The Illusion of "Peace through Power-sharing": Constitutional Choice in the Shadow of Civil War

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Conflict managers around the world cling to the hope that power-sharing decreases the risk of civil war in post-conflict societies. Distinguishing between territorial and governmental conflicts, we identify the lack of inclusion of potential rebels as a major source of the initial conflict. However, the analysis reveals that the war outcome rather than power-sharing rules like proportional representation or increased autonomy increase the chance of consociationalist arrangements and that they do not prevent the recurrence of conflict. Our results suggest that constitution makers should advocate power-sharing with caution as including rebels into a government might increase the risk of war recurrence.

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INTRODUCTION

Argentina and Sri Lanka experienced violent internal wars pitting an opposition movement against the respective government, and both made similar powersharing institutional choices in the wake of the civil conflicts. The constitution of both conflict-ridden countries introduced proportional representation as a key electoral reform in the early 1960s (Argentina) and in the late 1980s (Sri Lanka).[1] The decision to opt against the majority rule used earlier should theoretically have increased the chance of small parties to become part of a ruling coalition, enabling strong minorities to share power. However, the fate of the post-conflict societies differed greatly despite their common constitutional choices. While Sri Lanka fell again victim to an internal conflict involving the same actors as before, Argentina maintained a fragile peace until the coup against President Allende.

Such contrasting experiences raise two questions: First, what motivated the countries to embrace power-sharing institutions such as proportional representation? Second, to what extent does the adoption of institutions like proportional representation, which are typically associated with power-sharing, render governments more encompassing and reduce the risk of recurrent fighting? Drawing on Lijphart´s pioneering work on consociationalism[2], proponents of the power-sharing approach maintain that the warring parties who act in the shadow of inclusive institutional arrangements after a conflict which pitted them against each other should have less to fight about since they face a reasonable chance to obtain access to state resources through the inclusion into government at some point. However, the results in support of this conjecture are mixed. Some scholars have established that political power-sharing between governments and insurgents lowers the risk of war in ethnically, linguistically or religiously deeply divided societies.[3] Schneider and Wiesehomeier, for instance, establish that participation of minorities in federal or regional governments pacifies ethnically diverse societies in general.[4] Lustick et al., however, maintain that the inclusion of minorities reduces the threat of secession more effectively than repression, but also encourages larger groups to build "identitarian movements."[5]

We empirically re-examine in this article the controversy over the role of power-sharing institutions by focusing on their role in post-conflict societies and by differentiating between the potential effects of the rules associated with consociationalism (*power-sharing institutions*) and the real inclusion of former rebel organizations into the government (*power-sharing arrangements*). We contend that power-sharing may indeed generally be helpful in preventing dividing societies from embarking on a course of internal violence, but that they might not be strong enough to counter-act the disruptive forces which continue to linger on in a society after the end of a first civil war. We also examine the claim that the choice for power-sharing depends on the outcome of the internal conflict and the power-sharing institutions and arrangements that characterized the pre-war societies.

The empirical examination of the adaption and effectiveness of power-sharing institutions in post-conflict societies after World War II supports the double skepticism. First, we find that both de jure and de facto power-sharing after a conflict largely reflects the institutions and political power constellations

before a country fell victim to the internal conflict. We show first that the introduction of constitutional reforms that theoretically enable a society to embrace the benefits of power-sharing are very rare and that most democracies stick to their pre-war institutional setting. However, in line with our theoretical expectation, the de facto clout of the former rebels in the post-war society often increases in the event of a mediated end of the violence. Second, neither federalism nor proportional representation are seemingly sufficiently strong to overcome the divisive forces within a post-conflict society. The existence of federalism before conflict positively affects the occurrence of territorial conflict, however does not lead to recurrence of conflict in the long-term. Third, p*ower-sharing arrangements* rather than *power-sharing institutions* affect the probability of war recurrence. Ethnically polarized societies and fractionalized states also face a higher risk to become embroiled in territorial conflict, whereas highly fractionalized countries are less likely to experience a governmental conflict. We conclude our evaluation of post-conflict power-sharing with pointing out that constitution makers should consider the ethnic divisions and also other pertinent cleavages when opting for a more inclusive political system.

THE POWER-SHARING CONTROVERSY

Power-sharing has become a popular synonym for Arend Lijphart's concept of "consociational democracy."[6]Although Lijphart´s original model did not refer to post-conflict societies *per se*, conflict researchers and policy makers around the world frequently advocate it as a means to pacify post-conflict societies. According to this adage, inclusive institutions should make disputants have less to fight about since even relatively small groups have the prospect to gain access to state resources through peaceful means at some point. This positive effect should result from institutional changes along at least one of the four definitional components of consociationalism: (1) a grand coalition implying that all rival groups should be included in government, (2) a system of mutual veto power, (3) proportionality in political representation, civil service appointment, and allocation of public funds and (4) autonomy for ethnic segments, such as federalism.

A growing number of scholars has examined the role of inclusive constitutional arrangements on the prospects for democracy and peace in war-torn states. [7] Some studies have established that political power-sharing between governments and insurgents lowers the risk of war in ethnically or religiously diverse societies.[8] Most of these examinations focus on the risk of conflict in all countries in the world irrespective of whether or not they have recently experienced a civil war or not.

A growing number of studies assesses the capacity of power-sharing as a post-conflict management tool. [9] Defining it more broadly as rules ensuring that none of the parties has a dominant position over another, these examinations come to mixed results which particular power-sharing provision included in peace agreements expands the duration of these treaties.[10] Others point out that power-sharing might not necessarily help maintaining post-conflict stability or democracy in the long run or that it even counter-productively sows the seeds of future discord.[11]

Advocates of power-sharing portray it as an especially pertinent mechanism in societies that are socially or ethnically highly divided and in which the exclusion of minorities from government is therefore an issue that the post-conflict constitution builders have to reckon with. Reynal-Querol has shown that countries with inclusive political systems face a lower risk of internal war.[12] Based on theoretical work by Esteban and Ray[13], Schneider and Wiesehomeier[14] demonstrate that this pacifying impact depends on the manifestation of diversity. While proportional representation combined with fractionalization and polarization decreases the risk of conflict, fractionalization in the interaction with federalism similarly pacifies states.

