Dispute or Mediator? The Selection and Effectiveness of Conflict Management in Civil Wars

Paulina Pospieszna
Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznan

Gerald Schneider
University of Konstanz

Abstract

The literature on international conflict management offers two contrasting explanations why third parties show a markedly different effectiveness in their efforts to settle militarized disputes. While the structural research tradition focuses on conflict characteristics, individualist approaches highlight the background, skills and power of a mediator as well the strategy the conflict manager selects. Arguing in favor of a holistic perspective, we fuse the two approaches to account for the selection of mediation strategies and the success of mediation attempts. Using the Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset, our analysis covers all mediation attempts in civil wars between 1945 and 2004. The results support our assumption that the mediated disputes are not a random sample of all militarised disputes and that there is also a selection behind the choice of mediation strategy. The mediator type, the strategy chosen by the mediator, the identity of the actor initiating the mediation as well as the location of the mediation attempt influence the chance that mediation as a conflict management technique is successful. The statistical analysis also evinces that structural factors influence both mediation occurrence and mediation success and that the impact of mediation strategies largely depends on who applies them.

Acknowledgements:

Word count: 10,578

Introduction

One of the oddities of international conflict management is the discrepant explanations offered by those who try to mediate a peaceful ending to a militarized conflict. When the attempts by an outside party to reach some kind of settlement fail, its excuse for this lack of success often boils down to the contention that no agreement was possible because of the intractable nature of the conflict. Alleged constraints that prevent the resolution of the dispute include the intensity of the conflict as well as the intangibility of the contested issues. In the event of a successful outcome, conversely, the mediator statements often move from blame-shifting to self-congratulatory remarks that place great importance on their own strategies, skillfulness and trustworthiness. One typical example is the rhetoric of the U.S. foreign policy elite toward the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger justified in September 1992 the passive stance of the Bush administration with the words "Until the Bosnians, Serbs and Croats decide to stop killing each other, there is nothing the outside world can do about it" (Danner 1997). No such fatalism characterized the speech in which President Clinton announced on November 21, 1995, the Dayton Agreement and characterized the pivotal role NATO and the U.S. had played in this mediation success: "Without us, the hard-won peace would be lost (…)" (Kuypers 1997, 77).

The literature on mediation in militarized conflicts reflects these two contrasting perspectives. The structural perspective that tries to assess the conditions under which mediation may succeed or fail is often macro-quantitative in nature. These prerequisites may relate to the nature of a rivalry (Goertz and Diehl 1997) or of a regime (Dixon 1993). The alternative theoretical perspective stresses

the identity of a mediator, her strategies, skills, and beliefs, as well as the

relationship between a mediator and the warring parties are among the factors that

foster the conclusion a peace agreement (see e.g. Bercovitch and Schneider 2000;

Svensson 2007).

This article tries to reconcile individual and structural explanations of

conflict management occurrence and success. Since in our view neither mediated

conflicts nor the identity of conflict managers are random samples of all disputes

and of all potential mediators, we believe in line with Wall, Stark and Standifer

(2001) that a proper understanding of mediation effectiveness requires studying

the preceding phases of the mediation process and how they influence alone and

together the chance of mediation success. Our conceptual framework distinguishes

between the selection of mediation as a conflict management strategy, the choice of

a particular conflict manager, and finally the strategies that this outside party opts

for. [1] While the structural attributes of the conflict potentially influence all stages,

individual features of the mediator only affect the last two phases of the conflict

management attempt – the choice of a particular conflict management strategy and

the final outcome of the entire endeavor. We therefore argue in line with

Wallensteen and Svensson (2014, 320) that "the use of a particular mediation

strategy rarely occurs in isolation" and examine how both the conflict and the

mediator affect the effectiveness of mediation.

The empirical analysis is based on the Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset

(DeRouen at al. 2011). This source exclusively focuses on civil war mediation in the

---

[1] Beardsley (2011, 45) makes a similar point, accounting also s for mediation occurrence before examining mediation success and the trade-off between short-term and long-term success.

period from 1946 to 2004 and provides detailed information on mediated and non-mediated attempts as well as specific data on conflict episodes that go beyond general information provided by the UCDP conflict termination dataset. The statistical analysis shows that mediated conflicts are indeed not a random sample of all civil wars examined and that especially intensive conflicts and developing countries that have fallen victim to a civil war are more likely to experience this sort of voluntary conflict management. While the internationalization of a civil war increases the chance of an UN-led mediation on the one hand, such a widening of the conflict decreases the possibility of conflict interventions predominantly or exclusively directed by nation states. Conflict attributes, conversely, are only limitedly linked to the choice of the mediation strategy. If the mediation is, however, conducted by a nation state, the chance that the conflict managers engage in active mediation strategies is quite large.

Understanding the phases of mediation

Most internal and international militarized disputes have experienced some conflict management efforts since 1945, with mediation and bilateral negotiations being the most popular mechanisms (Bercovitch and Fretter 2007, 149). The particular mechanism this article studies is mediation which is in accordance with Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille´s (1991, 8) classical definition "(...) a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organization to settle their conflict or resolve

their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law".[2]

Mediation is therefore a peaceful, non-violent third party intervention into conflict, encompassing a wide array of strategies and tactics aimed at resolving the conflict (Terris and Maoz 2005: 563-66; Beber 2012: 5; Regan and Aydin 2006: 739-740). The choice set of the third party includes choosing sites for the mediation, the chairing of meetings, the conveying of proposals and the usage of social influence, persuasion and pressure to entice the warring parties to modify their current policies or to change their attitudes. Bercovitch et al. (1991) have developed the commonly employed trichotomy that categorizes mediation strategies according to their strength into (1) directive, (2) procedural, and (3) communication facilitation strategies. A directive strategy is the most powerful form of intervention as the third party is able to shape the content and nature of a final outcome by offering each party in conflict incentives, by promising support, or by threating with diplomatic sanctions and other coercive measures. While Zartman and Touval (1985) and Rauchhaus (2006) equate this active strategy with "manipulation," Beardsley (2011) calls it "heavy mediation" or "mediation with leverage." A procedural strategy, by contrast, enables the mediator only the control of the conflict management environment. Communication facilitation, finally, amounts to relatively passive tactics ranging from information provision about the other warring party to the organization of the talks between the belligerents.

---

[2] The definition is widely acknowledged and commonly used in the literature (see DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna2011: 664 or Beardsley 2008: 724).

While some research has focused on the choice of mediation strategies, most studies focus either on the occurrence and effectiveness of this conflict management strategy. Although our understanding of these two processes has greatly advanced in recent years, we do not know whether the contexts in which belligerents agree on mediation as a means to possibly resolve the conflict shapes the choice set the mediators have at their disposition and later on the effectiveness of the conflict management technique, too, to some extent. Our theoretical framework implies therefore that we need to study mediation in a broad context and that the process in which this form of conflict management was started influences it success. Similar to Bercovitch and Simpson's (2010, 79) "contingency model of mediation" or the aforementioned conceptual framework of Wall, Stark and Standifer (2001) our approach starts with the assumption that the selection of mediation as a conflict management strategy, the strategy choice of the possible mediator and the effectiveness of the attempt to end the hostilities are the results of step-wise decision making by the belligerents and the mediator. Various relationships suggested by these models have been explored by scholars[3], but empirical studies that connect these interrelated aspects are scarce.

