EUSANCT Dataset[1]

– Codebook: Case-level Dataset –

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Introduction

The EUSANCT Dataset covers the period from 1989 to 2015 and consists of a case-level and a dyadic version. The first database contains 326 sanction threats and imposed sanctions by the European Union, the United Nations, the United States or a coalition of these senders.

The EUSANCT Dataset amends, merges and updates some of the most widely used sanction data resources that have been developed in recent years: the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) dataset (Morgan et al., 2009; 2014), the dataset by Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (HSE) (Hufbauer et al., 1990; 2009), and the GIGA Sanctions Dataset (Portela and von Soest, 2012).[2]

We have used the TIES codebook by Morgan et al. (2009; 2014) as the baseline for the codebook of our dataset, but introduced new categories and altered some of the extant variable descriptions. In this codebook, we present these changes in detail. We code, *inter alia*, information on sanction threats and imposed sanctions for each individual sender which is a distinct feature of EUSANCT – including start and end dates, the identities of those who threatened and imposed sanctions, the (threatened) sanction types as well as the outcome of the respective case. Note that EUSANCT also includes and adopts variables used in other datasets, most notably the HSE effectiveness measure.

Comparison TIES vs. EUSANCT

We borrow large parts of our codebook from the TIES codebook (Morgan et al., 2009; 2014). Sometimes we stick exactly to their coding rules, other times we only introduce slight in the wording. Since the latter procedure makes a proper citation with quotation marks and references to the original document impractical and the sheer number of direct quotes disturbs the reading flow, we decided in consultation with the authors from TIES, to use different font colors in our codebook:

Text passages written in black indicate coding rules introduced by EUSANCT.

Text passages written in light blue indicate very close quotes with another wording.

Text passages written in dark blue indicate direct quotes from the TIES codebook.

Note: The reader will find the singular use of the words 'sanction', 'target', and 'sender' throughout the document for consistency. In a given case, there may be more than one sender, single targets, and single sanction cases which may include more than one sanction type.

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[2] Hufbauer GC, Schott JJ and Elliott KA (1990) *Economic sanctions reconsidered. History and current policy*. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

Hufbauer GC, Schott JJ, Elliott KA, et al. (2009) *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition*. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Morgan TC, Bapat N and Kobayashi Y (2014) Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31(5): 541–558.

Morgan TC, Bapat N and Krustev V (2009) The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971–2000. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26(1): 92–110.

Portela C and von Soest C (2012) *GIGA Sanctions Dataset Codebook: Version 18 June 2012*. Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.

Codebook EUSANCT Case-level Dataset

1.   Case Identification Number: Each case is assigned a unique case identification number. It consists of startyear+startmonth+startday+a number (1,2,3…), which distinguishes between sanction cases which started on the same day. Example: A sanction episode started on the 5th of June 2008 is coded 2008060501, another sanction simultaneously imposed is coded 2008060502.

2.   Target State: The COW country code for the target government and the respective country name. The sanction should target the (de facto) government of the country, thus the actors currently holding power over (the majority) of a country's territory. A list of the country codes is available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/cow-country-codes.

3.   EU: A binary variable which indicates the involvement of the European Union and/or the European Community prior to 1993. This field is accompanied by a dichotomous variable which indicates if the EU is the only sender in the respective case.

4.   US: A binary variable which indicates the involvement of the United States. This field is accompanied by a dichotomous variable which indicates if the US are the only sender in the respective case.

5.   UN: A binary variable which indicates the involvement of the United Nations. This field is accompanied by a dichotomous variable which indicates if the UN are the only sender in the respective case.

6.   Combination: This binary variable is coded as 1 if a combination of the three main senders are involved in the sanction case. If the case is only related to one of the senders, the variable is coded as 0.

7.   Sender Combination: This field displays the participating combination of the three main sanction senders which we consider: the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations.

8.   EU as Primary Sender: This binary variable is coded as 1 if the EU was the main driving force behind the sanction. Otherwise, it is coded as 0.

9.   Start: The next six fields identify the start year and exact date of the case for all three main sanction senders. A sanction case typically begins when a threat is made by the sender or the sender imposes a sanction against the target. If a sender is not involved in the case, the variable is coded as missing.