Horowitz, conversely, contends that proportional representation increases the risk that the party system becomes ethnically more politicized and that vote choice increases along ethnic fault lines within a society. [15] Although Lustick et al. maintain that power-sharing can be more effective in reducing the threat of secession than repression, they also similarly propose that it tends to encourage larger minorities to form "identitarian movements." [16] Huber[17], however, provides encompassing empirical evidence that one of the key components of consociationalisam, proportional representation, decreases the ethnic identification of voters.[18]

Various other reasons may explain the instability of power-sharing governments, not the least difficulties in holding the coalition together. This is most pronouncedly the case for those developing countries that opted for institutions that are similar to the ones of their former colonial expropriators.[19] However, little is known why some countries adopt new power-sharing institutions in the post-conflict period and whether this choice results from the circumstances surrounding the end of the war. Mukherjee [20], for example, in analysing why political power-sharing agreements lead to peaceful resolution of civil wars in some cases, but not others, finds that insurgents have incentives to accept a political power-sharing agreement and not revert to fighting after a decisive military victory. Recent studies of the duration of peace agreements[21] alert us against the danger to treat power-sharing institutions as an exogenous factor. As not all post-conflict societies adopt or maintain power-sharing institutions, we should consider that such constitutional choices and their effectiveness are contingent on the war outcome. In other words, post-conflict societies with inclusive political institutions might not be a random sample of all war-affected countries.

We will in the following address this debate and examine how war outcomes and the institutional legacy of conflict-affected countries shape the decision on post-war power-sharing adaptation and how eventual consociationalist choices have the desired double effect of making governments more inclusive and of reducing the risk of war recurrence.

WAR TERMINATION AND POWER-SHARING

The theoretical argument advanced in this article challenges the implicit assumption of the literature that key constitutional and political choices in the aftermath of war are made independently of the war outcome and the institutional setting before the conflict erupted. Further, we contend that the constitutional choice to adopt power-sharing institutions does not necessarily

improve the chance of the former rebel forces to be co-opted into government or to reach more political autonomy for the territory in which they are mainly living. We finally examine in line with the power sharing literature whether key institutional attributes of power-sharing or increased power of the former rebels influence the risk of war recurrence.

We will develop hypotheses on the different parts of our assessment of power-sharing in turn. The study distinguishes between *power-sharing institutions* (PSI) and *power-sharing arrangements* (PSA). While the former notion stands for the rules a diverse set of researchers has associated in the footsteps of Lijphart with the potential inclusiveness of a political system, the latter concept represents the real inclusiveness of rebels at the federal or regional level. Further, this study examines the effects of horizontal vs. vertical power-sharing dimensions: i) horizontal power-sharing manifests itself through proportional representation (PSI) and the inclusiveness of the central government (PSA), and ii) vertical power-sharing stands for federalist rules (PSI) and the *de facto* political autonomy granted to former rebel groups (PSA).

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Table 1 about here

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To start our evaluation of post-conflict power-sharing, we will first examine key determinants of both power-sharing institutions and powersharing arrangements. These distinctions necessitate that we analyse in a next step how horizontal (vertical) power-sharing institutions and arrangements influence the risk for renewed conflicts over the control of the central government or a particular territory.

*Pre-War Institutions, War Outcomes and Adoption of Power-Sharing***:** How does the war outcome affect the choice of power-sharing institution and the real inclusiveness of the political system? The literature on how different termination types influence the choice of post-conflict institutions is very scarce. While some studies focus on the impact of negotiated settlement and victory on the durability of peace[22] or the impact of power-sharing provisions in peace agreements[23], they do not account for the effect of constitutional choices by post-conflict societies.

We believe that decision makers only tend to agree to resort to these inclusive institutions if the sharing of power with a contending group allows them to enter government or to extend their stay in office. Such a possibility almost naturally arises if the civil war ended with a negotiated or mediated agreement instead of a victory by one side. Moreover, since many external negotiators tend to consider power-sharing as a good mechanism for keeping countries peaceful or for pacifying societies after the end of a civil war in the long term[24], they push for such provisions in peace agreements.

If a political group, however, emerged victorious from a war, it does typically not have any incentive to share power. The clear winners of a conflict will only make substantial constitutional concessions that possibly benefit the losers of the armed conflict if the ethnic fabric of a country seems sufficiently stable to guarantee their hold on electoral power. Obviously, these expectations

might be overly optimistic. Elster and others have maintained that constitution makers often misperceive their own power or the preferences that they might have in the future about a particular policy issue.[25] The Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" that is surrounding constitutional negotiations consequently leads to the adaptation of rules that have their own life and that might work against the very interests of the constitution makers.

In many post-conflict societies, decision makers will stick to the rules that existed before the conflict. The institutional legacy makes it quite likely that a war-torn country readopts power-sharing institutions again although these rules had not prevented the country from embarking on a destructive path in the first place. Obviously, a host of other factors such as colonial heritage or ethnic diversity influenced the pre-conflict constitutional choices.[26] However, as we are only interested in the causes of post-conflict adaptation of power-sharing institutions in this article, this article only examines whether or not a state inherited these rules from the pre-war era.

H1: A war-torn country is more likely to introduce power-sharing institutions in the first period of reconstruction if the civil conflict had ended with a conclusion of a peace agreement and if it possessed power-sharing institutions before the civil war.

Is PR a panacea for post-conflict countries? The electoral rule most closely associated with power-sharing is proportional representation.[27] Indeed, Lijphart[28] lists this institution - specifically, closed-list proportional representation in not overly large districts—among his recommendation for ethnically divided societies emerging from civil war and regime instability. The rationale behind this advice is that PR system allows a minority group to establish its own party, thereby avoiding the frustration that its interests are not represented.[29] Yes, while researchers disagree over whether PR is desirable in divided societies[30], there is a considerable consensus in the footsteps of Duverger that this electoral rule is closely associated with the presence of multiparty systems. This law also suggests by extension that PR improves the chance of a minority group to be represented in the political process.

Although the international community frequently calls for the adaptation of proportional representation, the effectiveness of this electoral power-sharing option for both democracy and peace is nevertheless heavily debated. Combining the evidence of both large-N and case studies, Norris[31] finds for instance that countries with PR electoral systems are more democratic than majoritarian democracies. Regardless of these merits the questions remains whether proportional representation is an effective instrument to promote civil peace. To start with, Cammett and Malesky[32] find strong support for their argument that closed-list PR systems with their depersonalizing effect on elections have rendered post-conflict societies more peaceful. Reilly[33] conversely argues in line with Horowitz[34] that 'efficient' institutions are those that can deliver clear parliamentary majorities to disciplined political parties offering distinct policy alternatives as the basis of their claim to government and these are more likely to be associated with majoritarian electoral laws. Similarly, Quade[35] favours plurality systems. Although PR systems in theory have the advantage of

providing better representation of minorities in parliament, they also replicate, according to these sceptical voices, social schisms in the legislature, which adds to the difficulties in establishing and sustaining coalition governments. Thus, PR may not only increase the instability of fragile states recovering from war, but it may in this view also deepen the cleavages of an already divided society.

