EUSANCT Dataset[1]

– Codebook: Dyadic Dataset –

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Version 2.0 – March 2020

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[1] Please cite as:
Weber PM and Schneider G (2020) *Post-Cold War Sanctioning by the EU, the US, and the UN: Introducing the EUSANCT Dataset.*
University of Konstanz: Unpublished Working Paper.

Introduction

The EUSANCT Dataset covers the period from 1989 to 2015 and consists of a case-level and a dyadic version. The first database contains 326 sanction threats and imposed sanctions by the European Union, the United Nations, the United States or a coalition of these senders.

The EUSANCT Dataset amends, merges and updates some of the most widely used sanction data resources that have been developed in recent years: the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) dataset (Morgan et al., 2009; 2014), the dataset by Hufbauer, Schott and Elliot (HSE) (Hufbauer et al., 1990; 2009), and the GIGA Sanctions Dataset (Portela and von Soest, 2012).[2]

The individual sanction episodes are the unit of observation in the case-level dataset which contains our 325 sanction cases. The dyadic version of the EUSANCT Dataset covers 193 members of the United Nations (some of them are not included for all years as they have joined the United Nations Organization later than 1989) as well as Taiwan for the entire period and former UN members during the period of their membership (West Germany, German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Yemen Arab Republic, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen). In sum, there are thus 199 countries for the period from 1989-2015, resulting in 5.077 country-years.

We further added several political and economic variables to the country-year dataset. Finally, we merged the country-year and the case-level dataset. We have therefore extended the case-level dataset such that there is one observation for each sanction case in every year from the start until the year in which the case is considered to end. We created two additional dummy variables indicating whether a threat or a sanction occurred in a given year. The sanction cases thus have a target-year structure which can be merged with our country-year dataset with all control variables. We conducted this step for all three senders – the EU, the US and the UN – individually. Moreover, we copied the country-year dataset three times – such that we could merge all EU, US and UN sanctions in one sheet to have one panel dataset for each sender. Due to overlapping sanction episodes, the observations of the extended case-level dataset do in some cases not uniquely identify observations in the country-year dataset. We have thus dropped target-year duplicates by choosing and keeping the more severe case. A threat is therefore ruled out through imposed sanctions – and multiple senders and stronger measures beat sanctions by a single sender and weaker measures. In case one sanction is related to a domestic, democracy-related issue and a simultaneous sanction is related to issues of international security or vice versa, we indicated this with an additional binary variable. In order to create the dyadic dataset, we have created a sender variable which indicates the respective panel. We then pasted all three panels in one sheet to have a sender-target-year structure with 15.231 dyads.

[2] Hufbauer GC, Schott JJ and Elliott KA (1990) *Economic sanctions reconsidered. History and current policy*. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

Hufbauer GC, Schott JJ, Elliott KA, et al. (2009) *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition*. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Morgan TC, Bapat N and Kobayashi Y (2014) Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31(5): 541–558.

Morgan TC, Bapat N and Krustev V (2009) The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971–2000. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26(1): 92–110.

Portela C and von Soest C (2012) *GIGA Sanctions Dataset Codebook: Version 18 June 2012*. Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.

Codebook EUSANCT Dyadic Dataset

Contents

Indicator Variables

1. sender:
European Union (EU), United States (US), or United Nations(UN)

2. ccode:
Numeric country code based on the ISO-3166-1 standard. All the numeric country codes are unique and this is thus the variable best suitable to use when merging files (in combination with year for time-series data).
Source: The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan17.

3. cname:
The name of the country.
Source: The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan17.

4. year:
Year.
Source: The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan17.

5. cname_year:
Country name and year.
Source: The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan17.

6. ccodecow:
The COW country code for the target government. A list of the country codes is available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/cow-country-codes.

A. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project

Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to conceptualizing and measuring democracy. It is a collaboration among more than 50 scholars worldwide which is co-hosted by the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden; and the Kellogg Institute at the University of Notre Dame, USA.

7. v2x_polyarchy: Electoral democracy index

To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?
The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association (thick) (v2x_frassoc_thick), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_thick), elected officials (v2x_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x_suffr) and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices.
Source: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, v7.

