Aktuelle Publikationen

Frauen sind im Bundestag unterrepräsentiert, insbesondere unter Parteien in und rechts der Mitte. Quotenregeln als vieldiskutierte Lösung greifen jedoch stark in die Freiheiten von Parteien, Kandidat*innen und Wähler*innen ein. Die Option offener Wahllisten hingegen findet wenig Aufmerksamkeit, obwohl sie verfassungsrechtliche Grundsatzprobleme vermeiden würde. Wir untersuchen daher, wie viele Wählerinnen und wie viele Wähler – insgesamt und nach Partei – in Deutschland auf offenen Listen für Kandidatinnen stimmen würden. Theoretisch erwarten wir, dass insbesondere Wählerinnen, Wähler*innen linker Parteien und Wähler*innen mit hoher Themensalienz bezüglich Geschlechtergerechtigkeit Präferenzen für Kandidatinnen ausdrücken. Zudem erwarten wir, dass Wähler*innen ungleich besetzte Listen tendenziell in Richtung Parität ausgleichen. Unser Forschungsdesign basiert auf einem Online-Umfrageexperiment (N=2640) mit einer quotenrepräsentativen Stichprobe der deutschen Wahlbevölkerung. Befragte wählten zwischen Listen der im Bundestag vertretenen Parteien, mit je vier fiktiven Kandidat*innen. Der Frauenanteil auf jeder Liste variierte zufällig zwischen 25 und 75 %, ebenso ob Listen geschlossen oder offen präsentiert wurden. Wir zeigen, dass Wähler wie Wählerinnen das Kandidat*innengeschlecht gemäß oben genannter theoretischer Erwartungen in ihre Wahlentscheidung einfließen lassen. Unsere Ergebnisse lassen damit vermuten, dass Kandidatinnen aufgrund ihres Geschlechts wohl insgesamt kaum benachteiligt würden, es aber Subgruppen in der Bevölkerung gibt, die sich bewusst für männliche Politiker entscheiden (Wähler der FDP, Wählerinnen der AfD). Insgesamt zeigt unser Beitrag, dass offene Listenwahlsysteme es Wähler*innen nicht nur ermöglichen, ihre Präferenzstimme im Sinne von Geschlechterrepräsentation einzusetzen, sondern dass Wähler*innen diese Möglichkeit auch nutzen. Hervorzuheben ist dabei auch die Tendenz, dass Wähler*innen über Parteielektorate hinweg ungleiche Listenvorschläge der Selektorate ausbalancieren. Die Debatte zur Reform des Wahlrechts sollte einer Einführung offener Listen deshalb mehr Beachtung schenken.

What are the distributional implications of European institutional integration? This article argues that European institutional integration exerts a moderating effect on the relationship between trade union strength and income inequality—particularly inequality at the top—within countries of the European Union (EU). I contend that European institutional integration reduces the bargaining power of trade unions due to rising market competition and decreasing union control over the supply of labor. Thus, the effectiveness of trade unions in reducing inequality should decline with progressing European institutional integration. On the basis of a long-term within-country analysis of the EU15, I will show that the effect of trade unions on inequality varies strongly with European institutional integration. Consistent with the theoretical argument, the inequality-reducing effect of trade unions becomes substantially lower the more a country integrates in the EU.

When member states contest policymaking in international organizations, some international public administrations (IPAs) react in a conciliatory way while others are adversarial. This article argues that IPAs’ dependence on contesting states, their policymaking authority, and affectedness from contestation shape communicative responses. A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 32 cases of contestation by the Trump administration indicates that IPAs yield when they are constrained by dependence on the United States or have no incentive to defend themselves. IPAs fend off contestation when they are unconstrained and incentivized by attacks on an international organizations’s polity, the bureaucracy, or policies in whose making they were substantially involved.