To understand the choice of mediation strategies and their impact it is necessary to analyze why mediation occurs and why certain mediators are chosen. Obviously structural factors related to conflict affect mediation occurrence, but we also assume that the structural variables influence the choice of particular mediation strategies and their success. Mediator characteristics are furthermore

---

[3] These examinations address how the nature of the dispute affects the mediation outcome (Bercovitch and Langley 1993), the impact of previous mediation attempts as well as mediator identity and strategy (Bercovitch and Houston 1993, Beardley et al. 2006).

only assumed to influence the selection of mediation strategies and their success. In other words, we see neither the occurrence of mediation nor the selection of a particular mediator, and their reliance on specific conflict management techniques, as isolated events, but that structural attributes and mediator characteristic jointly influence all relevant decisions and shape the outcome of the conflict management effort. More particularly, we advance a rational expectations framework and contend that warring parties carefully select mediator from whom they can expect strategies and an effectiveness of the conflict management attempt that is in their own interest.

Structural Factors

The decision of warring parties to request and accept the involvement of a third party may depend on the costs that the warring parties had to shoulder so far. The number of casualties is a first dimension of conflict intensity that we consider here. The early literature suggests that it affects the willingness to engage in mediated talks and in settling the conflict peacefully (e.g. Mason and Fett 1996: 551). If there are many lives lost relative to combat duration, we could expect that the warring parties are more likely to initiate or accept mediation as a conflict management tool as they gradually realize that the losses are too large to continue fighting (e.g. Young 1967). However, another literature suggests exactly the opposite. Burton (1969) stresses for instance that the higher the costs borne by each party, the more polarized will their positions be. This should render them more reluctant to engage in conflict management and mediation. Yet, although this dynamic might harden the positions of the warring parties, a growing blood trail weakens the support the

leaders might have created for their war effort. We therefore expect that warring parties are more likely to request and accept mediation when a conflict becomes more severe.

Another facet of costliness is war duration and the growing fatigue attached to it. Some analyses show that the chance of mediation increases with the length of a violent conflict (Greig and Diehl 2006, Bercovitch and Jackson 2001; Svensson 2008). The duration of a conflict affects the acceptability of mediation from warring parties as combatants may realize that they are unable to win by military means and thus are more willing to move on to the negotiating table in order to possibly find an agreement there (Zartman 1989). Scholars also find that longer, more intractable and frequently recurring conflicts tend to be the territorial wars. [4] According to DeRouen et al. (2011) territorial wars are more likely to be mediated than governmental wars, but also less likely to end with peace agreements and those signed agreements are more likely to fail[5]

We contend in line with our step-wise argument that the intensity of a conflict also influences the chance that third parties employ directive strategies. Bercovitch and Houston (2000) demonstrate that a mediator´s strategy choice largely depends on the conflict and the needs of the parties involved. A similar logic applies to the effects of conflict intensity on the effectiveness of a mediation attempt. Acknowledging the possibility of selection effects, Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) establish that more directive strategies are more likely to be successful in in low-

---

[4] By definition governmental conflicts are fought over the control and orientation of the government, while territorial conflicts are secessionist or autonomy-seeking wars (see for example the respective definitions of UCDP group at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/)

[5] See for instance the studies by Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008; DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna 2011; Holsti 1991;; Wallensteen et al. 2009, 248)

intensity conflicts. Böhmelt (2010,173) takes the selection statistically into account and shows that the relationship between conflict intensity and intensive mediation as well its success is curvilinear: "....both low and high intensity disputes are less likely to see interventions and effective outcomes." However, although mediation tends to work best before conflicts become very intense, they often have to become heated enough for the warring parties to feel a need to resolve them. Therefore, we advance the hypothesis that conflict intensity renders active mediation strategies more likely and that high conflict intensity also eases the resolution of the conflict.

H1: High-intensity conflicts are more likely to encounter mediation as a conflict management instrument, to see the mediators employing determined mediation strategy and to experience successful mediation attempts than low-intensity conflicts.

Note that the influence of conflict intensity might differ between mediator types. As potential mediators can reject an invitation to manage a conflict, they will only accept it if they derive – or believe to be doing so - some net benefit from their intervention (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Greig and Regan 2008: 762-765; Terris and Maoz 2005: 567-8). Obviously, a mediation success boosts their prestige independently of whether the conflict managers are a state representative, an IGO delegate or a private individual. State mediators might see a conflict management attempt additionally as a means to nurture an existing alliance, to gain strategic influence, or to improve economic relations (Greig and Regan 2008: 762-3). International organizations, conversely, are often involved, as Touval (1994: 46) as well as Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) argue, in "orphaned conflicts" which are

9

intense and difficult to resolve. Engaging into intractable wars is less attractive for state leaders as the chance to increase the own popularity through successful conflict management is rather dim. IGOs can engage less in cherry picking, as their mandates often explicitly include their engagement as conflict managers. The UN is a perfect and obvious illustration of this.[6] While international organization might "inherit" such conflicts from unsuccessful state mediators, they might also possess better resources for dealing with such disputes.

The role that an internationalization of a civil war might play seems more ambiguous than the one of conflict intensity. Because such wars tend to be more serious and intense one may argue that mediators are more likely to advance or accept conflict management offers in such wars (DeRouen et al. 2011). As the involvement of the third-party already provides a context that could draw in mediators, the intervening actor or another international power player could push for mediation. However, mediation becomes less likely in our view in internationalized wars because the party on whose behalf the intervention occurs might not be ready for a mediation effort to take place. In other words, conflict parties may perceive internationalization as a means to win the conflict so that they are unwilling to agree on third party conflict management.

---

[6] However, we may expect regional organizations to behave slightly different than globally active international organizations in their decision to mediate. Regional organizations are attached to specific region, they also may have "vested interests" in certain conflicts and may be biased (Elgstroem et al. 2003, 23). Further, they may act in order to prevent a conflict from destabilizing a region (Greig and Regan 2008, 764). Gartner (2011), studying the duration of peace agreements mediated by regional organizations, nevertheless argues that they are mainly selected as mediators in civil wars that are highly intractable.

H2: Internationalized wars are less likely to be mediated, to see a determined mediation strategy employed and to experience a success of the mediation attempt if the conflict parties agreed on using this conflict management strategy.

Obviously, the power of a country that has fallen victim to a civil war also influences its willingness to accept international mediators. We cannot omit the impact of conflict country characteristics, such as population size or economic development, which are commonly used to denote countries' power. Leaders of large countries might be unwilling to ask for outside help, believing that other nations should not meddle in what they perceive to be their own affairs. Thus, we argue that populous states are more like to withstand offer to mediate in internal conflicts. Moreover, economically powerful states are less likely to succumb to a promise to receive foreign aid in case a mediation offer is accepted. Another source of resistance comes from an alliance membership. Countries can shield themselves more easily against foreign intervention if they belong to a military alliance. Although joining a military alliance decreases the discretion of governments internationally, it increases their leverage in internal affairs as members of the same alliance are unwilling to manage the domestic troubles of one of their partners or to accept the involvement of a non-alliance member in the conflict, be it another state or an IGO. We therefore expect that increased leverage of a nation should decrease the chance that it accepts conflict mediation as a possible way to resolve an internal war. In other words, leaders of powerful states are not that easily lured into mediation as an international conflict management tool.