10.   End: The next six fields identify the year and exact date when the sanction case is considered to end. The sanction case is considered to end if any of the following conditions are met:
   (a) The target state acquiesces to the demands of the sender.
   (b) The target state changes. If at any time, the threat or the imposition of the sanction is no longer directed at the original target state, then the case is considered concluded.
   (c) The issue directed at the target state alters. If the sender threatens a new sanction against the target, but is referring to a new, separate issue, then a new case is considered to begin.
   (d) A sender lifts its sanctions without reaching a policy change of the target. In the case of the EU, this also includes sanction episodes which are not prolonged after the expiration date stated in the resolution passes.
   (e) A threat case is considered to be end if the sender declares that the threat is no longer valid, the target acquiesces to the demands of the sender of the threat is not repeated for more than a year.

11.   Sender Countries: The next fields represent the Correlates of War (COW) country code for up to four additional states which either initiate threats or impose the sanction against a target state. A list of the country codes is available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/cow-country-codes.

12.   Institutions: The next fields contain the Correlates of War (COW) organizational code for up to two additional international organizations which threaten or impose the sanction. The COW International Governmental Organizations Data Set can be found at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/IGOs. Additionally, each of these fields is accompanied by a dichotomous variable which indicates whether the target is part of the respective institution. If the target is part of the institution that issues a threat or imposes the sanction against it, this variable is coded as 1. Otherwise, it is coded as 0. If the respective field for sender institution is blank, it is coded as missing. To determine if the sanction was applied as part of a multilateral effort, some evidence must exist that a motion for the application of the sanction is considered through an international institution. The motion need not have been passed, but at least one member of the institution must threaten or propose that the body as a collective adopt the sanction against the target. The threat must be specifically mentioned to qualify, and threats from the leadership of an international institution qualify as threats from the institution. Note that formal alliances are also considered international institutions.

13.   Other Institution: This field identifies by name any other institution that was involved in the sanction case.

14.   Multilateral Sanction: This categorical variable identifies:
1. Unilateral Sanction: Sanction is imposed by a single state.
2. Multilateral Sanction: Sanction is imposed by a group of states.
3. Universal Sanction: Sanction is imposed by an encompassing majority of states, most likely in the UN.

15.   Issue: These variables are intended to capture as best as possible the issue(s) involved in the threat/imposition of the sanction. The issue variable borrows heavily from Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot. The issue categories are not mutually exclusive. The following three fields list up to three separate issues that are involved in the sanction case. If there are more than three issues, the field labelled "other issue" lists the additional issues in dispute. The issue categories are as follows:

> **1. Contain Political Influence:** The sanction is threatened/imposed in an effort to prevent the target from exercising non-military influence over a third state, a set of states, or an international institution.
> **2. Contain Military Behaviour:** The sanction is threatened alone or in conjunction with other measures for the purposes of preventing military actions by the target state or in response to target military behaviour. Military behaviour does not only include the official military, but also other parts of the security apparatus like militias, police forces, mercenaries etc. Repressive actions against the civilian population of the target state are not included in this category.
> **3. Leadership Change:** The sanction is threatened/imposed alone or with other measures for the purposes of fostering a change of leadership in the target country.
> **4. Release Citizens, Property, or Material**: The sanction is threatened/imposed in response to the seizure of citizens, property, or material by the target state. The seizure need not involve the citizens, property, or material of the sender, but the sender must declare that the sanctions are imposed as a result of the target's seizure.
> **5. Solve Territorial Dispute:** The sanction is threatened/imposed in an effort to resolve conflicts stemming from territorial disputes between the sanctioning state and the target state, or between the target state and a third party. If the sanction is used in an effort to terminate a territorial dispute, then the issue is coded as 5.
> **6. Deny Strategic Materials:** The goal of the sanctioning state in threatening/imposing the sanction is to deny the target access to all or a particular set of strategic materials. For an incident to qualify under this category, the goal of the sender must be to prevent the target from enhancing its political or military capabilities through the acquisition of a certain good. Examples of strategic materials include, but are not limited to, uranium, advanced weaponry, rocket technology, or supercomputers.
> **7. Retaliate for Alliance or Alignment Choice:** The sanction is threatened in response to the possibility or the actual joining of an alliance, or alignment between the target state and a third party.

8. Improve Human Rights: The sanction is threatened in order to induce the target state to end repressive laws, policies, or actions. The sanction may also be taken in an effort to compel the target state to respect individual rights.

9. End Weapons/Materials Proliferation: The sanction is threatened/imposed in an effort to prevent the target state from supplying weapons or materials to a third party client.

