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# **The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on the Internal Functioning of the EU: Why so much Continuity?**

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## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

In early August 2010 the Slovak National Council rejected bilateral loans for supporting Greece. This incited Commissioner Olli Rehn to speak of a “breach of solidarity within the Eurozone”. In 2009, the ratification of the Lisbon treaty was slowed down by the hesitant Presidents of the Czech Republic and Poland, creating uncertainty on the institutional future of the Union. Examples as such seem to suggest that decision-making in the European Union (EU) might have become more problematic after the accession of ten plus two new member states in 2004 and 2007. Political pundits take such incidents as confirmations of their pessimist expectations on Eastern enlargement. But also in academia, different analysts had previously formulated pessimist expectations on the EU’s capacity to act with 27 quite diverse member states. There was fear of increasing gridlock in a system already before paralyzed by the joint decision trap (Scharpf 2006). In contrast, today most empirical literature on enlargement highlights that decision-making in the EU has not become a lot more cumbersome after enlargement and such events as described above are rather rare exceptions. Hardly has any evidence for increasing gridlock in the EU been presented, especially when focusing on day to day EU decision-making. Against the backdrop of theoretical expectations, this finding however is surprising. In this short article, echoing Tullock (1981) I therefore here address the question of why we find so much continuity after enlargement.

The article is structured as follows. I first briefly review some core theoretical expectations about enlargement effects. Then I report the most prominent empirical assessments of EU decision-making after enlargement. Basically, there is a gap between the theoretical expectations and the empirical observations. I then turn to my analysis of this puzzle. The analysis is divided into two parts. First I report qualitative assessments on Eastern enlargement collected in open interviews with experts from member state representatives in Brussels and Commission officials. I group these assessments in different categories relating to institutions, norms, behavior and preferences. I then focus on the issue of preferences by analyzing a new dataset on post-enlargement EU decision-making. This dataset collected for the project “Does Group Size Matter? European Governance after Enlargement” is a continuation of the data collection presented by Thomson et al. (2006). I here analyze the structure of member state preferences after enlargement. Have the preferences in the EU become more heterogeneous with the accession of twelve new member states? And do the preferences of the new member states really make decision-making more difficult.

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<sup>1</sup> The data used in this article was collected in the context of a research project on EU policy-making after enlargement by Robin Hertz, Thomas Jensen, Manuel Schmitz and the author. The support by the Swiss National Science Foundation as well as the generosity of the Brussels experts to participate in our interviews is greatly acknowledged.

Against the backdrop of theoretical expectations a scenario of continuity is more than a negative finding. Methodologically and theoretically, however, analyzing continuity is demanding. If no changes in the dependent variable are recorded, how can one identify causal mechanisms? If the theories give us good grounds to expect change we have to ask which expectations did not hold and why? Were the theories wrong – and if yes, in which respect –, were certain conditions not met, is the measurement faulty or do other mechanisms counteract the expectations? I propose that various factors together account for the functioning of the EU's political system and mono-causal explanations seem too simple to fully explain the development of the complex macro structure that we observe in EU post-enlargement decision-making.