Note that a rich literature has examined the effect of regime type on mediation occurrence and success. To start with, extensions of the the "Democratic Peace" suggest that democratic regimes are more prone to accept and ask for mediation (Dixon 1993, 1994). Similarly, mediators may be more likely to intervene if the state torn apart through a civil conflict is sufficiently democratic (Wallenstein et al. 2009). However, Hegre at al. (2001) argue that civil conflict happen more often in intermediate regimes. Democracies that experience a civil war might therefore represent cases that are particularly difficult to resolve, often pitting presidents against rebel organizations (Schneider and Wiesehomeier 2008). Taken together, this suggests that the relationship between democracy and mediation has to remain inconclusive as the effects cancel each other out.[7]

Once mediation is selected as a conflict management tool, a resourceful war-torn country may prevent a mediator from adopting a determined mediation strategy. Bercovitch (1991) finds in this context that mediation is most successful where the adversaries are equally strong. Other scholars, however, point out that the power difference between mediator and the war-torn country also matters for mediation success.

H3: Powerful war-torn countries are less likely to experience mediation, to see determined mediation strategy adopted by the mediator and to experience the success of the mediation attempt if this conflict management tool is selected.

---

[7] For example, DeRouen et al. (2011) have not found any evidence that regime type plays a role in mediation.

Once warring parties agree on mediation and the possibly selected mediator accepts an offer to intervene, the conflict management officially starts. Some scholars see the mediators and their characteristics as a major factor that separates effective from ineffective mediation (e.g. Young 1968). We will spell out below the attributes of mediators that may affect the strategy choice of the mediator and the success of the conflict management attempt.

Mediation Characteristics and Mediation Effectiveness

The question which factors render mediation successful has occupied a large number of scholars.[8] Kleiboer (1996: 360) speaks of a quest for a "golden formula." The instruments, tactics and strategies chosen by the mediator play a particularly prominent role among these potential drivers of mediation success.[9] However, the findings of studies which try to trace conflict management success to mediation and mediator characteristics are very mixed. We contend that the inconclusive nature of these results is a consequence of the neglect to analyze mediation as a stepwise process in which attributes of the conflict, the warring parties and the mediator affect the strategy selection and, in consequence, also the success of the mediation attempt.

---

[8] The mediation literature distinguishes between short-term and long-term mediation success. A mediation attempt is effective in the short-term if the warring parties sign a peace treaty and many studies have found positive results connecting mediation to peaceful outcomes (Beardsely et al. 2006; Frazier and Dixon 2006; Regan and Aydin 2006; Walter 2002; Wilkenfeld et al. 2003; Svensson 2007; Rauchhaus 2006). A long-term success, by contrast, is only possible if the parties to this formal or informal mediated agreement do not take up arms over a considerably long period. Beardsley (2011) strongly indicates that mediation makes peace less stable in the long run. In this study we focus on mediation success in the short-term.
[9] The literature on this topic includes Bercovitch and Gartner (2009), Wilkenfeld et al. (2003), Maoz and Terris (2009), Beardsley et al. (2006), Svensson (2007).

An important attribute that the literature often suggests as crucially affecting

the options a mediator has at its disposition and also shaping the effectiveness of a

mediation attempt is the profile of the conflict manager. As indicated, extant studies

typically distinguish whether the conflict management attempt represented

organizations or states, whether the organizations involved were governmental or

not, whether the scope of the organization´s activities is regional or global and how

resourceful the mediator is. Although powerful states and IGOs dominate

international conflict management in terms of frequency (Bercovitch and Schneider

2000: 162), it remains unresolved which type of mediator is more successful. Some

scholars find that the disputants favor mediation by hegemonic states rather than

mediation by international organizations (see Bercovitch and Schneider 2000, 153),

and that such powerful mediators' efforts are more successful. Svensson (2007,

229) finds that although all types of mediators have a positive effect in terms of

reaching agreements, powerful mediators outperform "pure mediators", which

include representatives of IGOs, NGOs, regional organizations, small and distant

states as well as private individuals. On the other hand, Slim (1992) argues that less

powerful mediators such as Algeria, Switzerland, and Austria can profit from their

strategic weakness. According to this adage, relatively weak states can be

paradoxically successful in mediation since they cannot credibly threaten either of

the adversaries with the possibility of punitive action (Frazier and Dixon 2006, 390-

391). Bercovitch and DeRouen (2005, 108) support this result and argue that

superpower mediation decreases the chance for success.

There also are mixed results concerning the involvement of international

organizations. Bercovitch and Gartner (2006, 356) find that international

organizations are better able to deal with highly intense and intractable conflict. Also, DeRouen (2003, 251-260) proposes that the UN mediates ethnic civil conflicts quite successfully. Frazier and Dixon (2006, 401) suggest that IGOs are best at securing a negotiated settlement since multilateral actors not only provide legitimacy but also are also more likely to create an environment conducive to conflict resolution. Conversely, Touval (1994, 53-4) argues that international organizations are not destined to play the role of mediator. Using the United Nations (UN) as an example she blames the lack of real power and leverage, as well as the membership structure of international organizations that make a coherent mediation strategy unlikely (additionally the slow administrative machinery of organizations makes them inflexible). Other authors like Bercovitch and DeRouen (2005, 108), Bercovitch and Houston (1993, 317; 1996, 27) or Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 791) do also not establish such positive effects for UN-led mediation attempts. They trace the United Nation´s a fairly poor record to selection effects as the organization is only stepping into conflicts that are already very hard to resolve. There are also some negative findings regarding mediation by regional organizations (Gartner 2011).

We believe that these contradictory results are largely due to the neglect of studying international mediation as a stepwise process. Hence, if warring parties agree on mediation, they also need to decide jointly about the profile of the mediator and the potential that will select mediation tactics that are in their interest. If they do not want the mediation to succed, they are more likely to agree on a conflict manager who is less likely to resort to powerful conflict management strategies.

Many adherents of the mediator attributes approach believe that the strategy the third party chooses affects the outcome of the conflict management effort. Mediation styles vary greatly according to the needs of the parties and the mediator. Mediators use a variety of strategies in their effort to resolve international conflicts that range from settlement-oriented mediation to more transformative or relationship-centered mediation. In case of "settlement oriented" mediation, the mediator's primary goal is obtaining a settlement, and he or she may be highly directive and manipulative in an effort to bring the parties to a resolution, therefore this type of strategy is called "directive" or "heavy." Other mediation styles, such as communication facilitation or procedural strategies, focus on empowering both parties to act effectively on their own behalf and do not use tools to push the parties in the direction as much as they might be pushed in directive mediation style (Bercovitch et al. 1991).

However, no scholarly consensus exists about the kind of mediation strategy that presumably works best and is associated with short-term peace and complete conflict resolution. Bercovitch and Houston (1993, 304) for instance argue that directive strategies "help parties to save face, equalize power imbalances, and generally move the disputants toward a more cooperative orientation." Smith and Stam (2003, 128) further add that mediators cannot succeed by only acting as information providers. Beardsley et al. (2006, 81-3) emphasize, however, the importance of a balanced mediation strategy—facilitative strategies are the best possible answer to commitment problems and post-crisis tensions, while more intrusive forms of mediation seem to be redundant in contributing to conflict resolution. Beardsley (2011, 41) shows that heavy-handed mediation can create

16

temporary incentives for combatants to make peace, but resorting to conflictive

strategies will become attractive again once those artificial incentives are removed.