10. Terminate Support of Non-State Actors: The sanction is threatened/imposed in an effort to compel the target state to end its support for a non-state actor. Examples may include ending support for a transnational terrorist organization or ending support for a faction in a civil war.

11. Deter or Punish Drug Trafficking Practices and Corruption: The sanction is threatened/imposed in an effort to compel the target to adopt alternative drug policies, stricter drug policies, stricter drug enforcement of the drug trade, or as a punishment for failing to adopt acceptable drug policies or practices. Alternatively, the sanction is imposed in an effort to compel the target to fight corruption.

12. Violation of Constitutional Order: The sanction is imposed as a reaction to illegal seizures of state power, especially (military) coups. The sanction aims at the restoration of the constitutional rule.

13. Fraud Elections: The sanction is imposed in an attempt to enable free and democratic elections in the target state. It is targeted against any actor disturbing a fair electoral process, including the use of electoral violence, intimidation of voters, electoral fraud, etc.

14. Other

16. **Other Issue:** This field presents an explanation for the issue if it is coded as "Other". This field also identifies any additional issues that might be involved in this sanction dispute using the numerical codes for the issue variables.

The following set of variables is intended to capture sanction threats by the sender against the target state prior to the actual imposition of sanctions. The four variables are coded three times – once for each of the three main senders: the European Union, the United States, and the United Nations. If a sender did not issue a threat in the respective case, the variables should be coded as missing. A threat ends after one year if no further threats were issued and no sanction was imposed.

17. **Threat:** This variable identifies whether or not a threat was issued by the respective sender in this sanction case. The variable is coded as 1 if a threat was made and 0 if no threat was identified.

18. **Threat Identity:** The following field identifies who threatened to impose the sanction. The variable presents a list of choices. Like the sanction type variable, the threat identity categories are not mutually exclusive. The coder should then type the identity of the person(s) issuing the initial threat into the bottom field. In some episodes, the threat identity meets several of the categories. If this is the case, each category in which a threat was issued should be identified. If the threat identity repeats its threats at numerous points in the case, the coder need not code this threat identity multiple times. The identities include:

For the European Union:
The variable identifies by name one or more of the following identities:
   a. **European Community** (if the threat was made before 1993)
   b. **European Commission**
   c. **European Parliament**
   d. **Council of the European Union**
   e. **Presidency of the Council of the European Union**
   f. **High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**
   g. **ACP Consultations** (or Lomé IV if the threat was made prior to the Cotonou agreement)
   h. **Ambassadors of the European Union**
   i. **Council of Europe**

For the United States:
The variable identifies by name one or more of the following identities:

1. Legislature: The threat is considered to emanate from a legislature if a legislative body considers some resolution, in committee or on the floor, calling for the imposition of a sanction against the target state. The resolution must be formal and debated/considered by at least some part of the voting body.
2. Executive Staff Member: This variable should be coded if a member of the state executive's staff makes a threat of a possible economic sanction. The staff member must be a current member of the executive's staff at the time of the threat being made.
3. Executive: This variable should be coded as 3 if the executive personally makes a threat.
4. State in general: If the information available indicates that a sanction is threatened, but gives no further information, then the variable should be coded as 4. For example, if an article states that United States threatens to impose a sanction on Cuba but gives no further information, then the variable should be coded as 4.

For the United Nations:
The variable identifies by name one or more of the following identities:
    a.   **United Nations Security Council**
    b.   **President of the United Nations Security Council**
    c.   **General Assembly of the United Nations**
    d.   **Secretary-General of the United Nations**
    e.   **Special Envoy of the Secretary-General**
    f.   **United Nations Panel of Experts**
    g.   **International Narcotics Control Board**
    h.   **International Contact Group**
    i.   **Individual members**

19.   Threatened Sanction Type: This variable presents several categories of sanction types threatened by the sender in string format. Using the definitions below, we identified the types of sanctions that best fit the threat issued in the case. Note that in some cases, there are several types of sanctions threatened.