## **Literature Review**

Starting from a European Community of six in the 1950s the community project has in the meanwhile grown to an EU27. Especially Eastern enlargement has raised many concerns by practitioners and academics alike on the EU's capacity to act. In political science, the clearest expectations about the consequences of enlargement were formulated by rationalist analysts. For instance, it was argued that the inclusion of many new and rather diverse member states would lead to an increase of transaction costs (cf. Scharpf 2006). Similarly, from the perspective of club theory, enlargement was expected to increase crowding cost (cf. Schimmelfennig 2003: 21-27). The production of collective goods was expected to become more problematic since one could expect a increased possibility to free-ride (Koremenos et al. 2001). Furthermore, enlargement was said to cause additional problems of distribution. Since most of the new member states are comparatively poor countries, enlargement should entail distributive conflicts between old recipients and new demanders and between net-contributors and net-receivers (Zimmer et al. 2005). Others expected policy stability to rise due to a growth of heterogeneity (König and Bräuninger 2004; Kerremans 1998). This expectation is based on a spatial logic as contained in veto player theory (Tsebelis 2002). For instance, Tsebelis and Yataganas (2002) suggest that "policy stability in Europe is likely to increase significantly as a result of enlargement and of the Nice treaty." A-priori-voting power theory – although based on a different logic – similarly expects policy stability to rise after enlargement due to a reduced passage probability (Baldwin et al. 1997). Thus beyond a few exceptions – notably Steunenberg (2002) did not expect large changes in qualified majority voting – there was a general agreement that Eastern enlargement should make EU decision-making more difficult. Policy stability was expected to rise after enlargement.

Interestingly, most empirical research, however, suggests a less pessimist reading of enlargement (cf. Dehousse et al. 2006; Best et al. 2008; Bailer et al. 2009; Pollack 2009). As to the Council, little evidence of changing decision-making behavior has been presented so far. Studies on voting behavior by Hagemann (2008), Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse (2007) and Mattila (2009) show that the amount of negative votes has not increased after enlargement. On the basis of a spatial roll call model Mattila (2009), however, shows that after enlargement in addition to the well-know north-south cleavage, there is now a new east-west pattern of voting behavior. Such a pattern is also confirmed by network data presented by Naurin and Lindahl (2008). Thomson (2009), too, analyzes actor alignments in the enlarged EU. He uses information on the positions of all member states with the help of an extended version of the decision-making in the EU dataset (cf. Thomson et al. 2006). He finds that the new member states are rather in favor of national autonomy in issues related to harmonization. New member states, however, strongly support redistributive policies as compared to the old member states. In fact, they align more closely with the old Southern member states in such policies against the Northern member states. In a quantitative analysis of legislative output in the European Union, Robin Hertz and I find that only the number of directives shrinks with a growing number of member states in the EU (Hertz and Leuffen 2009). In a different contribution we show that the performance of formal models of decision-making does not substantively change after enlargement; in particular, the compromise model still performs best (cf. Hertz and Leuffen 2010). Similar patterns of continuity are found for the European Parliament by Hix and Noury (2009) and for the Commission by Peterson and Birdsall (2008).

These finding thus contrast the expectations formulated in the theoretical literature. Therefore, I will in the following address the issue of why we observe so much continuity after enlargement. I will first draw on qualitative assessments of practitioners in Brussels before analyzing a new data-set on EU-decision-making.

### **Assessment of Enlargement Effects by Administrative Experts**

From January to May 2009 we conducted 50 interviews with member state representatives and Commission officials in Brussels. The interviews started with a structured part – closely modeled on the methodology introduced by Thomson et al. (2006) – to then be followed by an open part in which the respondents were invited to share their ideas on enlargement effects. I will first refer to this qualitative part before turning to the analysis of the quantitative data.

The assessments of the experts can be grouped into three categories relating to institutions, preferences, norms and behavior.

### *Institutions*

In line with classic sociological theories on group size (Simmel 1908; Weber 1921), many of our respondents referred to institutional responses to the accession of the new member states to the European Union. Whereas formal institutional adjustments already prepared the ground for enlargement as highlighted by the intergovernmental conferences of Amsterdam, Nice and the Constitutional Treaty Reforms, after enlargement numerous respondents detected a move towards a growing informalization of EU decision-making. Some respondents found that there is more coordination going on between the member states and the Commission even before proposals are submitted. Also, the number of trilogues – uniting Council, European Parliament and Commission experts in an early stage of the co-decision procedure has increased in the past years. Accordingly, in the literature it has been argued that the percentage of acts passed after first reading has increased after enlargement (cf. Pollack 2009: 242). This finding highlights that the policy makers have found new ways of coordinating EU decision-making. Our respondents underlined the difficulties of the classic *tour de table* with 27 member states that wisely already had been simplified before enlargement. Today the policy positions are mostly coordinated informally before the formal meetings take place. This reduces unnecessary repetitions. Also the actors are described to be more focused in the debates because of their awareness of the more complex structure. There are more informal meetings in order to cope with the increased transaction costs. The growing number of meetings leads to a partial reduction of the decision-making speed as a consequence of enlargement as already suggested by Schulz and König (2000). Despite a partial slowing down, the increased coordination efforts according to our interviewees allow a continued decision-making after enlargement.