H4: If a mediator or team of mediators employ a determined strategy, they bolster the

chance of mediation success.

One crucial characteristic of the selection process is whether the belligerents

approached the mediator themselves or whether a mediator offered to act on their

behalf in the first place. Our analysis therefore differentiates *who initiates* the

mediation attempt. We believe that if one or both warring parties suggest a

mediation attempt they demonstrate the willingness for conflict resolution, thus

such mediation is more likely to end with success than mediation attempts that the

mediator initiated. The literature does not provide any evidence to what extent the

identity of the initiating party matters for the success of the conflict management

attempt. Outside parties who initiated the mediation themselves are more likely to

muster directive strategies as "convincing" the disputants to manage their conflict

peacefully takes some political clout. However, such tactics might alert the

intransigence of the warring parties.

H5: Mediators, which solely initiated the conflict management attempt, are

more likely to rely on directive strategies, but face an increased risk of seeing

their attempt ending in failure.

As argued above, the usage of a more forceful strategy may nevertheless be contingent on the mediator type. In other words, some mediators are simply unable to increase their leverage through the manipulation of inducements (e.g. promises of aid, promise of improved relationships) and punishments (threat of sanctions, alienation). Clearly, states are in a better position than international organizations as they can decide alone about the incentives they want to offer. It thus seems reasonable to expect that states are more likely to use directive strategy during mediation than other conflict managers. Of course, rational warring parties will anticipate that states have a better chance to employ more directive strategies than IGOs or independent mediators.

The lack of systematic data has prevented the quantitative literature from examining whether other attributes of the conflict management attempt make a difference. An important question is for instance whether it matters *where* mediation occurs. Bercovitch (1996) shows that mediation attempts that take place in a peaceful environment can bring better results rather than attempts taken to resolve a conflict on territory torn apart through an internal conflict. A neutral or third-party territory may make parties more likely to participate in talks and facilitate dialogue, which in turn may lead to the conclusion of peace agreements that end the war.

H6: Mediation attempts that take place on a neutral or the third party territory have an increased chance to be successful

Research Design

This study examines the success of mediation attempts as a stepwise process. We will use the Civil War Mediation (CWM) Dataset compiled by DeRouen et al. (2011), which draws on the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset.[10] The CWM dataset was published in two versions, one containing 319 civil war episodes and one containing 460 civil war mediation events (by states and other actors). As this analysis needs both, specific information on the mediated events as well as information regarding the civil conflicts, the two versions of the CWM dataset were merged. The time period studied ranges from 1946 to 2004.

Our first dependent variable is mediation occurrence. The dataset lists the names of mediators. We decided to group them into single-party mediations and multiparty mediations (Table 1). We also distinguish whether the former category was led by a state or by an IGO. The descriptive evidence also shows that mediations by states which are powerful through their permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council occur quite frequently. Further, the frequencies in which states or international organizations act as mediators are quite balanced. The UN plays a dominant position among international organizations (almost 20% of all single mediation attempts assigned to IGOs are led by the UN). Three similar categories are built for the analysis of multiparty mediations. We distinguish between UN-led teams, multilateral iniatives uniting representatives of nation states and a mixed lineup of IGO and state mediators.

---

[10] The UCDP/PRIO uses a threshold of at least 25 battle-related deaths to define civil war episode.

Similarly, we can identify better multiparty mediations by specifying whether mediation was led by a group of different actors (e.g. different states, IGOs), or a group led by the UN, or by the group of different states.

((Insert Table 1 here))

To test our stepwise model of mediation, we attributed the cases under examination, the civil wars that occurred in the period under examination, to five categories. The base line category is "no mediation" and includes decisions in favor of other conflict management strategies as well as those few disputes that did not experience any conflict management at all. Category 2 stands for the event that the UN single-handedly led the intervention, while the third group of cases unities unilateral mediation attempts by representatives of nation states (both large and small states). The fourth class of events assembles all other types of unilateral mediations not included in the other two categories of single party mediations; such "residual" conflict managers include other international organizations and private individuals. Category 5 gathers all cases of multiparty mediation.

To test our hypotheses on the choice of mediation strategies, we distinguish, as indicated, three different types: *Directive Strategy, Communication Facilitation Strategy*, and *Procedural Strategy*. Since procedural and directive strategies are more active than the facilitation of communication, we will collapse them into the category "Determined Mediation Strategies". The baseline category stands for cases for which no clear mediator strategy could be detected.

In order to unravel the impact of mediator type and strategies on the effectiveness of the conflict management effort, we transform these individual categories into dummy variables. We coded *Mediation Success* in line with most research evaluating the effectiveness of short-term mediation, as 1 if a mediation attempt resulted in a partial settlement, full or process agreement, 0 otherwise.

The independent variables that account for the possible influence of the conflict structure on the steps of mediation include two indicators of intensity. the log of the total *Battle Deaths* until the conflict managements sets in and the log of *War Duration,* which stands for the length in days since the outbreak of the war. All data are from CWM mediation dataset. Some studies have found that the type of conflict the warring parties are fighting matters—territorial wars are more likely to be mediated but at the same time are less likely to end with peace agreements than governmental wars. Yet, territorial wars tend to be longer, more intractable and to be more frequently recurring than militarized conflicts over government control. As we measure conflict intensity, our analysis will not control for the type of incompatibility. It is therefore in our view sufficient to examine the impact of conflict intensity on mediation. However, following DeRouen et al. (2011), we find it important to control for the number of previous conflicts within a particular dyad. *Recurrence* is coded 1 if at least one internal war terminated before, 0 otherwise.

Other structural factors relate to the characteristics of a conflict country. We used World Development Indicators to collect data for economic development, which is measured by the logged Gross Domestic Product per capita (*GDPpc*) in 2004, and for a country size measured by *Population* in 2004. Regime type of the mediated country, is measured by the *Polity* score of a country at the end of an

episode. We also collected data using common sources whether a conflict country was a *Member of Military Alliance* (such as NATO, Warsaw Pact, SCO, Arab League, and CSTO during the conflict) and we created a dummy variable if a conflict country was in a military alliance during a conflict. Note that we also control for the influence of democracy. Dixon´s (1994, 1993) finding that democracies are more likely to agree on a peaceful resolution of interstate conflict and to also accept an outside management of these disputes let us expect that political openness might also make these states more amenable to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Similarly, mediators may be more likely to intervene if the state which has succumbed to a civil conflict is sufficiently democratic (Wallenstein et al. 2009).

The independent variables that describe mediation attempts were taken from the Civil War Mediation dataset. We created three dummy variables that refer to the location of mediation: *Conflict Parties' Territory*, *Third-party Mediation Territory*, *Mediation on Neutral Site.* We also evaluate with three variables which actor initiated the mediation: *State mediator* (whether state other than a conflict country initiated a mediation), *IGOs initiated* (if the international organization initiated a mediation), and *Conflict Parties initiated.*

Finally, we introduce variables that will allow us to account at least to some extent for the effect that the previous mediations have on our results. We will include two dummies that specify if, and how many, previous mediation attempts influence the success of the conflict management effort: *Previous Mediation* is 1 if 1 or 2 mediation attempts occurred previously and 0 if no mediation was observed; *Many Previous Attempts* similarly dichotomizes cases with 5 and more previous mediation attempts in the dispute (1) and those that are below this threshold (0).