8. v2xme_alt_info_index

To what extent is the media (a) un-biased in their coverage (or lack of coverage) of the opposition, (b) allowed to be critical of the regime, and (c) representative of a wide array of political perspectives?
The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for media bias (v2mebias), print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit), and print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange).
Source: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, v7.

9. v2xel_clean_elections_index

To what extent are elections free and fair? Free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence.
The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for EMB autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB capacity (v2elembcap), election voter registry (v2elrgstry), election vote buying (v2elvotbuy), election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg), election government intimidation (v2elintim), election other electoral violence (v2elpeace), and election free and fair (v2elfrfair). Since the bulk of these indicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then been repeated within election regime periods (as defined by v2x_elecreg)
Source: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, v7.

10. v2xcs_civil_society_index

How robust is civil society? The sphere of civil society lies in the public space between the private sphere and the state. Here, citizens organize in groups to pursue their collective interests and ideals. We call these groups civil society organizations (CSOs). CSOs include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor unions, spiritual organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental organizations. The core civil society index (CCSI) is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.
The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs), CSO repression (v2csreprss) and CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt).
Source: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, v7.

11. v2x_civil_liberties_index

To what extent is civil liberty respected? Civil liberty is understood as liberal freedom, where freedom is a property of individuals. Civil liberty is constituted by the absence of physical violence committed by government agents and the absence of constraints of private liberties and political liberties by the government.
The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model.
Source: Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, v7.

B. The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset

The CIRI Human Rights Dataset (version 2014.04.14) contains standards-based quantitative information on government respect for 15 internationally recognized human rights for 202 countries, annually from 1981-2011. It is designed for use by scholars and students who seek to test theories about the causes and consequences of human rights violations, as well as policy makers and analysts who seek to estimate the human rights effects of a wide variety of institutional changes and public policies including democratization, economic aid, military aid, structural adjustment, and humanitarian intervention.
Note: The three different missing codes -66 (country is occupied by foreign powers), -77 (complete collapse of central authority), -999 (missing) have all been coded as missing.

12. ciri_empinx_new Empowerment Rights Index (New):

This is an additive index constructed from the Foreign Movement, Domestic Movement, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Assembly and Association, Workers' Rights, Electoral Self-Determination, and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these seven rights) to 14 (full government respect for these seven rights).
Source: The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan17.

13. ciri_empinx_old Empowerment Rights Index (Old):

This is an additive index constructed from the Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Speech, Workers' Rights, Political Participation, and Freedom of Religion indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these five rights) to 10 (full government respect for these five rights).
Note: Starting with the 2007 coding, this variable was retired in favor of the newer index ciri_-empinx_new.
Source: The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan17.

14. ciri_ physint Physical Integrity Rights Index:

This is an additive index constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance indicators. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights).
Source: The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan17.

C. Political Terror Scale

The PTS was first developed in the early 1980s, well before ”terrorism” took on much of its present meaning. The ”terror” in the PTS refers to state-sanctioned killings, torture, disappearances and political imprisonment that the Political Terror Scale measures. The PTS is computed annually by Mark Gibney, Reed Wood and a group of volunteers well versed in human rights practices. The ”data” for the PTS is provided by the annual reports on human rights practices that are published by Amnesty International (A) and the U.S. State Department (S).

15. gd_ptsa Political Terror Scale - Amnesty International:

Political Terror Scale Levels from the yearly country reports of Amnesty International:

1. Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.
2. There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.
3. There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, forpolitical views is accepted.
4. Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances,and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.
5. Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

Source: The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan17.

16. gd_ptsh Political Terror Scale - Human Rights Watch:

Political Terror Scale Levels from the Human Rights Watch’s World Reports:

1. Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.
2. There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.
3. There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.
4. Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.
5. Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

Source: The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan17.

17. gd_ptss Political Terror Scale - US State Department:

Political Terror Scale Levels from the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices:

1. Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.
2. There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.
3. There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.

4. Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

5. Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

Source: The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan17.

D. Polity IV Annual Time-Series, 1800-2015

18. p_polity Combined Polity Score:

Combined Polity Score: The polity score is computed by subtracting the p_autoc score from the p_-democ score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).
Source: The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan17.