The scepticism of these scholars about the pacifying effects of PR stands in marked contrast to the optimism that the literature attributes to power sharing arrangements. A broad range of scholars argues that including parties with a stake in post-war developments may prolong peace. [36] According to this adage, oppressed and discriminated groups may find peace after a conflict too costly if they continue to be excluded from government. Gurr and Stedman demonstrated along these lines that politically excluded former combatants return more frequently to violent tactics.[37] Note, however, that overly inclusive post-conflict arrangements might backfire. Slater and Simmons[38] find in a comparative case study of Bolivia and Indonesia that "promiscuous" power-sharing might even destabilize countries through the unpopular nature of party cartels that the political elites conclude in the aftermath of a war. Be that as it may, this article will test the optimistic expectation of the traditional power-sharing literature that proportional representation and the political inclusiveness of the central executive will make countries more peaceful after a governmental conflict.

H2: Proportional representation and the political inclusiveness after the end of a militarized conflict over the control of government increase the chance of enduring peace.

Federalism as a peace-sustaining structure? Federalism is a second key part of Lijphart's consociational democracy. It is the "most typical and drastic method" of power distribution because it constrains the central government which must give up some decision-making power to the lower-level units.[39] Territorial power-sharing between the centre of a country and its regions allows for a better representation of citizens' interests as citizens can have a better access to the policy-makers. In case of post-conflict countries, the adoption of a federal system may be a solution especially if the internal conflict resulted from minorities' exclusion and fragmentation. Treisman[40] argues that federalism appeases the demands of those groups that search their own national identity, thus in divided societies it is a visible solution. Schneider and Wiesehomeier[41], for example, find that participation of minorities in federal or regional government might help to pacify ethnically diverse societies in general.

According to the advocates of vertical power-sharing, the federal system may help preserve peace as minorities have a better access to the decision-making process, thus installing a balance of power[42] and allowing a targeted provision of public goods.[43] Stepan suggests that in divided societies federalism help the state to "hold together".[44] He also stresses the importance of federal structure of government for some regions as a prerequisite for the consolidations of a fragile democracy. Bermeo suggests that the pacifying mechanism of autonomy only works within democracies, as authoritarian federal structures gave a birth to secessionist civil wars.[45]

Although the choice to commit to a federal structure may be part of the institutional legacy[46], it can also be the result of the conviction that granting more autonomy to the territorial subunits might pacify a state after a territorial conflict[47] Chapman and Roeder[48] find that partition emerges as a better solution than other territorial institutional setups as it keeps the former enemies really apart from each other. Be that as it may, federalist solutions are much more likely in countries in which strong minorities dominate the populations of some subregions. It is in the light of the endogenous nature of federal arrangements that Christin and Hug[49] find that a growing number of minority-ruled federal units increases the risk of ethnic civil war onsets. It is therefore against the Lijphartian expectations doubtful if the empowerment of these minorities after a conflict decreases the chance of civil war recurrence.

Territorial power-sharing can also take the form of a *de facto* or *de jure* autonomy granted to some specific regions only. Devolved powers were for instance granted to the Basque country and some other regions in the aftermath of the Spanish democratization process. However, this specific example suggests that territorial power-sharing might not be sufficient in preventing a group from calling for total independence. [50]On the contrary, territorial concessions in the form of regional autonomy might strengthen group identification and thereby increase the risk of war recurrence. We nevertheless expect in line with the traditional power-sharing literature that federalism and de facto autonomy decrease the chance of a recurrence of a territorial conflict.

H3: De jure and de facto autonomy reduce the chance of recurrence of a territorial conflict.

RESEARCH DESIGN

To empirically evaluate power-sharing institutions and arrangements, we rely on different data sets. As the empirical analysis covers post-conflict societies, we resort to the Conflict Termination dataset (v.2010-1)[51] to select the cases. This source includes information about terminated civil war episodes as identified by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).[52] The dataset used for the analysis are 601 post-conflict dyads for which the civil conflict with at least 25 fatalities was terminated between1946 and 2009.[53]

The UCDP Conflict Termination dataset distinguishes seven different types of conflict terminations. We grouped war termination types into four variables: *Peace Agreement (*coded 1 if peace agreement resolved the conflict, 0 otherwise) and *Victory* (1 if one of the sides acknowledges defeat and surrenders, 0 otherwise), *Ceasefire* (1 (0) there is an (no) agreement between all *or* the main parties on the ending of military operations), and *Inconclusive* (coded as 1 if the conflict ended in another way or low activity; 0-otherwise). Note that about 27% of all terminations ended with the victory of one of the warring sides, and 13% with the conclusion of a negotiated peace agreement, while 9% were ceasefires, and 51% of the conflicts winded up inconclusively.

As we distinguish between vertical power-sharing as a solution to conflicts over regional autonomy and horizontal power-sharing as a remedy for a civil war over the control of the central government, we rely on the UCDP to

identify the original incompatibility between the rebels and the government. *Territorial (Governmental) Conflict* is coded as 1 if the war was over the control of territory (of government) , 0 otherwise. Our study evaluates whether the adoption of power-sharing institutions and arrangements consolidates peace and prevents a dyad from relapsing into conflict. *Recurrence* measures, based on information in the UCDP termination dataset, whether a conflict in a particular dyad recurs within 5 years after the end of the war or not.

We restrict the analysis of the adoption of power sharing institutions to democratic countries and thus exclusively to the cases where these rules could have had the desired effect of growing inclusiveness and peace duration. The analysis relies partly on the *Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World* (1946-2011) dataset collected by Bormann and Golder[54] to identify whether a democracy relied on power-sharing institutions or not. We also used this source to code for occurrence of elections and the type of electoral systems used before the start date of the conflict in order to trace whether there were any changes in the electoral systems or in the type of democracy before and after the conflict episodes. The data set employs the minimalist definition of democracy introduced by Przeworski et al.[55] according to which (i) the chief executive is elected, (ii) the legislature is elected, (iii) there is more than one party competing in elections, and (iv) an alternation under identical electoral rules has taken place. Distinguishing between many different types of *Electoral Systems* for legislative and presidential elections, we distinguish between *Parliamentary*, *Mixed* (Semi-presidential), and *Presidential* democracies. Table 2 details the kind of electoral rules used in the 99 post-conflict democratic settings analysed for a test of hypotheses 1 and 2.

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Table 2 about here

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In order to measure whether a country grants its sub-units *de jure* some autonomy, we relied on *Database of Political Institutions (DPI)* compiled by the Development Research Group of the World Bank and the *Institutions and Election Project (IAEP)* dataset.[56] Out of twelve federal countries we identified two federal post-conflict democracies, India, and Venezuela. We also added, based on the DPI dataset data set, we coded several former unitary post-conflict democracies that have granted autonomy to some regions: Greece, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, Serbia, and the United Kingdom.