Empirical Analysis

This article conceives of mediation as a stepwise process in which belligerents accept an offer by a third party to end their dispute or chose mediation themselves as a means to solve a conflict. Once this crucial initial selection has been made, mediators rely on different strategies in order to boost the chance of their efforts ending successfully. Our testing strategy reflects this procedural nature of conflict management. We first examine the criteria under which warring parties decide in favor of mediation. The second set of statistical tests supplements these analyses and examines the conditions under which more mediators decide to choose particular strategies. Third, we examine in line with our theoretical model the covariates of mediation success.[11] Our statistical tests are multinomial and binary probit models.

Table 2 presents two models that explore the covariates of mediation choice. Model 1 examines in a bivariate fasion the the conditions under which belligerent accept mediation as a possible conflict resolution mechanism, showing that this form of conflict management is more likely in smaller and poorer countries. This indicates that the international community is able to "convince" internationally

---

[11] As our argument strongly suggests the presence of selection effects, we have tried to test our hypotheses through Heckman selection models and related techniques. Note, however, that the plurality of these tests do not suggests that a two-stage model is appropriate and that hence the effects reported below do not necessarily suffer from selection bias. Although selection models are theoretically appropriate, their empirical usefulness is therefore somehow limited as actors have to make a myriad of decision between the initial choice in favor of meditation and the final support they have to lend to a mediated agreement.

feeble belligerents to accept a mediation attempt. These results cast some shadow on the proclamation that mediation is entirely a voluntary process. Model 1 further shows in line with our theoretical expectations that the longer the civil conflict lasts, the greater the chance that the warring parties rely on an outside party to help resolving them their dispute. We are also able to support Dixon´s (1993, 1994) finding that democracies are more willing to accept this form of intervention than states in which authoritarian regimes call the shots.

Model 2 examines through a multinomial probit model the chance that either the UN, A State, other single party mediators (other IGOs than the UN or indivduals) or a multilateral team are selected as mediators. The civil wars in El Salvador, Angola, and Mozambique where the United Nations were finally able to act as peace broker illustrate the tendency that this central IGO often inherits the mandate to mediate in "orphaned conflicts" from state respresentatives or other conflict managers whose efforts have failed. The UN is also more likely to act as a conflict manager in internationalized conflicts and those wars that occur in relatively poor countries and are therefore not of paramount importance for state-led mediation efforts as the gain in prestige to resolve such a conflict is smaller than for successful mediations in "important" civil wars. Table 2 also reports along these lines that state representatives which mediate alone seem to pick easier cases. Hence, they conduct their efforts in small countries and in conflicts with a comparatively low death toll. Multiparty mediations, finally, become more common the more democratic the country is that has fallen victim to a civil war.

((Insert Table 2 here))

The first analysis shows that characteristics of the conflict and the country suffering under an internal war affect the chance of mediation and the probability that the conflict parties agree on a certain type of meditor. Medition, in other words, does not occur randomly. This has led us to advance several hypotheses according to which the strategies on which the mediators rely follow a similar selection logic: do powerful interventions become more likely only in some circumstances? Based on the results presented in Table 3, the answer to this question is unambiguously "yes." Models 1 and 2 clearly show that both the structure of the conflict and especially features of the selected mediators are responsible for this. This suggests that warring parties can expect heavy-handed interventions from mediation attempts led by representatives of states and a less directive approach from UN diplomats. States used directive strategies in thirty-nine mediation attempts, procedural ones in two hundred eighteen, and communication facilitation in fifty six conflicts.

UN interventions rely on a procedural strategy rather than communication facilitation. The IGO did so for instance in its mediations in Cambodia, Croatia, Georgia, Indonesia, Morocco, Mozambique, and Tajikistan. A even more timid stance is often taken by multilateral mediation teams. Communication facilitation strategies was for instance used by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and a group of state mediators (Somalia, Senegal, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia) during the conflicts in the Philippines with MNLF/MILF in the 1970s and 1990.

Interestingly, if a conflict manager mediates in internationalized conflicts, its willingness to employ directive strategies is rather small. Similarly, the chance of

procedural strategies is larger in recurrent conflicts. Note also that the procedural strategy has been used frequently to mediate the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Dedtermined strategies (procedural or directive) were never used in conflicts that lasted 600 days or less, and which resulted in 4200 or less battle related deaths If there has been a previous medition attempts, the newly appointed conflict managers take this in general as a carte blanche to employ some discernible mediation strategy. Finally, we can observe that the more democratic a war-torn country is, the more likely it is that a meditor use communication facilitation in its mediation effort This was for instance the case during the conflicts in India (1961-1968), Malaysia (1963-1966) or Papua New Guinea (1992-1996).

((Insert Table 3 here))

Under what conditions is mediation successful? The tests reported in Table 4 reveal that certain attributes of a mediator and the strategies used by the conflict manager can make a difference, but that characteristics of the conflict matter as well. The self-congratulatory statements that effective mediators often utter in the aftermath of a successful attempt to bring peace often hide that cerain conflicts are easier to solve than other ones. Both the ROC area statistics and the number of correct predictions are generally larger for the integrated in comparison to the mediation characteristic models. The sole exception are the models for the UN-led mediations where the number of correctly predicted cases remains the same, but where the ROC area increases more than 20% through the addition of war and conflict country characteristics.

As model 2 reveals, conflict management that takes place in a small and poor state have a better chance to be resolved than conflicts in richer and larger states. This means in light of earlier findings that development and a large population size do not only prevent medition from occurring, but if it takes place at all it has a lower chance to end with a peaceful outcome. It also makes sense in this light that conflict managers, be it a state or a UN representative, have a better chance to convince the belligerents to sign an agreement. Interestingly, other attributes of the conflict only matter if the United Nations is at the helmet of the mediation attempt. While a long or a recurring war increases the chance that this central peacemaker is successful, a high death toll or an internationalization of the conflit diminish this possibility. The United Nations faces a higher risk to see its mediation effort to end in frustration the more democratic the country is that has fallen victim to a civil war. This puzzling relationship has, however, to be interpreted in light of the democratic civil peace. The more democratic a state is, the higher is it risk to experience a civil war. The failed UN led mediation attempts thus deal with conflicts that are particularly intense so that the domestic conflict resolution mechanism proved powerless in light of the deep social antagonisms.

Mediations which are led by the United Nations or a multilateral team have an increased chance to be successful. The United Nations tends to be a more effective mediator in cases were it is able to rely on forceful strategies. Recall in this context, however, that they are less likely to muster determined tactis than state mediators for which the positive effect of the usage of procedural or directive strategies is much smaller. When the United Nation acts as a mediator of the last resort and takes up the initiave after several failed attempts, its efforts to bring

peace are more easily frustrated. This means conversely that the United Nations fares much better if it is able to act early on. Mediation successesthat model 6 predicts well include the civil wars in Angola, Morocco, Mozambique, and Tajikistan). The model, conversely, forecasts a failure of mediation accurately during the second Chechen War in Russia (a mediation attempt in October 1999). Finally, cases in which state meditators initiated the conflict management attempt themselves exhibit an increasing danger to end without a positive result .