1. Total Economic Embargo: The sender stops the flow of all economic exchange to and from the target state.
2. Partial Economic Embargo: The sender stops the flow of certain commodities or services to and from the target state. For example, a sender may ban all exchanges in military goods to and from a target. For a case to qualify as a partial embargo, some exchange must still be allowed while a sector's trade must be frozen.
3. Import Restriction: The sender refuses to allow or places a restriction on a certain good or set of goods to be imported from the target state. Import restrictions differ from partial embargoes in that import restrictions only restrict the flow of goods to the sender. While the sender does not restrict the flow of goods to the target, the sender may prevent target commodities from being traded in the market of the sender or impose tariffs or duties on target commodities.
4. Export Restriction: The sender refuses to allow certain goods or services to be exported to the target state. Export restrictions differ from partial embargoes in that export restrictions only restrict the flow of goods to the target from the sender. Although the sender places no restriction on goods from the target for import, the sender does not allow a certain good or set of goods to flow out of the sender's firms to the target. An example of such a restriction is an export control on dual use technology.
5. Blockade: The sender threatens to prevent all states from engaging in economic transactions with the target state. Such a threat may be enforced physically by the military of the sender. An alternative is for the sender to threaten any state that engages in transactions with the target with a similar economic sanction.

6. Major Financial Sanction: A major financial sanction includes partial or complete asset freezes of the target state's assets under the jurisdiction of the sender, investment bans, bans on financial transactions, decisions to vote against the granting of loans by international financial institutions and bilateral donors (EU, US), and bans on export credits.

7. Targeted Financial Sanction: A targeted financial sanction includes asset freezes and bans on financial transactions for explicitly specified individuals.

8. Termination of Foreign Aid: The sender threatens to reduce or end foreign aid or loans if the target state does not comply with the sender's demands.

9. Travel Ban: The sender threatens to cease allowing an individual, group, or citizenry of the target country to enter the territory of the sender.

10. Suspension of Economic Agreement and Exclusion from Regional or International Organizations: The sender threatens to partially or completely cancel or void previous economic arrangements or contracts between the sender and the target state. The target can also be excluded from regional or international organizations.

11. Diplomatic Sanction: Including only major diplomatic sanctions, like expulsion of an ambassador, recall of an ambassador, temporary closing of an embassy, etc.; but no minor diplomatic incidences.

12. Arms Embargo: The sender threatens to partially or fully restrict the flow of weapons and/or material for military purposes into a country.

13. Unspecific: Sender threatens to impose a sanction on the target state, but does not specifically mention what type of sanction the target state will face.

20. Threatened Sanction Type, Other: This variable identifies sanction types threatened by the sender that do not fit the categorical definitions in the preceding variable.

The following set of variables is intended to capture the nature of the sanction imposed by the sender against the target state. In some cases, the dispute is settled in the threat stage. If this is the case, the sanction is not imposed. If no sanction is implemented, the coder should answer each of the following fields as missing, or no sanction imposed. If the sanction is imposed by the sender, the coder should answer each of the questions in the following section. The ten variables are coded three times – once for each of the three main senders: the European Union, the United States, and the United Nations.

21. Imposition: This variable identifies whether or not the respective sender imposed a sanction in this case. The variable is coded as 1 if the sanction was imposed and 0 if the sanction was not imposed.

22. Imposition Start Date: The next two fields identify the year and exact date when the respective sender imposed the first sanction on the target.

23. Identity of State Imposing the Sanction: This variable identifies the sending actor(s) that is responsible for the imposition of the sanction. The variable presents a list of choices. If the choices in the list do not match the person supervising the imposition of the sanction, the variable should be coded as other. Coders should indicate as best as possible the primary part of government that is responsible for implementation. The identities include:

For the European Union:
The variable identifies by name one or more of the following identities:
   a. **European Community** (if the threat was made before 1993)
   b. **Common Foreign and Security Policy**
   c. **Council of the European Union**
   d. **European Commission**
   e. **European Parliament**
   f. **ACP–EU development cooperation**
   g. **EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences**
   h. **Group of individual member states due to opt-outs**

For the United States:
The variable identifies by name one or more of the following identities:
    a. **Government**
    b. **Congress**
    c. **Senate**

For the United Nations:
The variable identifies by name one or more of the following identities:
    a. **United Nations Security Council**
    b. **General Assembly of the United Nations**
    c. **United Nations Secretariat**

24.   **Imposed Sanction Type:** This variable is a string that identifies several categories of sanction types. Using the definitions provided, choose the types of sanctions that best fit the incident in the case. If the sanction imposed by the sender does not match any of the categories, the category "other" is chosen and further defined in the next field.