19. p_polity2 Revised Combined Polity Score:

Revised Combined Polity Score: The polity score is computed by subtracting the p_autoc score from the p_democ score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). The revised version of the polity variable is designed to facilitate the use of the polity regime measure in time-series analyses. It modifies the combined annual polity score by applying a simple treatment, or ”fix” to convert instances of ”standardized authority scores” (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10). The values have been converted according to the following rule set:

(-66) Cases of foreign ”interruption” are treated as ”system missing.”
(-77) Cases of ”interregnum,” or anarchy, are converted to a ”neutral” Polity score of ”0.”
(-88) Cases of ”transition” are prorated across the span of the transition.

For example, country X has a p_polity score of -7 in 1957, followed by three years of -88 and, finally, a score of +5 in 1961. The change (+12) would be prorated over the intervening three years at a rate of per year, so that the converted scores would be as follow: 1957 -7; 1958 -4; 1959 -1; 1960 +2; and 1961 +5.
Note: Ongoing (-88) transitions in the most recent year are converted to ”system missing” values.
Transitions (-88) following a year of independence, interruption (-66), or interregnum (-77) are prorated from the value ”0”.
Source: The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan17.

20. p_sf State Failure:

State Failure: Variable p_sf is a flag variable that designates (by code ”1”) every year during which a Polity is considered to be in a condition of ”complete collapse of central authority” or ”state failure” (i.e., -77). The variable p_sf is also coded ”1” for years when a state disintegrates and when a profound revolutionary change in political authority occurs (during which the authority of the previous Polity is assumed to have collapsed completely prior to the revolutionary seizure of power and subsequent restructuring of authority). Using the p_sf variable to select regime information will facilitate identification of periods of state failure.
Source: The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan17.

E. The Authoritarian Regime Dataset

The Authoritarian Regimes Dataset is a comprehensive dataset on authoritarian regimes in the world between 1972-2010. The dataset enables researchers and practitioners to distinguish between different authoritarian regime types, follow global trends in authoritarianism and study the specific institutional trajectories of a particular country or set of countries.

21. ht_colonial Colonial Origin:

This is a tenfold classification of the former colonial ruler of the country. Following Bernard et al (2004), we have excluded the British settler colonies (the US, Canada, Australia, Israel and New Zeeland), and exclusively focused on ”Western overseas” colonialism. This implies that only Western colonizers (e.g. excluding Japanese colonialism), and only countries located in the non-Western hemisphere ”overseas” (e.g. excluding Ireland & Malta), have been coded. Each country that has been colonized since 1700 is coded. In cases of several colonial powers, the last one is counted, if it lasted for 10 years or longer. The categories are the following:

0. Never colonized by a Western overseas colonial power
1. Dutch
2. Spanish
3. Italian
4. US
5. British
6. French
7. Portuguese
8. Belgian
9. British-French
10. Australian

Source: The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan17.

22. ht_partsz Size of Largest Party in Legislature (in Fractions):

Counts the largest parties’ number of seats divided by the legislative assemblies’ total number of seats expressed in fractions. In countries with a two-chamber parliament the lower house is counted.
Source: The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan17.

23. ht_region The Region of the Country:

This is a tenfold politico-geographic classification of world regions, based on a mixture of two considerations: geographical proximity (with the partial exception of category 5 below) and demarcation by area specialists having contributed to a regional understanding of democratization. The categories are as follow:

1. Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central Asia)
2. Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic)
3. North Africa & the Middle East (including Israel, Turkey & Cyprus)
4. Sub-Saharan Africa
5. Western Europe and North America (including Australia &New Zeeland)
6. East Asia (including Japan & Mongolia)
7. South-East Asia
8. South Asia
9. The Pacific (excluding Australia & New Zeeland)
10. The Caribbean (including Belize, Guyana & Suriname, but excluding Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic)

Source: The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan17.