In our study we also aim to establish the *de facto* power sharing. To this end we need to identify whether the power status of the rebels has improved after the conflict or not. The first step in the construction of the two variables on horizontal and vertical power-sharing was the identification of the dominant ethnicity of the rebels using the UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia[57], datasets and international organizations (Minorities at Risk Project, International Crisis Group, UNHCR Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Human Rights Watch, OECD, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization) as well as monographs and articles on specific countries. Second, we identified, using data from the EPR-ETH (Ethnic Power Relations) Version 2.0 Group-Level dataset, the status of the ethnic group. The status variables in this source contains the following

categories: 1: Regional Autonomy; 2: Dominant; 3: Senior Partner; 4: Junior Partner; 5: Discriminated; 6: Separatist Autonomy; 7: Powerless; 8: State Collapse; 9: Monopoly; 10: Irrelevant. *Rebel Political Inclusion* (coded as Senior Partner or Junior Partner) and *Rebel Political Autonomy* (coded as Regional or Separatist Autonomy), which we coded five years after the conflict and one year before the start date of the conflict, traces the pre- and post-conflict status of the rebel organizations.

The empirical evaluation of *de jure* and *de facto* post-conflict power-sharing institutions and arrangements will control for the influence of ethnicity. Some scholars suggest that "ethnic conflict" create greater security concerns and that, as a consequence, the risk of conflict recurrence looms particularly large in ethnically divided societies.[58] However, Hartzell et al. [59]do not find support for this claim. Horowitz[60] points our that there is less violence in both highly homogeneous and highly heterogeneous societies, which suggests that ethnic fractionalization may not have a negative effect on the peace preservation in the post-conflict scenario. This claim motivated scholars to take a closer look at the impact of ethnic polarization on likelihood and intensity of conflict. Elbadawi[61] as well as Montalvo and Reynal-Querol[62] find that ethnically polarized societies have a higher risk of falling victim to a civil war. As power-sharing is traditionally portrayed as a remedy for highly diverse countries, we control for the ethnic structure of the countries under examination with two variables, *Fractionalization* and *Polarization*. We relied on the Hirschman-Herfindahl[63] measure of fractionalization (F) and on the Esteban-Ray[64] measure of polarization as adopted by Reynal-Querol (RQ):[65]

$$F = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \pi_i (1 - \pi_i) \qquad (1) \qquad \text{and} \qquad RQ = 4 \sum_{i=1}^{N} \pi_i^2 (1 - \pi_i) \qquad (2)$$

where π denotes the relative size of the relevant group, be they ethnically religiously or linguistically defined. We relied on information on the number of groups and their size from the ETH Ethnic Power Relations (1946 to 2009) dataset (henceforth EPR-ETH).[66] Specifically, we employed the GROUPSIZE variable from the group-level sub-dataset that calculates each ethnic group's population size relative to the host country's entire population. Since the ethnic composition rarely changes, we took the most recent year to calculate fractionalization and polarization indices, and we included all ethnic groups identified in the dataset. The higher the value of either index is, the more polarized or fragmented the country under consideration is. Note that the two measures are not as closely correlated as the ones used in other studies; the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.40.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

This article evaluates post-conflict power-sharing in three steps. We will first evaluate the extent to which democracies have opted for inclusive rules in the wake of a civil war. The article then assesses the extent to which the *de jure* power sharing affects the *de facto* inclusiveness of the post-conflict political

systems. The final step in our analysis is whether both de jure and de facto power-sharing reduce the risk of recurring civil conflict.

Determinants of Power-sharing Institutions (PSI): The first hypothesis states that post-conflict institutional choices largely reflect the institutional setting before the conflict started and the outcome of the conflict. Our expectation that the constitutional choices after the end of a civil war are largely endogenous is at least partly supported. As Table A-2 in the online appendix demonstrates, the institutional legacy of a country strongly determines the rules that it adopts or continues to use after a conflict. In other words, if a war-torn country relied on proportional representation before the war, it is highly probable that it employs such a purportedly inclusive institution after the end of the bloodshed, too, in case it stays democratic. This also implies more generally that the cases where a democracy opted for the institutional status quo outnumber the constitutional changes by far (See Table A-3). 90% of the first post conflict parliamentary elections relied for instance on the same electoral system as the one that was in place before the conflict. Of the four countries for which we observe a change in the electoral system, two moved from a majoritarian system to proportional representation (Argentina , 1965, and Sri Lanka, 1989), one from a majoritarian to a mixed electoral system (Philippines, 1998) and another one from PR to a mixed electoral system (Venezuela, 1993). [67]

Moves between Parliamentarism to Presidentialism, a majoritarian institution in the absence of some special quorum, are even less frequent. Sierra Leone shifted from the former to the latter system after the civil war of the mid-1990s, Sri Lanka had made the equivalent transition in the legislative elections of 1989 after the internal conflict with EPRLF and TELO, and Suriname also opted for a Presidential system in the beginning of the 1990s after the conflict with SLA, ending it pre-conflict parliamentary tradition. Introducing a federalist structure or granting autonomy to some regions is more widespread, but still not overly frequent. Ethiopia (1994), Iraq (2003), Malaysia (1963), and Nepal (2007) moved from a unitary to a federal system, while seven countries strengthened the powers of some regions five years after the end of a civil war. Myanmar (2011); Pakistan (1948); United Kingdom (1998); Moldova (1995); Democratic Republic of Congo (2003):

In light of the persistence of the institutional status quo, it is not surprising that the war outcome does not seem to be a strong correlate of the choice of the electoral system. Ceasefires exert, somehow surprisingly, a negative effect on the chance that a post-conflict society opts for proportional representation; only 37% of all conflicts endings with a ceasefire result in legislative election that rely on this institution. This constitutional choice is more frequent after conflicts that ended inconclusively (49%), and even less frequent after victories (24%) or peace agreements (21%).

The association between conflict termination and the type of democracy are more in line with our theoretical expectation. The chance that the constitution makers opt for a presidential system or a unitary system grows after a victory by either the government or the rebel forces after the conflict. Note, however, that presidential democracies and thus majoritarian systems are far more likely to experience a civil war than parliamentary ones, as Schneider and Wiesehomeier report.[68] It is also not surprising that the ethnic structure of a

country is closely associated with some of the rules that democracies use. Although it is impossible to disentangle any causal relationship in the cross-sectional design used here, note that fractionalization is positively associated with majoritarianism, the usage of qualified majority systems in presidential elections, parliamentarism as well as federalism. Polarization, conversely, is positively associated with the usage of PR and negatively with majoritarian electoral system.

In sum, the quantitative and qualitative evidence provided on the constitutional choices in the aftermath of civil wars suggest that discussions on the introduction of power-sharing institutions seem to be largely an academic exercise. In most cases, countries which were democratic before the war relied on the same rules again.