1. Total Economic Embargo: The sender stops the flow of all economic exchange to and from the target state.

2. Partial Economic Embargo: The sender stops the flow of certain commodities or services to and from the target state. For example, a sender may ban all exchanges in military goods to and from a target. For a case to qualify as a partial embargo, some exchange must still be allowed while a sector's trade must be frozen.

3. Import Restriction: The sender refuses to allow or places a restriction on a certain good or set of goods to be imported from the target state. Import restrictions differ from partial embargoes in that import restrictions only restrict the flow of goods to the sender. While the sender does not restrict the flow of goods to the target, the sender may prevent target commodities from being traded in the market of the sender or impose tariffs or duties on target commodities.

4. Export Restriction: The sender refuses to allow certain goods or services to be exported to the target state. Export restrictions differ from partial embargoes in that export restrictions only restrict the flow of goods to the target from the sender. Although the sender places no restriction on goods from the target for import, the sender does not allow a certain good or set of goods to flow out of the sender's firms to the target. An example of such a restriction is an export control on dual use technology.

5. Blockade: The sender attempts to physically prevent all states from engaging in economic transactions with the target state. Such actions may be enforced physically by the sender military. An alternative is for the sender to threaten any state that engages in transactions with the target with a similar economic sanction.

6. Major Financial Sanction: A major financial sanction includes partial or complete asset freezes of the target state's assets under the jurisdiction of the sender, investment bans, bans on financial transactions, decisions to vote against the granting of loans by international financial institutions and bilateral donors (EU, US), and bans on export credits.

7. Targeted Financial Sanction: A targeted financial sanction includes asset freezes and bans on financial transactions for explicitly specified individuals.

7b. Targeted Financial Sanction not only against individuals but against whole entities or companies.

8. Termination of Foreign Aid: The sender reduces or ends foreign aid or loans if the target state does not comply with the demands of the sender.

9. Travel Ban: The sender ceases allowing an individual, group, or citizenry of the target country to enter the territory of the sender.

10. Suspension of Economic Agreement and Exclusion from Regional or International Organizations: The sender partially or completely cancels or voids previous economic arrangements or contracts between the sender and the target state. The target can also be excluded from regional or international organizations.

11. Diplomatic Sanction: Including only major diplomatic sanctions, like expulsion of an ambassador, recall of an ambassador, temporary closing of an embassy, etc.; but no minor diplomatic incidences. Diplomatic sanctions are only included if they complement other economic sanctions.

12. Arms Embargo: The sender partially or fully restricts the flow of weapons and/or material for military purposes into a country.

13. Other.

25.   Imposed Sanction Type, Other: This field indicates that a description of the type of sanction imposed if the Sanction Type variable is coded as "Other".

26.   Imposed Sanction's Economic Costs: This ordinal variable is a proxy for the costs to the sanctions for sanctions imposition ex post. The coding of this variable is based on the imposed sanction type. If several types of sanctions are in place, the coder should code here the impact of the most severe measures.

1. **Visa bans**
2. **Aid sanction**
3. **Arms embargo**
4. **Targeted financial sanction**
5. **Trade sanction**
6. **Economic embargo**

27.   Imposed Sanction's Target Costs: This ordinal variable is a proxy for the costs of sanctions on the target. This variable is intended to measure the impact of sanctions imposition ex post. The coding of this variable is based on the imposed sanction type. If several types of sanctions are in place, the coder should code here the impact of the most severe measures.

1. **Visa bans**
2. **Targeted financial sanction**
3. **Arms embargo**
4. **Aid sanction**
5. **Trade sanction**
6. **Economic embargo**

28.   Imposed Sanction's Intensity:

This variables is the product of the two previous variables: the imposed sanction's economic costs and target costs.

29.   Gradualism:

1. All restrictive measures of an episode are **imposed and lifted at one point of time.**
2. Sanctions are **gradually tightened** during the course of the sanction episode.
3. Sanctions are **gradually relaxed** after the target (partially) acquiesces.
4. Sanctions are **gradually tightened and relaxed** during the course of the sanction episode.

The following set of variables is intended to capture the outcome of the sanction.

30.   Final Outcome: This variable is designed to capture the nature of the termination of the sanction incident. The coder should choose from among the categories listed. If the outcome does not match the categories listed, the coder should code the variable as "Other" and fill in the outcome in the blank field at the bottom. The categories are:

1. Partial Acquiescence by Target to Threat: The target state agrees to some of the demands of the sender and adjusts only these behaviours accordingly while continuing the engage in some of the offensive behaviour prior to imposition of the sanction.