24. ht_regtype Regime Type:

This typology of authoritarian regimes is based on a distinction between three modes of political power maintenance (probably the three most widely used throughout history): hereditary succession (lineage), corresponding to monarchies; the actual or threatened use of military force, corresponding to military regimes; and popular elections, designating electoral regimes. Among the latter we distinguish among no-party regimes (where all parties are prohibited), one-party regimes (where all but one party is prohibited), and limited multiparty regimes (where multiple parties are allowed but the system still does not pass as democratic); a subtype of these regimes where no parties are present, although not being prohibited, are coded as ”partyless” regimes. A subtype of military regimes are coded ”rebel regimes”, where a rebel movement has taken power by military means. We also code hybrids (or amalgams) combining elements from more than one regime type, as well as several minor types of regimes: ”theocracies”, ”transitional” regimes, ”civil war”, foreign ”occupation”, and a residual ”other” category. Using the mean of the Freedom House and Polity scales (fh_ipolity2), the line between democracies and autocracies is drawn at 7.5. This threshold value was chosen by estimating the mean cutoff point separating democracy from autocracy in five well-known categorical measures of democracy: those of Przeworski et al. (2000), Mainwaring et al. (2001), and Reich (2002), together with Freedom House's and Polity's own categorical thresholds for democracy.

1. Limited Multiparty
2. Partyless
3. No-Party
4. Military
5. Military No-Party
6. Military Multiparty
7. Military One-party
8. One-Party
9. Other
16. One-Party Monarchy
17. Monarchy
18. Rebel Regime
19. Civil War
20. Occupation
21. Theocracy
22. Transitional Regime
23. No-Party Monarchy
24. Multiparty Monarchy
100. Democracy

Source: The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan17.

25. ht_regtype1 Regime Type (simlified):

A simplified, collapsed version of ht_regtype, where all monarchical regimes with amalgams [ht_regtype =16, 17, 23 or 24] are treated as monarchies, all military regimes with sub-types and amalgams [ht_regtype=4, 5, 6, 7 or 18] are treated as military regimes, and multiparty regimes with sub-types are treated as multiparty regimes [ht_regtype=1 or 2]. Only pure noparty [ht_regtype=3] and oneparty [ht_regtype=8] regimes are treated as no-party and one-party regimes, respectively. The minor types [ht_regtype=9, 19, 20, 21, 22 or 25] are treated as other.

1. Monarchy
2. Military
3. One party
4. Multi-party
9. No-party
99. Other
100. Democracy

Source: The Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan17.

26. US_colony

A binary variable which becomes one when ht_colonial = 4. US.
Source: EUSANCT

27. FR_UK_colony

A binary variable which becomes one when ht_colonial = 5. British, 6. French, 9. British-French
Source: EUSANCT

F. Nuclear Latency (NL) Dataset

The NL dataset provides information on the global diffusion of latent nuclear capabilities from 1939 to 2012. It identifies all known uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities that have been built globally during the nuclear age.

28. latency_lab:

A variable indicating whether a nonnuclear weapons state has at least a laboratory-scale enrichment or reprocessing plant in operation in a given year.

0. No. Note that this variable is also coded 0 for all years in which a state possesses a nuclear arsenal. Users may wish to recode this variable so that all weapons-possession years are coded 1 (we use the dates provided below to determine when countries had nuclear arsenals).
1. Yes.

Source: Nuclear Latency (NL) Dataset – Country-Year Dataset, version 1.2

29. latency_pilot:

A variable indicating whether a nonnuclear weapons state has at least a pilot-scale enrichment or reprocessing plant in operation in a given year.

0. No. Note that this variable is coded 0 for all years in which a state possesses a nuclear arsenal. Users may wish to recode this variable so that all weapons-possession years are coded 1 (we use the dates provided below to determine when countries had nuclear arsenals).
1. Yes.

Source: Nuclear Latency (NL) Dataset – Country-Year Dataset, version 1.2

G. Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset

Coups d'etat are defined as… "overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting head of state using unconstitutional means…there is no minimal death threshold for defining a coup. A coup attempt is defined as successful if the coup perpetrators seize and hold power for at least seven days" (Powell & Thyne 2011: 252). This dataset provides information on coups in ccode/year (rather than event) format.

30. coup1

First coup attempt in ccode/year (if any). 0=no coup attempt in ccode/year; 1=failed coup attempt in ccode/year; 2=successful coup attempt in ccode/year.
Source: Powell, Jonathan M., and Clayton L. Thyne (2011). "Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset."

31. coup2

Second coup attempt in ccode/year (if any). 0=no second coup attempt in ccode/year; 1=second coup attempt in ccode/year failed; 2=second coup attempt in ccode/year succeeded.
Source: Powell, Jonathan M., and Clayton L. Thyne (2011). "Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset."