This article introduces CShapes 2.0, a GIS dataset that maps the borders of states and dependent territories from 1886 through 2019. Our dataset builds on the previous CShapes dataset and improves it in two ways. First, it extends temporal coverage from 1946 back to the year 1886, which followed the Berlin Conference on the partition of Africa. Second, the new dataset is no longer limited to independent states, but also maps the borders of colonies and other dependencies, thereby providing near complete global coverage of political units throughout recent history. This article explains the coding procedure, provides a preview of the dataset and presents three illustrative applications.

How does ballot structure affect party choice? We argue that open lists undermine the electoral support of cohesive parties, to the benefit of internally divided parties. We conduct a survey-embedded experiment in the aftermath of the European migrant crisis, presenting German voters with real parties but fictitious politicians. A crossover design varies ballot type and exposure to candidate positions on immigration. We find that the internally divided Christian Democrats gain votes at the expense of the cohesive Alternative for Germany when open lists are used and candidate positions are known. For individuals who are equally attracted to both parties, switching is most likely if their immigration preferences lie near the midpoint between the two parties. Overall, our analysis establishes conditions under which ballot structure can affect the electoral performance of parties in general, and that of the populist right in particular.

How does European integration affect the welfare state? This paper argues that European integration has non-complementary consequences for the political economy of welfare spending: European economic integration increases popular demand for social spending, whereas European political integration decreases the supply of social spending. Thus, the conflicting implications of European integration essentially break the link between social policy preferences and social policy. Using statistical models that deal with the multilevel structure of the theoretical argument, we find a positive relationship between economic integration and support for social policy. In the second part of the empirical analysis, dynamic model specifications at the country level show that higher levels of political integration are associated with lower levels of social spending. Furthermore, we provide evidence that social policy responsiveness declines as political integration increases.

The European Union, the United Nations, and the United States frequently use economic sanctions. This article introduces the EUSANCT Dataset—which amends, merges, and updates some of the most widely used sanctions databases—to trace the evolution of sanctions after the Cold War. The dataset contains case-level and dyadic information on 326 threatened and imposed sanctions by the EU, the UN, and the US. We show that the usage and overall success of sanctions have not grown from 1989 to 2015 and that while the US is the most active sanctioner, the EU and the UN appear more successful.

Researchers on inequalities in representation debate about whether governments represent the preferences of the rich better than those of less affluent citizens. We argue that problems of high‐ and low‐status citizens are treated differently already at the agenda‐setting stage. If affluent and less affluent citizens have different priorities about which issues should be tackled by government, then these divergent group priorities explain why government favors high‐ over low‐status citizens. Due to different levels of visibility, resources and social ties, governments pay more attention to what high‐status citizens consider important in their legislative agenda and pay less attention to the issues of low‐status citizens. We combined three types of data for our research design. First, we extracted the policy priorities (most important issues) for all status groups from Eurobarometer data between 2002 and 2016 for 10 European countries and match this information with data on policy outcomes from the Comparative Agendas Project. We then strengthen our results using a focused comparison of three single country studies over longer time series. We show that a priority gap exists and has representational consequences. Our analysis has important implications for the understanding of the unequal representation of status groups as it sheds light on an important, yet so far unexplored, aspect of the political process. Since the misrepresentation of political agendas occurs at the very beginning of the policy‐making process, the consequences are potentially even more severe than for the unequal treatment of preferences.

Does endorsing an Islamist agenda protect a candidate involved in corruption from negative voter evaluations? The corruption literature suggests that voter reactions to corruption are not unbiased and as such Islamist agendas could potentially mitigate the negative effects of a corruption scandal, especially in religious societies. The political Islam literature suggests that endorsing an Islamist agenda would not shield corrupt politicians from negative reactions of the voters. We directly answer this question through 2 nationally representative survey experiments in the world’s most populous Muslim democracy Indonesia. Our findings are 2-fold. First, Islamist agendas, in general, have only little effects on voter support for a candidate. Second, voters punish corrupt candidates equally, regardless whether or not they endorse an Islamist agenda.

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