### *Norms and behavior*

Many authors have referred to the importance of informal norms in everyday EU decision-making (cf. Heisenberg 2005; Lewis 2010). From this perspective, we were interested in knowing whether the new member states adapted to existing norms of EU decision-making. First research on post-enlargement voting behavior does not indicate a change of voting behavior, consensual decision-making still is the rule and the new member states do not vote negative more often than the old member states (Hagemann 2008; Mattila 2009). Some interviewees however underlined that some of the new member states needed some time before completely understanding the functioning of qualified majority voting. A member of the Swedish Permanent Representation, for instance, found that Poland initially pushed very hard for its positions. Others, however, underlined that the new

member states in general acted rather hesitantly at the beginning and were not as active as the old member states. Some interviewees believed that the new member states interacted closer with the Commission and often followed its assessments of issues.

The experience of holding the Council presidency was described as extremely informative by observers from the new member states. So far, only Slovakia held the Council presidency in spring 2008 and the Czech Republic in spring 2009. Participants found that during the Council presidency they learned how the game is actually played in Brussels. A member of the Slovak Permanent Representation remembers: "The presidency for us was the best experience. You really get the insights and inlook from the backup machinery. [...] And it gives you a weight as well." Such processes of adaptation take time, but the new member state representatives are generally described as willing to learn and accept the community norms.

### *Preferences*

Together with institutions, preferences are a key component of policy-making (Plott 1991). In the literature on the EU, there is an ongoing debate on how best to explain the preferences of the member states and about the actor alignments in the EU (Aspinwall 2007; Thomson et al. 2004; Moravcsik 1998). Whereas some authors stress the integration-independence dimension (Garrett 1992; Crombez 1996), others argue that partisan politics may play a role in the EU too (Hix et al. 2007; Hix 2008). While regional patterns of a north-south cleavage have been identified in the past (Naurin and Lindahl 2008; Thomson et al. 2004; Mattila 2009), it has widely been asked how the new member states integrate into the existing structures. It has been argued that the selection criteria and the accession process were supposed to guarantee some correspondence between the preferences of new and old member states (Plümper et al. 2005).

In fact, the issue of preferences was often raised in our interviews. For instance, national experts for the common fisheries policy maintain that in this sector the split is rather between landlocked and non-landlocked countries than between new and old member states. Only because there are now more landlocked countries in the EU after Eastern enlargement are there some differences for instance in the direction of a stronger focus on aquaculture. Commission experts mentioned that they had the impression that the new member states often appeared as less protectionist than the old member states which facilitated the passing of decisions from the Commission's perspective.

In the following I will turn to a new dataset covering the preferences of the 27 member states as well as the Commission and the European Parliament and analyze how the new member states relate to the old member states in terms of preferences. A similar type of data so far have only been explored by Thomson (2009). I here judge a direct measure of preferences to be superior to deduced preferences from voting behavior. I ask whether the new member states act as outliers in terms of preferences? How have alignments developed after enlargement and how has the Council heterogeneity changed after enlargement?