 ((Insert Table 4 here))

Putting the evidence of the various tests together, we find considerable support for the argument that we need to take both the structure of the conflict and the mediator identity into consideration if we want to understand the interlinked phases of mediation. Hypothesis 1 according to which the intensity of conflict matters ffor mediation occurrence, the strategies chosen and the success of the efforts receives overall quite solid empirical backing. While neither the length nor the duration of a conflict affect the chance that a particular strategy is chosen, these factors influence the probability that a conflict is mediated and, at least for UN mediations, that the conflict management will end with a peace agreement. Note, however, that, as suspected partly in the literature, war duration and war intensity have partly opposite influences: the former tends to render UN mediations more successful, while the latter has the opposite influence.

Our empirical tests lend some support to the second hypothesis. Internationalized wars are, to start with, not more likely to experience mediation in

general, but they find an increased chance that the United Nations are chosen as mediators in them. Simultaneously, as such wars are hard to settle in the first place, it is not surprising to see that, if they are mediated at all, the chance for a forceful mediation strategy is diminished. This means at least for some conflicts that the belligerents might be convinced that conflict management should take place, but that they prevent the mediation to be successful through the selection of a conflict manager with a reduced capacity for employing forceful strategies. If the conflict management team is led by the UN, the chance for a success of this mission is also reduced.

There is also some empirical evidence in favor of hypothesis 3 which links characteristics of a conflict country to the mediation phases. If a conflict country is large in terms of its population and is economically developed, it is less likely that this country will experience mediation as a conflict resolution strategy and, once this form of conflict management is nevertheless chosen, that these mediations are successful. Power, therefore, largely allows war-torn countries to shield themselves against conflict management. If warring parties decide nevertheless on mediation, they chose mediators which face a high chance to see their efforts frustrated in the end. Membership in an alliance, conversely, does not seem to prevent mediators to intervene, but once they have done so, mediation is more likely to end with failure, while this form of international entanglement does not affect the selection of mediation strategies systematically across the internal wars under examination.

We also examined which kind of strategies will be more successful. Our empirical tests provide ample evidence in favor of the expectation that the selection of forceful strategies makes a difference (H4). Moreover, we find support for the

assumption that indicates that it is better for a mediation attempt if it is not initiated by the mediator, be it a state or intergovernmental organization, but rather by the parties engaged in the dispute (Hy5). Finally, there is no systematic effect of where the mediation attempt taks place. The negative impact of third party mediation strategy on UN led conflict management just indicates that moving the negotiations to a country outside of the conflict zone is often not sufficient to bring peace, but it also might be that such cases are the especially difficult ones to mediate successfully.

Conclusion

The success of third parties in their endeavor to negotiate a peaceful settlement to a militarized conflict can be explained in terms of a mixture of different factors, some of them relating to the conflict itself, some relate to the parties that engage in conflict, and some relate to individual attributes of a mediator. Mediation is not just an exogenous input, unaffected by the reality of a conflict. Nor is it a mechanism totally dependent on who a mediator is, as we were led to think in the past. Mediation both affects and reflects, to some extent, the conflict environment in which it takes place. In this article, we have combined these considerations and explored whether the choice of mediation as a conflict management tool and the particular mediation strategy account for the relative success of conflict management attempts.

Structural factors are in general an important predictor of mediation occurrence and mediation success. Yet, not all our expectations are supported. The

longer a dispute lingers on and the more likely it is that it will find mediation as a

conflict management tool. However, the intensive conflicts in terms of battle deaths

are not necessarily always more likely to be mediated than less violent ones.

Moreover, if the intensity of combat has gone beyond a certain threshold it is harder

to resolve such conflict, although the UN is more destined to resolve such conflicts

successfully. Moreover, in case of mediation success a great role also play

characteristics related to a country, such as economic development, population and

membership in military alliance as well as whether foreign troops are present in a

country. All these characteristics negatively affect mediation effectiveness. We find

an interesting dynamics if we distinguish between mediation attempts led by the

single state or the United Nations. Thus, these findings imply that it matters who is

involved in mediation.

We find that it is important not only *who* mediates but also *how* this conflict

manager mediates. There is a great deal of support for the association between

mediation attempt attributes and mediation success. We also find that it matters

who initiates the mediation. It makes a difference whether there is only state-

mediator trying to mediate or whether the impulse comes from the warring parties.

We also demonstrate that the territory on which mediation takes place cannot be

ignored, as well as strategies used by mediators. However, the statistical results

show that previous mediation attempts do not negatively affect the likelihood of

mediation success sending an optimistic message to all mediators.

What do these findings indicate for the broader debate on mediation

effectiveness? Our analysis clearly shows that two sets of variables, one of them

structure- and one mediator-oriented, account for success and failure in the attempt

to resolve armed conflict on the international level. This implies that we will have to build models that consider both aspects rather than only focusing on either categories. We also demonstrated that mediation occurrence and mediation success are related. However, more research is required. In our analysis we only touched upon differences between types of mediators and their attributes in resolving conflict. A next step forward might be to furthermore focus on individual characteristics of the decision makers involved at the negotiation table, at their strategies and patterns of interaction.

References

Balch-Lindsay, Dylan, and Andrew J. Enterline. 2000. Killing time: The world politics of civil war duration, 1820-1992. *International Studies Quarterly* 44 (4): 615-42.

Beardsley, Kyle C. 2008. Agreement without peace? international mediation and time inconsistency problems. *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (4): 723-40.

Beardsley, Kyle C., David M. Quinn, Bidisha Biswas, and Jonathon Wilkenfeld. 2006. Mediation style and crisis outcomes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (1): 58-86.

Beardsley, Kyle. 2011. *The Mediation Dilemma*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Beber, Bernd. 2012. International Mediation, Selection Effects, and the Question of Bias. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* (29): 397-424.

Bercovitch, Jacob 1996. Understanding Mediation's Role in Preventative Diplomacy. *Negotiation Journal*, 12(3): 241-258.

Bercovitch, Jacob and Houston, Allison. 1993. Influence of mediator characteristics and behavior on the success of mediation in international relations. *International Journal of Conflict Management* 4 (4): 297-321.

Bercovitch, Jacob, and Houston, Allison. 1996. The study of international mediation: Theoretical issues and empirical evidence. In *Resolving international conflicts. the theory and practice of mediation*, ed. J. Bercovitch, 11-38. Boulder: Lynne.

Bercovitch, Jacob, and Gerald Schneider. 2000. Who mediates? the political economy of international conflict management. *Journal of Peace Research* 37 (2): 145-165. Bercovitch, Jacob and Karl R. DeRouen. 2004. Mediation in internationalized ethnic conflicts: Assessing the determinants of a successful process. *Armed Forces & Society* 30 (2): 147-170.

Bercovitch, Jacob, and Karl R. DeRouen. 2005. Managing ethnic civil wars: Assessing the determinants of successful mediation. *Civil Wars* 7 (1): 98-116.

