Aktuelle Publikationen

Literature on the compensation hypothesis overwhelmingly concentrates on either the macro or micro level of the relationship between globalization and welfare spending. This paper explicitly addresses this shortcoming by using individual citizens and country-specific characteristics in a hierarchical model framework. We start by examining individual’s context-conditional reactions to actual economic globalization and welfare generosity; after which, we make the effect of actual economic globalization (welfare generosity) conditional on whether the individual is a globalization winner or loser. In contrast to theoretical expectations, our results indicate that actual economic globalization does not affect people’s perception in the manner expected by the compensation hypothesis. However, individuals display more positive attitudes toward globalization if welfare state generosity is proxied using government spending on active labor market programs.

This article focuses on current asylum policies in Germany and analyzes the impact of the federal state structure on the field of asylum. The paper is based on migration statistics and documents by federal institutions and on the most recent secondary literature on asylum in Germany. Starting from the assumption that the role of institutions is a comparatively neglected area of migration research, the paper investigates how the competences of the German federal states, the Länder, differently shape the living conditions, social situations and integration opportunities of refugees. It comes to the conclusion that the influence of the federal state structure on asylum is problematic since it creates unequal living conditions for refugees. However, because of the role of the federal states as advocates for the labor market integration of refugees, federalism overall contributes to encouraging the development of German asylum policies towards an integration regime.

In recent decades, the regulation of pornography has been confronted with challenges emerging from cultural change, economic interests, and technological progress. As a result, the respective regulatory frameworks have changed substantially in many countries. These changes have been accompanied by fierce political struggles and societal value conflicts. However, there are few comparative studies on the reactions of national governments to these problems. In this article, we present new empirical data on the regulation of pornography in 26 countries between 1960 and 2010. To assess regulatory change, we rely on a new measurement approach that considers the extent to which governments intervene into individual freedoms and the degree to which noncompliance with these rules is actually sanctioned. Our analysis reveals a trend toward more permissive styles of pornography regulation. However, this trend is accompanied by growing regulatory specialization and a convergence toward more interventionist regimes for special types of pornography.

Anecdotal evidence from many armed conflicts suggests that religion incites violence. Theoretically speaking, several facets of religion can create motives and opportunities to overcome the collective action problems associated with organized violence. However, empirical research has hitherto found no conclusive answer on the extent to which religion is connected to armed conflict onset. Contributing to the filling of this gap, we use a new database that incorporates important religious factors that previous studies left largely untested. The data set covers 130 developing countries for the period 1990 to 2010. Results from logistic regressions confirm our expectation that certain religious factors fuel armed conflict—in particular, the overlap of religious and other identities, religious groups’ grievances, and religious leaders’ calls for violence. We also find that religious determinants vary in their impact according to whether conflicts are religious or not in origin.

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A large proportion of coup attempts in autocracies occur in the aftermath of elections, yet little systematic research exists on the topic. Drawing on recent literature on elections in autocracies, we present an argument to explain postelection coups. While we recognize that electoral institutions have the potential to stabilize autocracies, we illustrate that the election event can spark instability when incumbents reveal electoral weakness. Electoral outcomes—in the form of vote shares and opposition reactions—are signals containing information about the strength of the opposition, and indirectly about the likelihood of a successful full-scale revolution that would compromise the privileged positions of regime elites. In these situations, coups are likely to be initiated to avoid a revolution, either by serving as concessions to the opposition or by facilitating increased repression. We perform a large-N study that supports our argument, significantly nuancing the claim that elections stabilize autocracies.

During the European debt crisis, numerous states launched austerity programmes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) evaluates and forecasts the likelihood of member states’ success in implementing these programmes. Although IMF evaluations influence country risk perceptions on capital markets, little is known about their reasoning. This article uses fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to explore on what grounds the IMF evaluated the success prospects of austerity programmes during the European debt crisis. Results reveal that IMF evaluations are heavily influenced by the programme's implementation credibility. They require a tractable policy problem, a country's institutional capacity to structure implementation, and favour expenditure reduction over revenue measures. By acting as a strict guide on the road to fiscal adjustment, the IMF indirectly influences member states’ scope of policy making through its surveillance activities. Extensive austerity programmes that need to be implemented swiftly are evaluated negatively if the country is not involved in an IMF programme.

Die Weiterverbreitung des Modells der dualen Ausbildung gilt vielen als probates Mittel zur Bekämpfung der Jugendarbeitslosigkeit in Europa. Der Artikel untersucht, inwiefern Versuche des Aufbaus dualer Ausbildungsstrukturen auch in Ländern erfolgreich sein können, die über keine sozialpartnerschaftliche Tradition in der Berufsbildungspolitik verfügen. Wir zeigen anhand von Fallstudien zur Berufsbildungspolitik in England und Irland, dass der Aufbau dualer Berufsbildungsstrukturen durchaus möglich ist. Jedoch sind nationale politische Interessen, insbesondere von Regierungsparteien, relevant für deren Entstehung. Die konservativen Thatcher-Regierungen haben im Laufe der 1980er Jahre den Einfluss der Gewerkschaften auf die Berufsbildung in England nachhaltig geschwächt. Infolgedessen ist der Aufbau einer dualen Berufsbildung regelmäßig gescheitert. Hingegen zeigt der irische Fall, dass die Etablierung solcher Strukturen in liberalen Marktwirtschaften möglich ist. Hier verfolgten Koalitionsregierungen einen sozialpartnerschaftlichen Ansatz und legten somit die Grundlagen für die Kooperation zwischen Gewerkschaften und Arbeitgebern in der dualen Ausbildung.

Political parties competing in elections for the power to set public policy face the problem of making credible their policy promises to voters. I argue that this commitment problem crucially shapes party competition over redistribution. The model I develop shows that under majoritarian electoral rules, parties' efforts to achieve endogenous commitment to policies preferred by the middle class lead to different behavior and outcomes than suggested by existing theories, which either assume commitment or rule out endogenous commitment. Thus, left parties can have incentives to respond to rising income inequality by moving to the right in majoritarian systems but not under proportional representation. The model also generates new insights about the anti-left electoral bias often attributed to majoritarian electoral rules, and the strategic use of parliamentary candidates as a commitment device. I find evidence for key implications of this logic using panel data on party positions in 16 parliamentary democracies.