### *Data*

Our interviews and the resulting data structure follow the methodology proposed in Thomson et al. (2006). Using information from *Agence Europe* and other public sources, we first identified controversial proposals that had been proposed after the 2004 enlargement. Note that in order to test decision-making models it is necessary to work with controversial issues, while this does not inform about the representativeness of the cases selected. We selected cases that were formally passed in 2008 in order to minimize the time between our interviews and the negotiations in the Council. This should maximize the validity of our measurement. In the interviews we asked policy experts from member state representations and Commission experts that had followed the specific dossiers to identify and explain the controversial issues of a given proposal. We then demanded of the respondents to order the preferences of all member states, the Commission and the European Parliament on a policy space ranging from 0 to 100. This range is formed by the most extreme positions held by the actors as well as the reversion point – defined as the fallback solution in case of a failure of passing the act – and the outcome. We conducted 55 interviews on 19 proposals. In total 48 issues were identified as controversial in our interviews. More detailed introductions to this methodology with the use of examples can be found in Thomson et al. (2006) or Thomson (2009).

### *Analysis of Preference Data*

Our data-set allows a detailed analysis of member state preferences on controversial issues after enlargement. I will in the following provide some descriptive statistics in order to compare the preferences of old and new member states. A good starting point is to compare how far the positions of the twelve new and the fifteen old member states fall from the reference point. The reference point in most cases is equivalent to the status quo. I use the distance of a position to the reference point as a measure of policy stability (cf. Tsebelis 2002). I assume that the closer an actor aligns to

the status quo, the less reform-friendly that actor is. Given that the new member states already had to enact numerous reforms in order to meet the requirements of the *acquis communautaire*, one could expect those member states to display a certain reform fatigue after accession to the EU. Accordingly they should on average position themselves closer to the reference point than the old member states. However, when comparing the positions over the 48 issues contained in our data set, this cannot be confirmed. On average the new member states have a distance to the reference point of 44 scale points as compared to 46 for the old member states. This should not be considered a substantial difference.

The average between the positions of the new and old member states on individual issues is 12 scale points, with a standard deviation of 10. Only for two of the 48 issues the average new member state is more than 30 scale points away from the average old member state. Commission proposal COM (2004) 835 relates to the setting up of the visa information system (VIS) and the particular issue concerns the rollout of the VIS. Since the new member states expect higher costs of a complete and immediate implementation – many new member states have borders with non-EU states – they are in favor of a successive implementation. This is thus a cost-related issue. The second issue (COM (2006) 636) concerns the scope of the ban on metallic mercury. This is a technical issue with economic impacts. It does not represent an issue that seems closely related to an integration dimension.

	Scale Points
Av. distance to reference point EU15	46
Av. distance to reference point new MS	44
Average distance new vs. old MS	12
Average distance new MS vs. EC6	16
Average distance new MS vs. UK	24
Av. Standard Deviation EU27	24
Av. Standard Deviation EU15	26

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of dataset. Numbers relate to the scale 0 to 100.

When comparing the standard deviations over all issues for the EU27 with those for the subset of the EU15, I find that the average standard deviation is smaller for the EU27. That means that the average heterogeneity has not increased by adding the twelve new member states. This is an important finding since an increase of heterogeneity is usually linked to an increase of policy stability (Tsebelis



2002). Thus if the preference heterogeneity is not substantively increased, there is no reason to expect more policy gridlock.

What can be said about the location of the new member states vis-à-vis other member states? In the accession negotiations the UK supported the accession of the Eastern European member states (cf. Schimmelfennig 2001). Given their often presumed liberal orientation one could expect that the new member states align more closely with the UK than with the founding members of the European Community, i.e. the EC6. Again, this is not confirmed by our data. On average the new member states are 24 points away from the UK, as compared to 16 points from the EC6. There thus is no evidence of a particularly close relation between the UK and the new member states.

In order to get a better understanding of how the different countries' positions relate to one another table 1 in the annex lists the correlation coefficients of country positions over all issues of our dataset. In order to facilitate the read, I have marked those correlation coefficients that are above 0.5 in red and those that extent 0.7 in green. There are some aspects that merit attention. There are countries that are highly correlated with other countries and countries that are not highly correlated with other countries. Notably France and Hungary, but also Spain, Portugal, Italy and Germany are only weakly correlated to most other states. The three Baltic countries are strongly correlated with each other and they seem in line with most Northern European states as well as with most other new member states. Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, Finland and Romania display a medium to high level of correlations with other countries.