2. Complete Acquiescence by Target to Threat: The target state agrees to all of the demands of the sender and adjusts its behaviour accordingly prior to the imposition of the sanction.

3. Capitulation by the Sender in Threat Stage: Although the sender threatens a sanction, the sender refuses to impose a sanction despite the refusal of the target to alter its behaviour.

4. Stalemate in the Threat Stage: Although the issue remains unresolved following the threats of the sender, the target does not alter its behaviour and the sender does not impose a sanction.

5. Negotiated Settlement: The target state agrees to alter some of its behaviour in exchange for actions taken by the sender prior to the imposition of a sanction. The sender must perform some action in exchange for the target state's compliance for this variable to be coded as 5.

6. Partial Acquiescence by the Target State Following Sanction Imposition: The target state agrees to some of the demands of the sender and adjusts only these behaviours accordingly while continuing the engage in some of the offensive behaviour after a sanction is imposed.

7. Total Acquiescence by Target State Following Sanction Imposition: The target state agrees to all of the demands of the sender and adjusts its behaviour accordingly after the sanction is imposed.

8. Capitulation by the Sender after Imposition: The sender state removes the sanction despite the refusal of the target to alter its behaviour.

9. Stalemate after Sanction Imposition: A sanction is imposed by the sender, but the target does not alter its behaviour.

10. Negotiated Settlement Following Sanction Imposition: The target state agrees to alter some of its behaviour in exchange for actions taken by the sender following the imposition of the sanction. The sender must perform some action in exchange for the target state's compliance for this variable to be coded as 10.

11. Sanction No Longer Applicable: Circumstances have changed and the initial reasons for a sanction no longer exist. Example: State collapses, death of sanctioned persons, etc.

31. **Threat Success:** A binary variable which indicates whether the sanction case ended successfully at the threat stage. The variable is based on the final outcome variable and becomes one when the outcome variable indicates partial or complete acquiescence by the target in the threat stage and prior to the imposition of a sanction. If there is no threat by any sender, the variable is coded as missing. Another binary variable which indicates whether any of the three main senders (EU, US and UN) issued a sanction threat precedes the success variable.

32. **Sanction Success:** A binary variable which indicates whether a sanction case linked to the ended successfully at the imposition stage. The variable is based on the final outcome variable and becomes one when the outcome variable indicates partial or complete acquiescence by the target at the imposition stage or a negotiated settlement after the imposition of a sanction. If no sanction is imposed, the variable is coded as missing. Another binary variable which indicates whether any of the three main senders (EU, US and UN) imposed a sanction precedes the success variable.

33. **Success:** The variable indicates whether the case has been successful in either the threat or the imposition stage. If the case ended successfully in either stage, the variable is coded as 1. If the case failed in both stages (or in one stage and missing in the other), the variable is coded as 0.

The following three variables are intended to capture the outcome of the sanction by using the outcome measure introduced by Hufbauer et al. (2009: 49-50):[3]

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[3] Hufbauer GC, Schott JJ, Elliott KA, et al. (2009) *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition.* Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.

34. **"Policy Result:"** The variable indicates up to which degree the goals stated by the sender are realized.

   1. **"Failed Outcome:"** The goals of the sender were not realized.
   2. **"Unclear but Possibly Positive Outcome:"** The goals of the sender were potentially realized.
   3. **"Positive Outcome:"** The goals of the sender were partly realized.
   4. **"Successful Outcome:"** The goals of the sender were largely or entirely realized.

35. **"Sanction Contribution:"** This variable assesses the sanction's contribution to the achievement of the goals of the sender.

   1. **"Negative Contribution"**
   2. **"Little or No Contribution"**
   3. **"Substantial Contribution"**
   4. **"Decisive Contribution"**

36. **HSE "Success Score:"** Multiply the scores for Policy Result and Sanction Contribution. A score of 9 or higher implies that the sanction made a substantial contribution to the goals of the sender.

The final set of variables provides an initial data source and additional information on the case.

37. **Data Source:** This variable indicates the source from which information on the case is taken: either TIES, GIGA, HSE – or EUSANCT for cases not included in any existing dataset.

38. **Link:** A hyperlink to an online resource which provides first information on the respective sanction case.

39. **Comments:** Additional comments related to the sanction case.