Determinants of Power-sharing Arrangements and War Recurrence

The usage of the Lijphartian institutional recommendations does not yet guarantee that the political system is sufficiently inclusive to prevent a renewal of the civil conflict. The last part of our empirical inquiry therefore tests whether vertical and horizontal power-sharing institutions increase the power of the rebels after a conflict and whether these rules and the power distribution possibly resulting from them influence the risk of war recurrence.

The results show that rebels were becoming part of the central government after a conflict in several instances: Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Nigeria, Pakistan and South Yemen. Some wars improved their already existent power-sharing status before the conflict (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Chad, and Ghana). However, some ethnic groups shifted from being a partner before the conflict to obtaining a dominant position like the Alawis in Syria in the second half of the 1960s. Conflicts also help formerly discriminated or powerless ethnic groups to gain de facto autonomy like in Myanmar and Philippines.[69]

In order to examine these changes in rebel groups' real power in the post-conflict period we use two-stage probit models. The first stage of these regressions examines whether powersharing rules or arrangements as well as the ethnic diversity of a conflict have influence the onset of a governmental or a territorial conflict. Based on EPR-ETH Version 2.0 Group-Level dataset and our matching efforts as described in the research design, *Rebels Exclusion* measures the pre-war status of the rebels. It is coded as 1 if ethnic group was "Discriminated", "Powerless" or "Irrelevant". The second step considers the impact of the conflict type outcomes and the appropriate power-sharing institutions on the chance that rebels will gain power-sharing status or political autonomy status. Using EPR-ETH data again, we created two dependent variables: i) *Gained Political Inclusion* that is coded 1 if rebels´ ethnic group changed it status from "Discriminated", "Powerless", and "Irrelevant" to "Senior Partner" or "Junior Partner" or if moved from "Junior Partner" to "Senior Partner" in the first five years after the conflict in comparison to the pre-war situation; ii) *Gained Political Autonomy*, which is 1 if the rebels gained within the same time frame "Regional" or "Separatist Autonomy". We report the results of the two-stage probit model in Table 3. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering on dyads.

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Table 3 about here
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The results reported in Table 3 show that power-sharing rules might be a mixed blessing. While proportional representation is not associated with the risk that a conflict is governmental by nature, it also does not systematically influence the chance that the power status of the rebels improves following a conflict Model 3). An improved political status is, however, a consequence of the mode in which a war ended. *De facto* horizontal power sharing becomes more likely in the aftermath of a peace agreement (Model 2), but is not the systematically linked to the few instance of a rebel victory (Model 1). Note also that a conflict is more likely in ethnically relatively homogenous countries, but that the risk of a territorial conflict by comparison grows in ethnic diversity. Both fractionalization and polarization increase the risk that a country experiences this type of armed violence (Models 4 to 6). Hence, ethnically powerful minorities will rather try to control a territory than attempting to challenge the central government. The same logic that groups strategically choose the kind of conflict in which they can succeed also become obvious in the negative association of the variables *Rebel Exclusion* in the model on governmental conflict and the reverse sign in the models on territorial conflict. Model 5 also shows that *de facto* power sharing arrangements are exogenous to the conflict outcome. This means that governments only tend to accept rebels as junior or senior partners in the government if they were not entirely successful in their attempt to quell the rebellion in the first place.

The last step in our analysis is to test whether power-sharing arrangements and institutions reduce the risk of war recurrence. As Table 4 shows, such a positive influence is only visible for governmental conflicts. Promoting rebels that were marginalized before the conflict to junior or senior positions in the government reduces the risk that a conflict recurs. However, granting political autonomy to some regions or being forced to accept quasi-autonomy, increase the danger that the government finds itself in a new war with the same rebel groups. This relationship supports the concerns of some recent studies which do not support the early optimism that federal arrangements might be a pacifying force. Note finally that de jure power-sharing does not have a systematic effect on the risk of a new war at all.

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Table 4 about here
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CONCLUSION

This article has re-examined the hope advanced by many constitutional engineers that power-sharing rules increase the inclusiveness of political decision making and, by extension, help stabilizing fragile societies. Our evaluation has established severe limitations of this peace-through-power-

sharing conflict management visions. While not questioning the possibility to pacify divided countries preventively, our quantitative evaluation showed that consociationalist choices and arrangements are endogenous to the war outcome and the rules that governed the society before the armed conflict. More specifically, the analysis has demonstrated that the chance of a society opting for two key components of power-sharing, proportional representation or federalism, crucially hinges on whether or not it employed these constitutional rules already before the violence erupted. The *de facto* power of the former rebels only improved following a peace agreement and therefore a negotiated settlement of the conflict to which both sides agreed. Second, rules for horizontal power-sharing do neither affect the real inclusiveness of policy-making in the post-conflict societies nor do they reduce the risk of a war recurrence. Third, while the co-optation of rebels into the central government reduces the risk of a recurrent conflict, granting autonomy to rebel territories or accepting their de facto independence increases the risk of a civil war recurrence.

Obviously, our statistical evidence has to be taken *cum grano salis* as the number of cases examined is relatively small and as especially the number of institutional changes made in the aftermath of conflict are limited. The article nevertheless suggests that the international community should avoid recommending the adaptation of power-sharing or of some of its key components without taking stock of the dominant cleavages within a society in the first place. Power sharing might only be helpful if it softens the identification with a particular group. While this might, according to Huber[70], be a consequence of proportional representation, not all forms of territorial power-sharing might have the desired pacifying effect frequently associated with them.

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TABLES

Table 1. Analysed Dimensions of Power-Sharing

	Power-sharing Institutions (PSI)	*Power-sharing Arrangements (PSA)*
Horizontal	Proportional Representation (PR)	Inclusiveness of the central government
Vertical	*De jure* autonomy (Federalism)	De-facto political autonomy

Table 2. Summary Statistics for Electoral Systems used in Democratic Legislative and Presidential Elections after Civil Conflict, 1946 to 2009

LEGISLATIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEM	Freq.	Per cent	Cum.
Plurality and Majoritarian			
Single-Member District Plurality (SMDP)	26	26.26	26.26
Two-Round System (TRS)	2	2.02	28.28
Alternative Vote (AV)	0	0.00	28.28
Borda Count (BC)	0	0.00	28.28
Block Vote (BV)	4	4.04	32.32
Party Block Vote (PBV)	1	1.01	33.33
Limited Vote (LV)	1	1.01	34.34
Single-Non Transferable Vote (SNTV)	0	0.00	34.34
Proportional Representation			
List PR (LPR)	54	54.55	88.89
Single transferable vote (STV)	0	0.00	0.00
Mixed			
Mixed dependent	6	6.06	94.95
Mixed independent	5	5.05	100.00
N	99	100.00	
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL SYSTEM	Freq.	Per cent	Cum.
Plurality (PL)	19	35.85	35.85
Absolute Majority (AM)	17	32.08	67.92
Qualified Majority (QM)	9	16.98	84.91
Electoral College (EC)	5	9.43	94.34
Alternative Vote (AV)	3	5.66	100.00
Single Transferable Vote (STV)	0	0.00	100.00
N	53	100.00	