Since the interpretation of such a table is difficult, I in the following apply a technique called multidimensional scaling. This method represents measurements of similarity (or dissimilarity) among pairs of objects as distances between points of a low-dimensional multidimensional space (Borg and Groenen 2005: 3). An often cited illustrative example is the problem of generating a map from distance data between cities (cf. Kruskal and Wish 1978). A map visually displays the geometric configuration in a two-dimensional space. Similarly, in the EU literature multidimensional scaling is used for visualizing alignments between actors' positions and voting behavior (cf. Thomson et al. 2004; Thomson 2009; Mattila and Lane 2001). While multidimensional scaling allows to visualize a "hidden structure" of a data – provided such a structure exists – it is often more difficult to interpret the substantive meaning behind the dimensions. The scales as such do not convey a specific meaning and demand interpretation by the analyst.

I used classical metric multidimensional scaling for generating the following plot. City-block or so-called Manhattan distances are computed that simply sum of the absolute differences in the attributes. In this case, city-block distances increase the fit of the model as compared to Euclidian

distances. In order to evaluate how well multidimensional scaling represents the distances in our data, I use 'stress' (cf. Kruskal and Wish 1978), a numerical measure of the badness-of-fit. I first tried a reduction to two-dimensions. However, with a stress value of 0.28 two dimensions do not seem to adequately represent the data in the matrix. Adding a third dimension improves the stress value to 0.16 which is satisfactory and underlines that three dimension should be preferred to two.<sup>2</sup> Figure 1 is a visualization of the first and second dimensions.




Figure 1: Classical metric multidimensional scaling of member states (2 of 3 dimensions visualized; Stress 0.16).

Figure 1 shows that the new member states are broadly located in a triangle formed by the UK and Sweden, France and the Southern Member states of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. Cyprus and Malta fall more closely to this cluster of Southern nations. Poland slightly tends towards France. The Commission and the European Parliament fall apart from all member states. The plot highlights that the new member states do not form a new block beyond the scope of the old member states on the issues contained in our dataset. Since our case selection is based on controversial cases, it seems fair to assume that the finding might hold more generally. The accession of the new member states has not stretched the EU member states' preference space. However, I so far have not disaggregated this data in to different policy areas or types of issues. Thomson (2009) using a slightly larger dataset on

<sup>2</sup> The Shepard diagram additionally confirms that the distances between the points correspond to the proximities rather well.

post-enlargement policy making finds some new alliances between old Southern and the new Eastern member states on issues relating to financial subsidies. However, in accordance with my findings, he does not generally provide evidence for the new member states acting as outliers.

As to the voting behavior the new member states do not behave differently than the old member states in our dataset. There are hardly any negative votes; if at all Malta is an outlier with negative votes on two proposals. Denmark once votes negative – on COM (2007) 372 on the common organization of the market in wine, mostly for ideational reasons. The UK, Finland, Austria, Italy and Estonia abstain once. This finding confirms the high degree of consensus detected in the literature (cf. Mattila 2009; Mattila and Lane 2001; Hagemann 2008). Our data thus provides no evidence for different voting behavior after enlargement. The new member states broadly seem to adhere to the consensus norm (cf. Lewis 2005). This is all the more surprising since we selected such proposals that initially were identified as controversial.

## **Conclusion**

In this paper I analyze the internal functioning of the European Union after Eastern enlargement. Starting from the puzzling observation that Eastern enlargement went on more smoothly than initially expected by most practitioners and analysts, I here combine qualitative and quantitative information on post enlargement governance. I find that answering the complex question of continuity after enlargement demands more than a mono-causal theory. In fact, more factors seem to contribute to enabling the EU to move and act after enlargement.