Bercovitch, Jacob and Leah Simpson. 2010. International mediation and the question of failed peace agreements: Improving conflict management and implementation. *Peace & Change* 35 (1): 68-103.

Bercovitch, Jacob and Scott S. Gartner. 2006. Is there method in the madness of mediation? some lessons for mediators from quantitative studies of mediation. *International Interactions* 32 (4): 329-54.

Bercovitch, Jacob 1996. Understanding Mediation's Role in Preventative Diplomacy. *Negotiation Journal*, 12(3): 241-258.

Bercovitch, Jacob, J. Theodore Anagnoson, and Donnette L. Wille. 1991. Some

conceptual issues and empirical trends in the study of successful mediation in

international relations. *Journal of Peace Research* 28 (1): 7-17.

Bercovitch, Jacob (1986) International Mediation: A Study of Incidence, Strategies

and Conditions of Successful Outcomes. *Cooperation and Conflict* 21: 155-168.

Bercovitch, Jacob and Richard Jackson. 2001. Negotiation or Mediation? An

Exploration Factors Affecting the Choice of Conflict Management in

International Conflict. *Negotiation Journal* 17(1): 59-77.

Bercovitch, Jacob; Fretter, Judith. 2007. Studying International Mediation:

Developing Data Sets on Mediation, Looking for Patterns, and Searching for

Answers. *International Negotiation* 12 (2): 145-173.

Burton, John W. 1969. Conflict and communication: The use of controlled

communication in international relations. London: MacMillan.

Danner, Marc (1997) Clinton, the UN, and the Bosnian Disaster. *The New York

Review of Books*, December 18, 1997.

DeRouen, Karl 2003. The role of the UN in international crisis termination, 1945-

1994. *Defense and Peace Economics* 14 (4): 251-60.

DeRouen, Karl R, Bercovitch, Jacob and Pospieszna, Paulina. 2011. Introducing the

Civil Wars Mediation (CWM)Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (5): 663–

672.

DeRouen, Karl R., and J. Bercovitch. 2008. Enduring internal rivalries: A new

framework for the study of civil war. *Journal of Peace Research* 45 (1): 55-74.

DeRouen, Karl; Jacob Bercovitch and Jun Wei. 2009. Duration of peace and recurring

civil wars in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. *Civil Wars* 11(2): 103-120.

Dixon, William J. 1994. Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International

   Conflict. American Political Science Review 88(1): 14-32

Dixon, William J. 1993. Democracy and the Management of International Conflict.

   Journal of Conflict Resolution 37(1): 42-68.

Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. 2000. International peace building: A

   theoretical and quantitative analysis. *The American Political Science Review* 94

   (4): 779-801.

Elgstrom, Ole 1994. National Culture and International Negotiation. *Cooperation and*

   Conflict 29(3): 289-301.

Frazier, D. V., and W. J. Dixon. 2006. Third-party intermediaries and negotiated

   settlements, 1946-2000. *International Interactions* 32 (4): 385-408.

Gartner, Scott Sigmund. 2011. Signs of Trouble: Regional Organization Mediation

   and Civil War Agreement Durability. The Journal of Politics 73 (02): 380-390

Greig, J Michael and Paul F Diehl. 2006. Softening up: Making conflicts more

   amenable to diplomacy. *International Interactions* 32(4): 355-384.

Greig, J. Michael and Patrick M. Regan. 2008. "When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of

   the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars." International

   Studies Quarterly 52(4): 759-781.

Hegre, Havard; Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates and Nils Peter Gleditsch. 2001. Towards

   a democratic civil peace? Democracy, political change, and civil war, 1816-

   1992. *American Political Science Review* 95(10): 33-48.

Hensel, Paul R. 2001. Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of

   Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816-1992. *International Studies Quarterly*

   45 (1): 81-109.

Jarstad, Anna K. and Sisk, Timothy D. 2008. *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, eds. 2008. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kleiboer, Marieke. 1996. Understanding success and failure of international mediation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40 (2): 360-89.

Kuypers, Jim A. 1997. *Presidential Crisis Rhetoric and the Press in the Post-Cold War World*. Westport, CT: Praeger

Maoz, Zeev and Lesley Terris. 2009. Credibility and Strategy in International Mediation" *International Interactions*.

Mason, T. David, and Patrick J. Fett. 1996.) How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40 (4): 546–568.

Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin and Paul R. Hensel. 2007. International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements. *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4):721-737.

Rauchhaus, Robert 2006. Asymmetric information, mediation and conflict management. *World Politics* 58(2): 207-241.

Regan, Patrick M. and Aysegul Aydin. 2006. Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(5): 736-756.

Slim, Randa M. 1992. Small state mediation in international relations: The Algerian mediation of the Iranian hostage crisis. In *Mediation in international relations. multiple approaches to conflict management.*, eds. Jacob Bercovitch, Jeffrey. Z. Rubin, 206-231. New York: St. Martin Press.

Svensson, Isak. 2007. Mediation with muscles or minds? Exploring power mediators and pure mediators in civil wars. *International Negotiation* 12 (2): 229-48.

Terris, Lesley G. and Zeev Maoz (2005). "Rational Mediation: A Theory and a Test" *Journal of Peace Research, 42 (5):563-584.*

Touval, Saadia. 1994. Why the UN fails. Foreign Affairs 73(5): 44-57.

Wall, James A., John B. Stark John B, Rhetta L. Standifer 2001. Mediation: A current review and theory development. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(3): 370–391.

Wallensteen, Peter; Karl DeRouen Jr, Jacob Bercovitch and Frida Möller. 2009. Democracy and mediation in territorial civil wars in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. *Asia Europe Journal* 7(2): 241- 264.

Wallensteen, Peter and Isak Svensson (2014) Talking peace: International mediation in armed conflicts. *Journal of Peace Research* 51(2): 315–327.

Walter, Barbara 2002. *Committing to peace: The successful settlement of civil wars.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wilkenfeld, Jonathon., Kathleen Young, Victo Asal, and David M. Quinn. 2003. Mediating international crises: Cross-national and experimental perspectives. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47 (3): 279-301.

Young, Oran, 1967. *Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Zartman, I. William. 1989. *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Zartman, I. William, and Saadia Touval. 1996. International mediation in the post-cold war era. In *Managing global chaos*, edited by Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson (with Pamela Aall), 445-61. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Tables

Table 1. Mediation Occurrence by Mediator's Identity

	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Single party mediation			
Individual	15	4.70%	4.70%
IGOs	155		
United Nations	62	19.44%	24.14%
Other IGOs	93	29.15%	53.29%
States	149		
UN Security Counil permanent members	45	14.11%	67.40%
Other states	104	32.60%	100.00%
Total	319	100.00%	
Multiparty mediation			
UN-led	33	25.38%	25.38%
Group of states	59	45.38%	70.77%
Mixed mediation	38		
UN+EU mediation	14	10.77%	81.54%
Other mixed mediation	24	18.46%	100.00%
Total	130	100.00%	

Table 2. Mediation Occurrence in Civil Wars (Probit and Multinomial Probit Model)