Source: Based on Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946-2011 (Bormann and Golder 2013) and UCDP Conflict Termination dataset v.2010-1, 1946-2009 by Kreutz (2010)

Table 3. Determinants of Changes in Power-sharing Arrangements (PSA) after Conflict and (Two-stage Probit Regression), 1946-2009

GAINED POLITICAL INCLUSION						
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Gov. Conflict	Gained Inclusion	Gov. Conflict	Gained Inclusion	Gov. Conflict	Gained Inclusion
Fractionalization	-1.323***		-1.264***		-0.259	
	(0.389)		(0.401)		(1.103)	
Polarization	-0.553		-0.634		0.661	
	(0.385)		(0.391)		(1.271)	
PR before					0.859	
					(0.678)	
Rebel Exclusion	-0.987***		-0.983***		-2.210***	
	(0.183)		(0.184)		(0.669)	
Rebel Victory		0.332				
		(0.301)				
Peace Agreement				0.472*		
				(0.280)		
PR						0.244
						(0.820)
Constant	1.542	-1.710	1.572	-1.711	0.368	-1.933
	(0.246)	(0.121)	(0.251)	(0.126)	(0.509)	(0.663)
N	393		365		52	
Log-Likelihood	-302.701		-283.670		-23.744	
Wald $\chi 2$	48.21		47.01		41.56	
Rho	0.395		0.437		0.999	
	(0.151)		(0.141)		(0.004)	
Chi^2 (Rho)	5.530		7.244		0.517	

GAINED POLITICAL AUTONOMY						
	Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	Territorial Conflict	Gained Autonomy	Territorial Conflict	Gained Autonomy	Territorial Conflict	Gained Autonomy
Fractionalization	0.753*		0.758*		0.749*	
	(0.440)		(0.439)		(0.439)	
Polarization	0.821**		0.808**		0.820**	
	(0.400)		(0.398)		(0.400)	
Federalism before	0.770***		0.767***		0.772***	
	(0.251)		(0.250)		(0.251)	
Rebel Exclusion	0.917***		0.917***		0.916***	
	(0.189)		(0.188)		(0.189)	
Rebel Victory		0.341				
		(0.304)				
Peace Agreement				0.484*		
				(0.273)		
Federalism		0.171		0.120		(0.134)
		(0.274)		(0.268)		(0.267)
Constant	-1.533	-1.744	-1.529	-1.769	-1.531	-1.686
	(0.245)	(0.140)	(0.245)	(0.142)	(0.245)	(0.122)
N	391		391		391	
Log-Likelihood	-293.152		-292.188		-293.759	
Wald $\chi 2$	55.14		54.95		53.64	
Rho	-0.480		-0.519		-0.503	
	(0.119)		(0.115)		(0.114)	
Chi^2 (Rho)	11.436		13.389		13.101	

Table 4. Determinants of War Recurrence after Conflict (Two-stage Probit Regression), 1946-2009

Governmental Conflict				
	Conflict Occurrence	Recurrence	Conflict Occurrence	Recurrence
Fractionalization	-1.823*		-1.811*	
	(0.988)		(1.003)	
Polarization	1.040		1.087	
	(0.812)		(0.823)	
PR before	0.375		0.373	
	(0.5603)		(0.558)	
Rebel Exclusion	-1.782***		-1.809***	
	(0.433)		(0 .433)	
Rebel Victory		-6.360***		
		(0.268)		
Peace Agreement				-0.199
				(0.549)
Gained Political Inclusion		-6.280***		-5.911***
		(0.276)		(0.401)
PR		0.483		0.488
		(0.526)		(0.519)
Constant	1.260	-1.679	1.232	-1.674
	(0.493)	(0.469)	(0 .499)	(0.505)
N		65		65
Log-Likelihood		-38.046		-38.335
Wald $\chi 2$		783.20		679.88
Territorial Conflict				
	Conflict Occurrence	Recurrence	Conflict Occurrence	Recurrence
Fractionalization	0.546		0.552	
	(0.457)		(0.457)	
Polarization	1.144		1.132***	
	(0.397)		(0.398)	
Federalism before	1.113***		1.110***	
	(0.253)		(0.252)	
Rebel Exclusion	0.843***		0.842***	
	(0.199)		(0.201)	
Rebel Victory		-0.586		
		(0.371)		
Peace Agreement				-0.169
				(0.356)
Gained Political Autonomy		0.734*		0.603
		(0.444)		(0.451)
Federalism		0.088		0.116
		(0.404)		(0.405)
Constant	-1.651	-1.550	-1.648	-1.572
	(0.245)	(0.124)	(0.245)	(0.125)
N		357		357
Log-Likelihood		-280.752		-281.498
Wald $\chi 2$		73.51		67.93