First, institutional adjustments can allow decision-making processes to function even if a group grows in size. While the results of the Amsterdam and Nice intergovernmental conferences were often described as lagging behind the expectations and goals set out beforehand, informal adjustments after enlargement allowed the coordination of policy positions in the Council preparatory groups. Informal meetings of experts allow policy coordination. The *tour de table* has been abolished and bundled positions are presented in the Council and in Coreper. There is also more informal coordination going on between the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission. While enlargement might have led to higher transaction costs (Coase 1960: 15), actors find new channels for coordinating policies, allowing effective decision-making.

Second, the new member states have generally adapted to the modes of behavior of the old EU15. Through the long accession negotiations they have become familiar with the practices of EU decision-making. For instance, they too adhere to the consensus norm and voting behavior has not

significantly changed after enlargement. The new member states are often described as pragmatic and solution-oriented. In the first years they needed to become even more acquainted with the practices of EU decision-making. In our interviews the formative experience of holding a Council presidency was often underlined.

Third, the analysis of member state preferences revealed that the new member states do not form a new block that generally increases the heterogeneity of the Council. This may come as a surprise given the different economic and cultural background of these countries. At the same time, it again highlights the difficulties of understanding the preferences in EU policy-making. If heterogeneity is not substantively increased through enlargement there is no reason to expect an enormous increase of policy stability. Whether the Commission anticipates conflicts and the EU now plays new and simpler tunes (Downs and Rocke 1995), of course, so far remains an open question. For instance, one Commission official argued: "But maybe an explanation is that certain proposals are either not put on the table, or are put on the table in a different form, taking out controversial aspects because the Commission expects that otherwise they will not get through." In this analysis, I have not analyzed whether the outcomes of policy-making are more status-quo oriented than without the new member states.

In my analysis, I have not disaggregated our data to different policy areas given the still relatively small number of issues. However, the analysis of Thomson (2009) shows that this is potentially the way forward. Perhaps some issue areas might have become more problematic after enlargement. I here have focused on the aggregate level.

My general assessment of enlargement highlights that the accession of twelve new member states has not led to increasing gridlock in the EU. In the perspective of future enlargements it seems important to maintain the high standards of accession criteria. The Copenhagen criteria and the adoption of the *acquis communautaire* still form a good basis for enabling successful cooperating and integration of new member states.

