations for such claims and link the key changes in the foreign economic policy of these states to internal coalition building during the first stages of the political transformation.A simple game-theoretic model demonstrates that the way in which ruling elites responses to the competing demands of domestic stakeholders crucially shaped the chance of foreign economic liberalization years later.This early starter hypothesis is contrasted with contending accounts of economic opening in multivariate tests using the ELITE data set (Economic Liberalization in Transition Economies). The regression models confirm that the scope of the political transformation process has fostered foreign economic openness, while the existence of veto players helps rather than inhibits the process of foreign economic liberalization.

Post-conflict situations face a high risk of reversion to conflict.We investigate the effect of military expenditure by the government during the first decade post-conflict on the risk of reversion. We contrast two theories as to the likely effects. In one, military spending deters conflict by reducing the prospects of rebel success. In the other it acts as a signal to the rebels of government intentions. In the signalling model, low military spending signals that the government intends to adhere to the terms of the peace settlement and so reduces the risk of renewed rebellion.We investigate the effects of post-conflict military spending on the risk of conflict, using our existing models of military expenditure and of conflict risk.We find that, consistent with the signalling model, high military spending post-conflict significantly increases the risk of renewed conflict. This effect of military spending is distinctive to post-conflict period, and becomes progressively more pronounced over the decade.

The Central and East European (CEE) countries that had applied for membership in the European Union were confronted with far-reaching requirements in order to bring domestic policies in line with EU standards. Notwithstanding these rather uniform pressures emerging from conditionality, there is considerable variety in alignment performance across the candidate countries and over time. To account for this, we use time series cross-sectional data on the implementation performance of 13 EU candidate countries between 1999 and 2003. Our results indicate that the bureaucratic strength and effectiveness of a country positively influence its ability to adjust domestic arrangements to EU requirements. By contrast, we find no support for veto-player theories of political constraints on legislative change. We hence conclude that the implementation of the acquis communautaire in candidate countries prior to accession has been a question of bureaucratic problems rather than of political veto-manoeuvres.

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dc.contributor.author: Kellermann, Christian; Petring, Alexander; Stuchlík, Andrej

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Why do election results at national and regional parliamentary elections in Switzerland differ so widely? And why are these differences more pronounced in some constituencies than in others? This study discusses competing theoretical views of the linkage between elections held at multiple federal levels, and empirically tests their predictions using official election statistics and contextual data from Swiss national and cantonal elections between 1999 and 2003. Despite the spatially and temporally limited scope of this analysis, one conclusion suggests itself: current theories of the linkage suffer from their neglect of features of the electoral systems which may vary between different types of elections. Taking these institutional variations into account, we find a strong systematic relationship between election outcomes at different levels. Moreover, the linkage of election outcomes is, to some extent, contingent upon the degree to which regions are integrated into the national political system: while national trends in party support tend to drive election outcomes in nationally well-integrated cantons, election results ostensibly follow regional electoral developments in more peripheral cantons.

Neither in literature nor in practice are there any doubts that the performance of an orchestra depends on the respective conductor. Despite this fact, leadership behaviour in an orchestra was rarely systematically investigated. Against this background we summarize selected findings from empirical research on leadership and cooperation within orchestras. In our investigations, we deal with the conductor's way to lead the musicians. Also, we analyze the cooperation within German orchestras, and take a look at how these aspects influence the artistic quality. Starting from the fact that about half of the polled musicians think about the orchestra's artistic quality as a success variable that needs improvement, we identify ways to enhance the artistic quality. On the one hand we deal with cooperation within the orchestra, and on the other hand we investigate the kind of the conductor's leadership. Cooperation among the musicians (playing together exactly) is a crucial factor for creating high artistic quality. The reason for this lies in the specific quality-related requirements of an orchestra. Furthermore, the conductor's leadership behaviour can improve artistic quality, especially an authoritarian leadership behaviour. This way of leading diminishes the musician's degrees cf freedom indeed. However, they accept it due to the charismatic legitimation of the conductor's authority. This serves as an explanation for the effectiveness of authoritarian charismatic leadership in orchestras. In doing so, the conductor's authority can depend on different power bases. Comparing the functionality of different power base adoptions with linear structural equation modelling shows that artistic quality can be enhanced particularly through the combination of both expertise and identification power. Less important in terms of quality are information power and position power. Completely ineffective for raising artistic quality is power based on immaterial or material reward or punishment. From these results, we derive practical consequences for leadership in orchestras.

Der Aufsatz analysiert die policyanalytische Literatur zum Konzept der Politikbeendigung (Policy Termination). Die seit der Entwicklung des Konzepts vorgenommenen Revisionen werden ebenso behandelt wie die nach wie vor bestehenden Defizite dieser Forschungsrichtung. Angesichts vermehrter Hinweise auf die in jüngster Zeit steigende Anzahl von Beendigungsphänomenen in westlichen Wohlfahrtstaaten und insbesondere in Deutschland werden empirische sowie methodisch-konzeptionelle Perspektiven aufgezeigt, wie das Konzept der Politikbeendigung für die aktuelle Policyforschung gerade in theoriebildender Absicht wieder fruchtbar gemacht werden kann.

The article offers a concept for better understanding the role of the European Commission during the implementation phase of European policies. The aim is to address a deficit within the literature about the European Commission and European public policy-making. While our knowledge about the Commission s ability to set the agenda and to influence decision taking has continuously advanced, we lag behind in understanding the Commission s behaviour in policy implementation. In order to focus the link between the European Commission and national policy implementation, this article proposes a mechanism that explains Commission behaviour throughout policy execution on the basis of resource interdependencies. More precisely, it argues that the Commission has an intrinsic motivation to overcome informational asymmetries during policy execution in order to stabilise its ordinary functions in policy drafting and decision taking. The central theoretical argument is thus based on the vulnerability of the Commission stemming from the fact that it has no formal say in national policy execution. On the other hand, its supranational peers, in particular the Council, Parliament and the Court of Auditors, hold the Commission responsible for implementation deficiencies. In order to diminish that dilemma which occurs especially when European programmes stretch over repetitive policy cycles the Commission needs what is called Implementation Management Capacity (IMC).