NOTES

[1] According to Bormann and Golder's dataset Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, , which we introduce later, Argentina used PR for the first time during the legislative elections of July 7, 1963, Sri Lanka on 15 February 1989.
[2] A. Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1977)
[3] J. Horowitz, *Power-sharing in Kenya : power-sharing agreements, negotiations and peace processes* (Oslo : Centre for the Study of Civil War, 2008); B. O'Leary, 'Debating consociational politics: normative and explanatory arguments' In *From power sharing to democracy. Post-conflict institutions in ethnically divided societies,* ed. S.J.R. Noel (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 2005); T.D. Sisk, *Power sharing and international mediation in ethnic conflicts.* (Washington, WA: United States Institute of Peace 1996); A. Wimmer, R. J. Goldstone, D. L. Horowitz, U. Joras, and C. Schetter, *Facing ethnic conflicts. Toward a new realism.* (Lanham, MD: Rowman Littlefield Publishers 2004).
[4] G. Schneider and N. Wiesehomeier, 'Rules that matter: Political institutions and the diversity-conflict nexus' *Journal of Peace Research* 45/2 (2008) pp.183-203.
[5] I.S. Lustick, D. Miodownik, and R. J. Eidelson, ' Secessionism in multicultural states: Does sharing power prevent or encourage it?' *American Political Science Review* 98/2 (2004) p.209.
[6] Lijphart (note2)
[7] P. Norris, *Driving democracy: Do power-sharing institutions work? (*New York: Cambridge University Press 2008)
[8] Horowitz (note 3); O'Leary (note3); Sisk (note 3); Wimmer (note3).
[9] Hartzell and Hoddie defined power-sharing provisions broadly as "rules that, in addition to defining how decisions will be made by groups within the polity, allocate decision-making rights, including access to state resources, among collectivities competing for power" C. Hartzell, M. Hoddie, and D. Rothchild, 'Stabilizing the peace after civil war: An investigation of some key variables' *International Organization* 55/1 (2001) pp. 183-208 p. 320. The main goal of power-sharing provisions included in peace agreements is to ensure that none of the parties has a dominant position over another, which in turn will help minimize the danger of war recurrence.
[10] Walter finds that territorial and political power-sharing pacts increase the chance that a peace agreement is both signed and implemented. Jarstad and Nilsson, as well as DeRouen et al. demonstrate that military and territorial power-sharing expands the duration of such agreements, while Hartzell and Hoddie stress that multiple power-sharing provisions in settlements play an important role in the durability of peace. B. Walter, *Committing to peace: The successful settlement of civil wars (*Princeton: Princeton University Press 2002); A. K. Jarstad and D. Nilsson, 'From words to deeds: The implementation of power-sharing pacts in peace accords' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25/3 (2008) pp. 206-23. ; K. DeRouen, L. Jenna, and P. Wallensteen. 'The duration of civil war peace agreements.' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26/4 (2009) pp. 367-87; C. Hartzell, and M.Hoodie, '*Crafting Peace: Power Sharing Institutions And the Negotiated Resolution of Civil Wars* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania University Press 2007)
[11] J.B. Adekanye, 'Power sharing in multi-ethnic political systems' , *Security Dialogue* 29/1 (1998), pp. 25-36; H. M Binningsbø, and D. Kendra, 'Using power sharing to win a war: The implementation of the Lomé agreement in Sierra Leone' *Africa Spectrum* 44/3 . (2009) pp. 87-107; A. K. Jarstad, ' The prevalence of power-sharing: Exploring the patterns of post-election peace' *Africa Spectrum* 44 /3 (2009) pp. 41-62; P. Norris, *Driving democracy: Do power-sharing institutions work? (*New York: Cambridge University Press 2008); P.G. Roeder and D. Rothchild, *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell Press 2005); J.S. Spears, 'Understanding Inclusive Peace Agreements in Africa: The Problems of Sharing Power' *Third World Quarterly* 21/1 (2000), pp. 105-118; S. Vandeginste, 'Power-sharing, conflict and transition in Burundi: Twenty years of trial and error' *Africa Spectrum* 44/3 (2009) pp. 63-86
[12] M. Reynal-Querol, 'Does democracy preempt civil wars?' *European Journal of Political Economy* 21/2 (2005) pp. 445-465
[13] J. Esteban and D.Ray, 'On the Measurement of Polarization' *Econometrica* 62/4 (1994) pp. 819-851
[14] Schneider and Wiesehomeier (note 4)

[15] D. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1985); D. Horowitz, *A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1991)
[16] Lustick et al. (note 5)
[17] J. D. Huber, 'Measuring Ethnic Voting: Do Proportional Electoral Laws Politicize Ethnicity?' *American Journal of Political Science* 56/4 (2012), pp. 986-1001
[18] This suggests in his view quite ironically that Horowitz (note 12) should have advocated proportional representation rather than vote pooling institutions in order to depoliticize ethnicity.
[19] D. Acemoglu, S. Johnson and J. A. Robinson, 'Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation' , *American Economic Review* 91/5 (2001) pp.1369-1401
[20] B. Mukherjee, 'Why political power-sharing agreements lead to enduring peaceful resolutions of some civil wars, but not on others?' *International Studies* Quarterly 50/2 (2006) pp. 479-504
[21] DeRouen, Lea, and Wallensteen.(note 10); Hartzell and Hoddie (note10); Jarstad and Nilsson, (note 10); Walter (note 10); B. Mukherjee (note 20) M. Mattes, and B. Savun, 'Fostering peace after civil war: Commitment problems and agreement design' *International Studies Quarterly* 53/3 (2009) pp. 737-59. S. Stedman, 'Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes. International Security 22/2 (1997) pp. 5-53; S.Stedman, S.John, D.Rothchild, and E.Cousins, (eds.) *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (New York: Lynne Rienner Publishers 2002). B. Walter, *Committing to peace: The successful settlement of civil wars (*Princeton: Princeton University Press 2002)
[22] R.H. Wagner, 'The Causes of Peace' In R. Licklider, *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End* (New York: New York University Press 1993) pp. 235–268
R. Licklider, 'The Consequences o, 'Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993' *American Political Science Review* 89/3 (1995) pp. 681–690.
D. Toft, *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 2010)
T.D. Mason *Sustaining the Peace after Civil War* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2007).
[23] DeRouen et al. (note 18); Mukherjee (note 22); Mattes and Savun (note 21); Hartzell and Hoodie (note 29); I. Svensson. 'Who brings which peace? neutral versus biased mediation and institutional peace arrangements in civil wars' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53/3(2009) pp. 449-69.
[24] see Schneider and Wiesehomeier (note 4); A. Mehler, 'Peace and power sharing in Africa: A not-so-obvious relationship' *African Affairs* 108/432 (2009) pp. 453-73.
[25] J. Elster 'Constitution Making in Eastern Europe' *Public Administration* 71/1-2 pp 169-217.
[26] C. Boix, 'Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies' *American Political Science Review* 93/3 (1999) pp. 609-624, for instance advocated the position that ethnic and religious fractionalization promotes the adoption of proportional representation. T. Brambor, W. Clark and M. Golder. 'Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses' *Political Analysis* 14/1 pp. 63-82 reject this result.
[27] Norris (note 6). For more about definitions and classification of different types of electoral systems see A. Reynolds, B. Reilly, and A. Ellis, International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System. (Stockholm: International IDEA Design 2005)
[28] A. Lijphart, 'Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, 2004' *Journal of Democracy* 15/2 (2004) pp. 96-109.
[29] A. Reynolds, 'Women in the Legislatures and Executives of the World' *World Politics* 51 (1999) pp. 547-72
[30] e.g., Horowitz (note 15),
[31] Norris (note 7)
[32] M. Cammett and E. Malesky, 'Power Sharing in Postconflict Societies: Implications for Peace and Governance' *Journal of Conflict Resolution December* 56/6 (2012), pp. 982-1016.,
[33] B. Reilly. *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001); B. Reilly, 'Electoral Systems for Divided Societies. *Journal of Democracy,* 13/2 (2002) pp. 156-170.
[34] Horowitz, (note 15)
[35] Q.L. Quade, 'PR and Democratic Statecraft' In L.Diamond and M.F. Plattner (eds.) *Electoral Systems and Democracy (*Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press 2006).

