Aktuelle Publikationen

Many studies describe how globalisation—the global integration of the economic, political, and cultural domains of society—transforms party competition in Western Europe. At the citizen level, however, our knowledge about globalisation attitudes and their electoral consequences remains limited. Using data from a large-scale panel survey of the German public, we show that, first, citizens hold stable rather than fluid attitudes towards the concept of globalisation. Second, these attitudes are rather closely related to positions on specific economic, cultural, and political issues that social scientists understand as facets of globalisation but unrelated to positions on traditional redistribution issues. Third, attitudes towards globalisation are systematically associated with voting decisions even when controlling for specific issue attitudes. We conclude that individuals hold integrated belief systems concerning globalisation and that globalisation matters as a contentious political symbol. We discuss the implications of these findings for the politics of globalisation in Germany and beyond.

Self-reports of adherence to non-pharmaceutical interventions in surveys may be subject to social desirability bias. Existing questioning techniques to reduce bias are rarely used to monitor adherence. We conducted a list experiment to elicit truthful answers to the question whether respondents met friends or acquaintances and thus disregarded the social distancing norm. Our empirical findings are mixed. Using the list experiment, we estimate the prevalence of non-compliant behavior at 28%, whereas the estimate from a direct question is 22%. However, a more permissively phrased direct question included later in the survey yields an estimate of 47%. All three estimates vary consistently across social groups. Interestingly, only the list experiment reveals somewhat higher non-compliance rates among the highly educated compared to those with lower education, yet the variance of the list estimates is considerably higher. We conclude that the list experiment compared unfavorably to simpler direct measurements in our case.

Because accountability may improve the comparability that is compromised by lenient grading, we compare exit exam outcomes in the same schools before and after a policy change that increased teacher accountability by anchoring grading scales through centralization. In particular, using a large administrative dataset of 364,445 exit exam outcomes for 72,889 students, we find that centralization increased inequality in scoring between the higher and lower performing schools by about 25%. In addition, the reform improved relative scoring outcomes for schools with larger shares of male students and lowered relative scoring outcomes for schools with a higher share of minority students.

What is the effect of foreign aid on the survival of autocratic regimes? Extant work about the effect of foreign aid on the recipient’s political regime has come to contradictory conclusions. Current findings display the full spectrum of possibilities from a democratizing effect to the enhancement of authoritarian survival. While some studies suggest that foreign aid strengthen autocrats and their incentives to cling to power, others have focused on specific periods and donors, thus finding a democratizing effect of foreign aid. In this article, we argue that the effect of foreign aid on autocratic survival does not operate in a direct way, but it is conditional on the levels of political leverage exerted by democratic donors vis-à-vis the autocratic leaders. This leverage, we find, is defined by the capability of democratic donors to back conditionality with effective political pressure. More specifically, we find that given similar levels of aid, autocratic recipients that are highly dependent on the United States—a quintessential democratic donor with extensive political influence—have a shorter survival rate when compared to those with which the United States has weaker ties and thus lower leverage.

This article provides a normative assessment of parliamentary representation in fields of differentiated integration in the European Union. Based on three criteria of legitimate democratic representation, autonomy, accountability and equality, we evaluate four alternative representation models. These models comprise (I) complete representation of all members of the European Parliament (MEPs), (II) insider representation through the creation of new, regime‐specific assemblies, and (III) partial representation without and (IV) with inclusive deliberative stages. We find that the current system of complete representation, while honouring the principle of equality, violates autonomy and accountability in areas of differentiated integration. We therefore advocate a model of partial representation: MEPs elected in opt‐out states should not take part in EP voting but should be invited to participate in the deliberative stages of parliamentary decision‐making. This reconciles the principles of autonomy, accountability and equality, at least as long as there is no truly European electoral system in place.

Since the last review of public opinion on European defense policy and NATO concluded that Europeans wanted both European defense integration and a continuing commitment to NATO, the EU has almost doubled in size and new initiatives have been launched to develop a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). We reexamine these issues and trace public opinion trends in all 28 EU member states from 2000 to 2019. With little variation across countries, general support for CSDP and NATO remains substantial. While Europeans, especially in continental Western Europe, believe that the EU should take a more independent approach from the United States in security and diplomatic affairs, large segments of the publics show no clear opinion on whether European defense should mean a transfer of decision-making power from the state to the EU level and the end of NATO. Cross-country differences are more pronounced when it comes to the creation of an EU army and its deployment.

Why did Argentina risk seizing the Malvinas/Falkland Islands by force in 1982, provoking a war against Great Britain, and what are the larger implications of this case? We revisit this influential episode using counterfactual analysis to interpret newly declassified declarations of high-ranking state officials involved in the decision to occupy the islands. These sources cast doubt on the diversionary-war and miscalculation theses of the Malvinas/Falklands War, among other extant interpretations. Evidence suggests long-term power dynamics and prospect theory better explain Argentine foreign policy behavior leading to the war. Due to aversion to tangible losses, the leadership of waning states like Argentina might favor risky military strategies despite their low expected utility. These biases may provoke a war if decision-making groups are small and isolated from de-biasing influences. Our explanation illustrates the value of prospect theory to understand why certain declining states behave aggressively and more plausibly explains the Malvinas/Falklands War when confronted to set-theoretic counterfactual analysis.

Are levels of criminal violence lower where emigrants collaborate with the state authorities in the funding and provision of public goods and services? In this article, I examine the causal effect on violence levels in the municipalities participating in Mexico's Three‐for‐One (3×1) Programme for Migrants. Using municipal‐level data for the period between 2001 and 2010, the analysis shows that the implementation of this programme led to an increase in violence in the municipalities in question, and that this effect is driven by the ‘war on drugs’ initiated by the Mexican government in 2006. Because cartels splinter when kingpins are captured, they look for sources of revenue other than drug smuggling. The budgetary gains obtained via the 3×1 Programme inadvertently increased the returns of extortion and directed the attention of organized criminals to the participant municipalities. The evidence highlights some of the unintended effects that the leveraging of emigrants' money may have in home countries where governments make the so‐called ‘kingpin strategy’ a centrepiece of their security strategy.