## Appendix

	AU	BEL	DK	FIN	FRA	D	GR	IRE	IT	LUX
AU	1									
BEL	0.5316	1								
DK	0.537	0.5799	1							
FIN	0.6307	0.5893	0.6451	1						
FRA	0.2998	0.3439	0.3574	0.2275	1					
D	0.4511	0.3727	0.6731	0.4687	0.4568	1				
GR	0.3126	0.2825	0.2678	0.1788	0.2104	0.1309	1			
IRL	0.5281	0.4804	0.5998	0.5801	0.3852	0.4528	0.1324	1		
IT	0.2387	0.0888	0.301	0.1778	0.3367	0.4781	0.6213	0.2527	1	
LUX	0.7563	0.5831	0.5315	0.59	0.2198	0.5767	0.3418	0.4001	0.3663	1
NL	0.5885	0.4744	0.5701	0.6472	0.3535	0.4901	0.1831	0.5858	0.2057	0.5822
POR	0.2597	0.3397	0.2872	0.2296	0.4581	0.143	0.6868	0.2643	0.5098	0.2021
SP	0.3044	0.3179	0.2826	0.2146	0.1118	0.278	0.6352	0.2157	0.4573	0.3949
SW	0.6202	0.6261	0.7118	0.8689	0.2092	0.4349	0.1377	0.5883	0.0499	0.5706
UK	0.4729	0.3913	0.6146	0.5788	0.41	0.5391	0.1683	0.6998	0.2009	0.5342
PL	0.6134	0.407	0.447	0.5366	0.249	0.215	0.5481	0.5371	0.4486	0.4459
HU	0.2955	0.3049	0.1624	0.2539	0.1817	0.0916	0.152	0.4416	0.1682	0.2127
CZ	0.7445	0.5172	0.5767	0.593	0.312	0.392	0.1076	0.7015	0.0684	0.5766
SK	0.8626	0.5542	0.6243	0.6608	0.2758	0.514	0.2779	0.5928	0.2147	0.7751
SLOV	0.6957	0.3837	0.4831	0.4523	0.3183	0.5493	0.2627	0.3927	0.2777	0.717
LAT	0.7448	0.5684	0.5427	0.6667	0.2789	0.4131	0.2986	0.5646	0.2676	0.6406
LIT	0.7185	0.5243	0.5625	0.702	0.2978	0.4382	0.4142	0.5353	0.3817	0.6454
EST	0.7325	0.5345	0.564	0.7244	0.2628	0.4435	0.3443	0.5145	0.3534	0.6962
MAL	0.5545	0.3601	0.3825	0.4115	0.4368	0.3151	0.5884	0.4267	0.5509	0.5168
CYP	0.5774	0.3501	0.3372	0.456	0.2595	0.4139	0.4952	0.4469	0.507	0.5694
ROM	0.7867	0.552	0.5938	0.6611	0.3296	0.4367	0.3753	0.523	0.324	0.7131
BUL	0.6494	0.3455	0.4506	0.4413	0.1257	0.2845	0.1983	0.3713	0.0992	0.5636

	NL	POR	SP	SWE	UK	POL	HUN	CZ	SK	SLOV
NL	1									
POR	0.2612	1								
SP	0.2376	0.6	1							
SWE	0.6192	0.1673	0.1075	1						
UK	0.685	0.1456	0.227	0.6023	1					
POL	0.4463	0.4813	0.4041	0.467	0.4551	1				
HUN	0.4865	0.1354	0.2184	0.2448	0.3735	0.497	1			
CZ	0.5847	0.1364	0.2195	0.5839	0.6116	0.4787	0.3979	1		
SK	0.6148	0.2397	0.358	0.6414	0.5901	0.5975	0.3113	0.8149	1	
SLOV	0.4991	0.1841	0.3484	0.4389	0.5293	0.4506	0.292	0.6525	0.787	1
LAT	0.6643	0.2826	0.2964	0.6333	0.6033	0.7839	0.4144	0.6268	0.799	0.576
LIT	0.6563	0.3664	0.339	0.6092	0.6016	0.8341	0.4036	0.6147	0.7853	0.6075
EST	0.642	0.3315	0.2923	0.6415	0.584	0.8036	0.416	0.6155	0.7804	0.6365
MAL	0.4162	0.5142	0.3004	0.4362	0.3624	0.62	0.404	0.3395	0.4884	0.4395

CYP	0.3812	0.3766	0.4449	0.4215	0.3816	0.5936	0.4689	0.4413	0.6251	0.5992
ROM	0.6401	0.339	0.2402	0.6405	0.5625	0.7226	0.3616	0.6871	0.8486	0.7508
BUL	0.4198	0.1688	0.2489	0.5454	0.435	0.5118	0.2138	0.6404	0.7878	0.7299

	LAT	LIT	EST	MAL	CYP	ROM	BUL
LAT	1						
LIT	0.9347	1					
EST	0.9155	0.9431	1				
MAL	0.5245	0.4953	0.5237	1			
CYP	0.522	0.507	0.5029	0.802	1		
ROM	0.8716	0.8584	0.9088	0.5873	0.5642	1	
BUL	0.6481	0.6377	0.6595	0.3127	0.4231	0.7799	1

Table A1: Country correlation coefficients. Marked red when corr. coeff.  $\geq 0.5$  and green when corr. coeff.  $\geq 0.7$ .

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