	Mediation (No/Yes)l	UN	State	Other Single Party Mediations^	Multiparty Mediation
	(1)	(2)			
Population	-0.001**	-.0000398	-.0000731**	-1.73e-06	-0.000075
	(0.0005)	(0.000066)	(0.0000267)	(7.17e-06)	(0.00005)
GDPpc	-0.00007**	-0.0001626**	-0.0000492	-0.0001**	-0.0000402
	(0.00003)	(0.0000694)	(0.0000451)	(0.00005)	(0.00003)
War Duration	0.0001151**	0.0001892**	0.000075	0.00012*	0.0000726
	(0.000037)	(0.0000694)	(0.0000483)	(0.000069)	(0.00004)
Battle Deaths	0.0017873	-0.0009027	0.0058431**	0.0020444	0.0027299
	(0.0013)	(0.0048625)	(0.0027152)	(0.002008)	(0.00264)
Member of Military	0.1580209	0.3639161	0.3282339	0.2176302	-0.314692
Alliance	(0.314478)	(0.5309181)	0.4369154	(0.44558)	(0.4315)
Polity	0.0395039*	0.0371977	0.0347218	0.0092015	
	(0.02045)	(0.0501573)	(0.036562)	(0.0393235)	0.075102**
					(0.02617)
Recurrence	-0.298969	-0.6486394*	-0.3809034	-0.4815856	0.197734
	(0.2146357)	(0.3405842)	0.2901359	(0.31256)	(0.36607)
Internationalized	0.4560779	1.311875**	-0.0978715	0.5279265	0.6015167
	(0.3773673)	(0.623541)	(0.481389)	(0.578804)	(0.4477)
Constant	-0.1645987	-1.510116	-0.765449	-0.8820352	-1.38579
	0.2686601	(0.4141841)	(0.5068571)	(0.45807)	(0.36375)
N	581	581			
Wald chi2(32)	32.42	277.42			
Prob > chi2	0.001	0.0000			
Log pseudolikelihood	-309.62808	-772.05863			

^ Other mediation efforts include single mediation by IGOs (other than the UN) or individual mediators.
Baseline category is no mediation. Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.
Std. Err. adjusted for clusters in dyad

Table 3. Occurrence of Mediation Strategies (Probit and Multinomial Probit Model)

	Mediation Strategy (No/Yes)	Directive Strategy	Procedural	Communication Facilitation
	(1)		(2)	
Mediation Characteristics				
Mediator's Identity				
UN	0.2264124	-.1968653	.2423928	.4951359
	(0.328636)	(.5917868)	(.4760037)	(.6268636)
State	1.190574***	1.205059**	1.506586***	1.663265**
	(0.276)	(.4219976)	(.4051932)	(.5287795)
Multiparty mediation	0.7815429**	.7672415	1.023726**	.8134366*
	(0.3692338)	(.5352671)	(.5070184)	(.4712282)
Initiation of Mediation				
Mediator	1.695873***	1.879907**	2.179578***	2.307024***
	(0.4581534)	(.6529622)	(.5777472)	(.7067098)
Structural Factors				
Population	2.02e-06	5.18e-06	-7.05e-06	.0000103
	(3.48e-06)	(5.71e-06)	(6.11e-06)	(6.89e-06)
GDPpc	-0.0000181	-9.51e-06	-.0000185	-.0000509
	(0.0000183)	(.0000268)	(.0000305)	(.0000441)
War Duration	8.20e-06	.0000107	.0000184	-.0000168
	(0.0000254)	(.0000373)	(.0000377)	(.00006)
Battle Deaths	0.0001615	.0000716	.0009928	.0000494
	(0.001117)	(.0022405)	(.0016005)	(.00337)
Member of Military Alliance	0.5434943	-.3304739	.6639665	1.357517
	(0.3645688)	(.8922168)	(.441213)	(.8711567)
Polity	0.001605	-.0174471	-.0122269	.0976091*
	(0.0199309)	(.0328837)	(.0291781)	(.055465)
Recurrence	0.3770394*	.4580913	.6277243*	-.068274
	(0.2181869)	(.4835473)	(.330926)	(.4646124)
Internationalized	-0.2708124	-10.65454***	-.1721821	-.8520161
	(0.4379036)	(.8505968)	(.5832561)	(.8024954)
Previous mediation	2.786902***	3.323569***	3.554514***	3.762324***
	(0.355944)	(.5384721)	(.4362843)	(.5640699)
Constant	-1.965999	-3.297119	-2.734281	-5.148294
	(0.2705797)	(.5270245)	(.3731019)	(.9929226)
N	581		581	
Wald chi2(39)	125.39		8405.63	
Prob > chi2	0.0000		0.0000	
Log pseudolikelihood	-106.40959		-300.15614	

Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Std. Err. adjusted for clusters in dyad

Table 4. Mediation Success in Civil Wars (probit model)

	General		State		UN	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Mediation Characteristics						
Mediator's Identity						
UN	0.514*	0.860***				
	(0.312)	(0.299)				
State	0.177	0.0664				
	(0.224)	(0.231)				
Multiparty mediation	0.442**	0.450*				
	(0.216)	(0.252)				
Decisive Strategies	0.277	0.380*	0.389	0.778**	0.583	5.406**
	(0.194)	(0.211)	(0.284)	(0.303)	(0.827)	(2.261)
Third Party Mediation Territory	0.265	0.0372	0.206	0.125	-0.172	-1.688*
	(0.170)	(0.189)	(0.250)	(0.313)	(0.622)	(1.005)
Initiator of Mediation						
State Mediator	-0.280	-0.631***	-0.460*	-0.765**		
	(0.182)	(0.185)	(0.245)	(0.318)		
IGOs	-0.0525	-0.0418			0.625	2.095
	(0.286)	(0.303)			(0.513)	(1.544)
Previous Mediation Attempts	-0.0542	-0.0977	-0.137	-0.131	-0.379	-2.336**
	(0.206)	(0.245)	(0.291)	(0.345)	(0.701)	(1.011)
Structural Factors						
Population		-0.0007*		0.00493		-0.034***
		(0.0003)		(0.00531)		(0.0106)
GDPpc		-0.00005***		-0.00007***		-0.0004**
		(0.00002)		(0.00002)		(0.00016)
War Duration		0.0333		0.171		1.766**
		(0.0734)		(0.129)		(0.738)
Battle Deaths		0.000331		-0.00024		-0.007**
		(0.000218)		(0.00031)		(0.00299)
Member of Military Alliance		-0.702*		-1.114**		-3.441**
		(0.381)		(0.542)		(1.315)
Polity		0.0302		0.0318		-0.175**
		(0.0201)		(0.0377)		(0.0832)
Recurrence		-0.457*		-0.522		2.589**
		(0.252)		(0.373)		(1.052
Internationalized		-0.227		0.787		-1.249**
		(0.351)		(1.089)		(0.626)
Constant	-0.515**	-0.629	-0.277	-1.706*	-0.268	-8.659**
	(0.254)	(0.611)	(0.417)	(0.968)	(0.689)	(4.349)
N	305	281	93	89	48	42
Log pseudolikelihood	-202.3418	-170.3577	-60.87841	-50.5075	-32.6892	-17.56593
Pseudo R2	0.0337	0.1186	0.0460	0.1721	0.0163	0.3956
% correctly predicted	0.6035	0.7176	0.5367	0.6576	0.7131	0.6948
ROC Area	58.36%	67.62%	60.22%	69.66%	54.17%	80.95%

Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001. Std. Err. adjusted for clusters in dyad