[36] For a more extensive discussion about the pros and cons of broad inclusion see A.K. Jarstad, 'Dilemmas of war-to-democracy transitions: theories and concepts' In A.K. Jarstad and T.Sisk *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp.17-36)
[37] T.R. Gurr *People versus states: Minorities at risk in the new century (*Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press 2000); Stedman *Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes* (note 23).
[38] D. Slater and E. Simmons, 'Coping by Colluding: Political Uncertainty and Promiscuous Powersharing in Indonesia and Bolivia' *Comparative Political Studies* (in press)
[39] A. Lijphart *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (*New Haven/London: Yale University Press 1999, p. 185).
[40] D. Treisman, *The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization (*New York: Cambridge University Press 2007)
[41] Schneider and Wiesehomeier (note 4)
[42] Hartzell and Hoddie (note 9)
[43] D.A. Lake, and D. Rothchild. Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict' *International Security* 21/2 (1996) pp. 41–75.; M. S. Saideman, D. J. Lanoue, M. Campenni and S.Stanton, 'Democratization, Political Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1985-1998.' *Comparative Political Studies* 351 (2002), pp. 103-129
[44] A. Stepan, Alfred, ' Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model' *Journal of Democracy* 10/4 (1999) pp. 22-23.
[45] N.G. Bermeo, ' The Import of Institutions' *Journal of Democracy* 13/2 (2002) pp.108.
[46] J. Bednar, Jenna, 'Federalism as a Public Good' *Constitutional Political Economy* 16/2 (2005) pp.189-205.
[47] J. Darby and J. Madhav, *Introducing the Peace Accords Matrix: A Database of Comprehensive Peace Agreement and their Implementation*, 1989-2006. (Presented at 53rd annual convention of ISA, San Diego. USA, 2012)
[48] T. Chapman and P.G. Roeder, 'Partition as a Solution to Wars of Nationalism: The Importance of Institutions The American Political Science Review 101/ 4 (2007) pp. 677-691.
[49] T. Christin and S. Hug, 'Federalism, the Geographic Location of Groups, and Conflict' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 29/1 (2012), pp. 93-122
[50] Lake and Rothchild for example find that regional autonomy can only serve as an interim solution, unclear are the long-term prospects for peace achieved initially by regional autonomy. DA Lake, D Rothchild, 'Territorial decentralization and civil war settlements' In P.G.Roeder, and D. S. Rothchild *Sustainable Peace: Power And Democracy After Civil Wars* (Cornell University Press 2005)
[51] J. Kreutz, 'How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset' *Journal of Peace Research* 47/2 (2010), pp. 243-250.
[52] The UCDP definitions are available at http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/55/55267_Codebook_UCDP_Conflict_Termination_Dataset_v_1.0.pdf
[53] Technically, the statistical analysis employs the conflict dyad as a unit of analysis. In other words, each line in our dataset is a separate conflict termination based on the UCDP dataset. As some countries experienced several, often overlapping conflicts with different rebel groups within their borders, only taking into account one conflict with one rebel group would result in the omission of many important conflict ends and the subsequent constitutional choices. An exclusive focus on particularly intensive conflicts would also bias the results as peace accords with one rebel group often overlap with continuing wars a government leads against other insurgent troops. The selection of those conflicts for which peace years do not overlap with war years of other conflicts is not a convincing choice either, since it would exclude several important conflicts from our analysis. We therefore decided to treat each conflict in our sample as equally important.
[54] N. Bormann, and M.Golder, 'Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946-2011' *Electoral Studies* (in press). The codebook is available at https://files.nyu.edu/mrg217/public/es3_codebook.pdf
[55] A. Przeworski, M.E. Alvarez, J. A. Cheibub, F. Limongi *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990* (Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy 2000); . see also J.A. Cheibub, J. Gandhi, and J.R. Vreeland, 'Democracy and dictatorship revisited' Public Choice 2010 143/1-2 (2010) pp 67-101.

[56] P. Keefer, DPI2010. *Database of Political Institutions: Changes and Variable Definitions* (Development Research Group, World Bank 2010). T. Beck, G.Clarke, A.Groff, P.Keefer and P.Walsh, 'New tools and new tests in comparative political economy: the Database of Political Institutions' *World Bank Economic Review* 15 (2001) pp. 165-176 describe an earlier version of this resource. The Institutions and Election Project (IAEP), which is described in P. M. Regan, R. W. Frank, and D. H. Clark, 'Political Institutions and Elections: New Datasets', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26/3 (2009) pp. 320–337, is available at http://www2.binghamton.edu/political-science/institutions-and-elections-project.html. Note that we used common resources like the *CIA World Factbook* to update or complement these sources where necessary.
[57] Available at www.ucdp.uu.se/database
[58] T.R. Gurr, 'Ethnic Warfare and the Changing Priorities of Global Security', *Mediterranean Quarterly* 1/1 (1990) pp. 82-98; R. Licklider, *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End* (New York: New York Univeristy Press 1993); C. Kaufmann, Chaim, 'Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars', *International Security* 20/4 (1996) pp. 136-175.
[59] Hartzell et al. (note 9)
[60] Horowitz *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (note15)
[61] I.A. Elbadawi, Ibrahim, *Civil wars and poverty: The role of external interventions, political rights and economic growth* (Paper presented at the World Bank's Conference on "Civil Conflicts, Crime and Violence," February, Washington, DC. 1999)
[62] for example J.G. Montalvo and M. Reynal-Querol, 'Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars' *UPF Economics and Business Working Paper* 770 (2004)
[63] A.O. Hirschman, 'The Paternity of an Index' *The American Economic Review* 54/5 (1964) pp. 761.
[64] Esteban and Ray (note 13)
[65] Reynal-Querol (note 9); J. Esteban and G.Schneider, ' Polarization and Conflict: Theoretical and Empirical Issues *Journal of Peace Research* 45/2 (2008) pp. 131-141, among others, provide a non-technical introduction to these measures.
[66] We used the EPR-ETH data (Version 2.0) that is available in research-ready country-year and group-year format from the GROW^{up} Research Front-End data portal, at http://www.icr.ethz.ch/data/growup/epr-eth
[67] The first presidential elections also relied most often on the same rules. Interestingly, however, Argentina changed its electoral system three times after violent internal episodes: from Plurality (PL) to Electoral College (EC) in 1958, from EC to Absolute Majority (AM), and again to EC in 1983. We find one change from Plurality to Absolute Majority (Columbia, 1994) and one from Qualified Majority (QM) to AM (Guatemala, 1999) respectively.
[68] See Schneider and Wiesehomeier (fn. XX)
[69] Conflicts with NMSP (1 January 1959—31 December 1963) and SNUF (1 January 1962—31 December 1963) in Myanmar led to separatist autonomy of Mons and Shans, or conflict with MIM in the Philippines to separatist autonomy of Moro ethnic group.
[70] Huber (note 17)