32. coup3

Third coup attempt in ccode/year (if any). 0=no third coup attempt in ccode/year; 1=third coup attempt in ccode/year failed; 2=third coup attempt in ccode/year succeeded.
Source: Powell, Jonathan M., and Clayton L. Thyne (2011). "Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset."

33. coup4

Fourth coup attempt in ccode/year (if any). 0=no fourth coup attempt in ccode/year; 1=fourth coup attempt in ccode/year failed; 2=fourth coup attempt in ccode/year succeeded.
Source: Powell, Jonathan M., and Clayton L. Thyne (2011). "Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset."

34. date1

Date of first coup attempt in ccode/year (if any).
Source: Powell, Jonathan M., and Clayton L. Thyne (2011). "Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset."

35. date2

Date of second coup attempt in ccode/year (if any).
Source: Powell, Jonathan M., and Clayton L. Thyne (2011). "Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset."

36. date3

Date of third coup attempt in ccode/year (if any).
Source: Powell, Jonathan M., and Clayton L. Thyne (2011). "Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset."

37. date4

Date of fourth coup attempt in ccode/year (if any).
Source: Powell, Jonathan M., and Clayton L. Thyne (2011). “Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset.”

H. UCDP Conflict Data

UCDP Dyadic dataset, version 18.1: A dyad-year version of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. A dyad consists of two opposing actors in an armed conflict where at least one party is the government of a state.
UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset, version 18.1: An actor-year dataset with information of intentional attacks on civilians by governments and formally organized armed groups.

38. conflict

A binary variable which indicates armed conflict(s) in the respective country-year. UCDP defines armed conflict as: "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year."
Source: Pettersson T and Eck K (2018) Organized violence, 1989–2017. *Journal of Peace Research* 55(4): 535–547.

39. sum_conflict

A count variable which indicates the sum of armed conflicts in the respective country-year.
Source: EUSANCT

40. max_conflict

This variable indicates the highest intensity level of all armed conflicts in the respective country year. The UCDP Dyadic dataset codes the "intensity level in the dyad per calendar year. Two different intensity levels are coded: minor armed conflicts and wars.
Source: Pettersson T and Eck K (2018) Organized violence, 1989–2017. *Journal of Peace Research* 55(4): 535–547.

41. one_sided_violence

A binary variable which indicates one-sided violence in the respective country-year. "One-sided violence is the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths. Extrajudicial killings in custody are excluded."
Source: Allansson, Marie, Erik Melander, and Lotta Themnér (2017). Organized violence, 1989-2016. *Journal of Peace Research* 54(4): 574–587.

42. best_fatality_estimated_osv

The best fatality estimate for the given episode. This is an automatic aggregation (summing) of all the Best figures for all incidents reported for the given dyad-year in the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset.
Source: Allansson, Marie, Erik Melander, and Lotta Themnér (2017). Organized violence, 1989-2016. *Journal of Peace Research* 54(4): 574–587.

I. World Development Indicators

This dataset contains selected World Development Indicators.

43. GDP_constant_2010_USD_WDI

GDP (constant 2010 US$)
Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators, obtained on 27 June 2017

44. GDP_growth_annual_WDI

GDP growth (annual %)
Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators, obtained on 27 June 2017

45. GDPpc_constant_USD_WDI

GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$)
Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators, obtained on 27 June 2017

46. pop_tot_WDI

Population, total
Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators, obtained on 27 June 2017

J. EUSANCT Sanctions Dataset

47. threat_dyad

A binary variable which indicates a sanction threat in the respective sender-country-year.
Source: EUSANCT

48. sanction_dyad

A binary variable which indicates an ongoing sanction in the respective sender-country-year.
Source: EUSANCT

49. potential_sanction

A binary variable which indicates whether we have identified the respective country-year as a potential sanction dyad.
Source: EUSANCT

50. democracy_sanction

A binary variable which indicates an ongoing democracy-related sanction in the respective sender-country-year.
Source: EUSANCT

51. additional_sanction

This variable indicates if an ongoing democracy-related sanction is accompanied by another sanction case concerning issues of international security or vice versa.
Source: EUSANCT

52. caseid

Case Identification Number of the EUSANCT Sanctions Dataset.
Source: EUSANCT

All following variables correspond to the variables described in the case-level dataset.